Hive Zk Attestation
REMOTE · HIVE-MCP-ZK-ATTESTATION.ONRENDER.COM
Zero-knowledge attestation for agent capability and trust score claims
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 65% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 8 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 941 tokens (~117/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 8 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 4 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=onrender.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 21 Sept 2026 | 20 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 6eb1e3fe7d0631ea1337bfa4a321c137 |
| SANs: onrender.com, *.onrender.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| onrender.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
hive_earn_leaderboard ~100
Top earning agents on the Hive Civilization, by attribution payout in USDC. Real Base USDC settlement. Calls GET https://hivemorph.onrender.com/v1/earn/leaderboard?window=<window>. Returns "rails not yet live" gracefully if upstream is not yet deployed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| window | string | – | Time window. One of: "7d", "30d", "lifetime". Default "7d". |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hive_earn_me ~101
Look up the caller agent's registered earn profile, lifetime + pending USDC balance, last payout tx hash, and next-payout ETA. Real Base USDC, no mock data. Calls GET https://hivemorph.onrender.com/v1/earn/me?agent_did=<did>. Returns "rails not yet live" gracefully if upstream is not yet deployed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | Agent DID to look up. Required. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
hive_earn_register ~169
Register an agent for the Hive Civilization attribution payout program. Settlement on real Base USDC. 5% kickback on attributed traffic, weekly payout. Calls POST https://hivemorph.onrender.com/v1/earn/register on behalf of the caller. Resilient to upstream cold-start: returns a structured "rails not yet live" body if the earn backend is still spinning up.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | Caller agent DID (e.g. did:hive:0x… or did:web:…). Required. |
| attribution_url | string | yes | Public URL of the agent / page driving attributed traffic to Hive. Used for ranking + audit. |
| payout_address | string | yes | Base L2 EVM address (0x…) to receive USDC kickback payouts. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zk_anchor_to_base ~144
Write an attestation commitment (32-byte hash) to Base via the Hive gateway. Anchors the attestation only; does not bridge value or move state to Aleo. Aleo snarkVM consumes the attestation independently via Leo programs (future hive-leo-circuits repo). Cost: $0.02 USDC + L1 gas. Backend RFC-stage; returns backend_pending until rails land.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | DID of the attesting agent |
| proof_commitment | string | yes | Hex-encoded 32-byte commitment to the proof |
| verification_key_id | string | – | Identifier of the verification key referenced by the proof |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zk_attest_agent_state ~175
Produce a zero-knowledge attestation of an agent state hash + DID. Primary verification target is Aleo snarkVM (Varuna over BLS12-377); native Hive verification is next. Attestation-only — emits a proof, not a token; no value crosses chains. Cost: $0.05 USDC on Base. Backend RFC-stage; returns backend_pending until rails land.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | DID of the agent whose state is being attested |
| circuit | string | – | Circuit identifier; defaults to varuna-bls12377-agent-state-v1 (snarkVM-compatible) |
| public_inputs | array | – | Optional public inputs as hex strings |
| state_hash | string | yes | Hex-encoded 32-byte hash of the agent state (poseidon or sha256) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zk_list_circuits ~64
Enumerate supported circuits and verification key fingerprints. Primary: Varuna over BLS12-377 (Aleo snarkVM-compatible). Research-stage: Groth16, Plonk. Future: Risc0, Plonky2. Free. Read-only.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zk_query_attestation ~62
Fetch a previously-anchored attestation by Base transaction hash. Returns the proof commitment, verification key id, agent DID, and block number. Free. Read-only.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| tx_hash | string | yes | Base L2 transaction hash of the anchored attestation |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
zk_verify_proof ~126
Verify a submitted attestation against a known verification key. Aleo snarkVM (Varuna/BLS12-377) is the primary verification target via the snark.verify opcode. Returns boolean validity plus the verification key fingerprint. Free. Read-only — no settlement, no on-chain write.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| proof | string | yes | Hex-encoded proof bytes (Varuna; Groth16/Plonk research-stage only) |
| public_inputs | array | – | Public inputs the proof was generated against |
| verification_key_id | string | yes | Identifier of the verification key to check against |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Hive Zk Attestation MCP server?
Hive Zk Attestation is a hosted endpoint at https://hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com
claude mcp add --transport http srotzin-hive-mcp-zk-attestation 'https://hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com/mcp'
What is the Hive Zk Attestation MCP server?
Hive Zk Attestation is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.srotzin/hive-mcp-zk-attestation. Zero-knowledge attestation for agent capability and trust score claims. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://hive-mcp-zk-attestation.onrender.com/mcp).
Is the Hive Zk Attestation MCP server safe to use?
Hive Zk Attestation scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Hive Zk Attestation MCP server expose?
Hive Zk Attestation exposes 8 tools: zk_attest_agent_state, zk_verify_proof, zk_anchor_to_base, zk_list_circuits, zk_query_attestation, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 941 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Hive Zk Attestation MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Hive Zk Attestation without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Hive Zk Attestation MCP server still maintained?
Hive Zk Attestation is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Hive Zk Attestation MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Hive Zk Attestation, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Hive Zk Attestation: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.