Hive Dispute
REMOTE · HIVE-MCP-GATEWAY.ONRENDER.COM
Agent-to-agent dispute resolution and arbitration with on-chain settlement
Available components
Last scanned (20 hours ago)
Scores higher than 64% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability75
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 293 tokens (~73/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management97
- Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 2 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 4 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 3 Aug 26 0
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com/dispute/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=onrender.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 21 Sept 2026 | 20 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 6eb1e3fe7d0631ea1337bfa4a321c137 |
| SANs: onrender.com, *.onrender.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| onrender.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com/dispute/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com/dispute/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com/dispute/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
dispute_check ~105
Given a counterparty address + chain, return public dispute history, active arbitration cases, and on-chain reversal-pattern flags. Sources: Kleros / UMA / Reality.eth subgraphs (with direct on-chain RPC fallback) plus Etherscan-family transaction scans. Observational only — Hive does NOT judge, freeze, or enforce.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | 0x-prefixed counterparty address (20 bytes) |
| chain | string | yes | ethereum | base | arbitrum |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
dispute_providers ~52
List available third-party arbitration protocols (Kleros, UMA Optimistic Oracle, Reality.eth) with current case load, intake URLs, and jurisdiction model. Hive is not one of them — Hive only surfaces signal.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
dispute_route ~109
Given a case description, disputed amount in USD, and optional jurisdiction preference, return ranked arbitration provider options. NO automatic filing — Hive returns options + intake URLs only. The disputing party files directly with the chosen provider.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount_usd | number | yes | Disputed amount in USD |
| description | string | yes | Free-form case description (max 2000 chars) |
| jurisdiction | string | – | Optional preference (e.g. 'decentralized', 'optimistic', 'crowdsourced') |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
dispute_today ~27
24-hour rollup: flagged-counterparty count + top arbitration providers by active case load.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Hive Dispute MCP server?
Hive Dispute is a hosted endpoint at https://hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com/dispute/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com
claude mcp add --transport http srotzin-hive-mcp-dispute 'https://hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com/dispute/mcp'
What is the Hive Dispute MCP server?
Hive Dispute is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.srotzin/hive-mcp-dispute. Agent-to-agent dispute resolution and arbitration with on-chain settlement. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://hive-mcp-gateway.onrender.com/dispute/mcp).
Is the Hive Dispute MCP server safe to use?
Hive Dispute scores 75 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Hive Dispute MCP server expose?
Hive Dispute exposes 4 tools: dispute_check, dispute_providers, dispute_route, dispute_today. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 293 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Hive Dispute MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Hive Dispute without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Hive Dispute MCP server still maintained?
Hive Dispute is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.