HiveAttest
REMOTE · HIVE-MCP-ATTEST.ONRENDER.COM
Pre-action attestation perimeter for AI agents — 8 primitives, signed C18 receipt per call.
Available components
Last scanned (4 hours ago)
Scores higher than 61% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 6 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 1644 tokens (~91/item across 18 items; 18 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage99
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 98% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 18 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 18 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities20
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 1 Nov 26 +56
- HTTPS: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- 31 Oct 26 −56
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HTTPS: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 2 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 27 Aug 26 0
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 6 Nov 2026 · Probed https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=onrender.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 21 Sept 2026 | 20 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 6eb1e3fe7d0631ea1337bfa4a321c137 |
| SANs: onrender.com, *.onrender.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| onrender.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
attest_absence_build ~80
Build a sorted Merkle tree for an audit window (enables cryptographic non-membership proofs, C13: prov-absence). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| events | array | yes | Observed events to commit to the sorted Merkle tree |
| window_id | string | yes | Audit window identifier |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_absence_prove ~72
Prove that a query event is NOT a member of a previously-built audit window (C13). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | object | yes | Event to prove absent |
| window_id | string | yes | Audit window identifier (must have been built) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_absence_verify ~71
Verify a non-membership proof against an expected Merkle root (C13). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| proof | object | yes | Non-membership proof from attest_absence_prove |
| root_hex | string | yes | Expected Merkle root (hex) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_cargo_register ~145
Register a versioned cargo type in the HiveAttest registry (C17: hive-cargo-taxonomy). Pins a definition hash for version-anchoring. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | Unique cargo type ID, e.g. "pii" |
| name | string | yes | Human-readable cargo type name |
| schema | object | yes | JSON Schema defining the payload shape |
| sensitivity | string | yes | – |
| supersedes | object | – | Optional {id, version} of superseded type |
| version | string | yes | Semver version string, e.g. "1.0.0" |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_cargo_snapshot ~40
Get a registry snapshot with Merkle root for version pinning (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_cargo_validate ~73
Validate a payload against a registered cargo type schema (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cargo_type_id | string | yes | Registered cargo type ID |
| payload | object | yes | Payload to validate against the schema |
| version | string | yes | Cargo type version |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_custody_append ~128
Append a node to a custody chain (C16: hive-custody). Taint propagates: once tainted, always tainted. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_did | string | yes | DID of the agent performing the transform |
| chain_id | string | yes | Chain identifier (create new by using a fresh ID) |
| payload | object | – | Transform payload (will be hashed) |
| taint_status | string | – | Declared taint status |
| transform_id | string | yes | Transform identifier for this step |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_custody_proof ~66
Retrieve a Merkle inclusion proof for a specific node in a custody chain (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain_id | string | yes | Chain identifier |
| index | integer | yes | 0-based node index |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_custody_verify ~68
Verify a custody chain: hash linkage, Ed25519 signatures, and taint propagation (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| nodes | array | yes | Ordered array of custody chain node objects (from attest_custody_append responses) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_gate_evaluate ~156
THE HEADLINE TOOL. Evaluate whether an agent may proceed through the HiveAttest gate (C19: hive-gate-enforcer). Verifies passport signature + expiry, cargo registry membership, and warranty status. Every response (allow OR deny) includes a signed C18-format receipt of the gate decision. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cargo_manifest | object | – | C17 cargo manifest (optional) |
| context | object | – | Additional gate evaluation context |
| custody_root | string | – | Expected custody chain Merkle root (optional) |
| passport_manifest | object | yes | C15 passport manifest from attest_passport_issue |
| warranty_ids | array | – | Active warranty IDs to verify |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_inspect_sample ~106
Probabilistic secondary inspection of a record batch (C20: hive-secondary-inspection). Returns a signed inspection record. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| records | array | yes | Records to probabilistically inspect |
| sample_id | string | yes | Identifier for the sample batch |
| sample_rate | number | – | Fraction to inspect (0.0 to 1.0) |
| seed | integer | – | Optional RNG seed for reproducibility |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_meta ~42
Return HiveAttest layer/spec/patent metadata for all claims. Useful for agent introspection. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_passport_issue ~150
Issue a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Signs with Ed25519 over RFC 8785 JCS-canonical body. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_id | string | yes | Caller-supplied action correlation ID |
| agent_did | string | yes | DID of the attesting agent |
| inputs | object | – | Declared inputs (will be hashed) |
| intended_op | string | yes | Operation name, e.g. "tool_invocation" |
| target_resource | string | yes | URI or identifier of the target resource |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | Validity window in seconds (default 300) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_passport_verify ~88
Verify a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Checks Ed25519 signature, temporal validity, and optionally observed inputs hash. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| manifest | object | yes | Full passport manifest object (from attest_passport_issue) |
| observed_inputs | object | – | Optional observed inputs to check against declared hash |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_smsh_verify ~120
Verify a SMSH-Stamp v1 receipt (C8/C12: smsh-stamp-verifier). Validates schema, version, algorithm, timestamp, and Ed25519 signature. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_age_seconds | integer | – | Reject receipts older than this many seconds |
| pubkey_b64url | string | – | Override trust anchor Ed25519 public key (base64url, 32 bytes) |
| receipt | object | yes | SMSH-Stamp v1 receipt object |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_warranty_breach ~81
Report a warranty breach. Marks the warranty as breached and returns a signed breach record (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| breach_description | string | yes | Description of the breach |
| evidence | object | – | Optional evidence dict |
| warranty_id | string | yes | Warranty ID to report breach on |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_warranty_get ~43
Retrieve a warranty by ID (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| warranty_id | string | yes | Warranty ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
attest_warranty_issue ~115
Issue an attestation warranty committing an agent to a claim (C18: hive-attestation-warranty). Signed with Ed25519. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_id | string | yes | Action correlation ID being warranted |
| agent_did | string | yes | DID of the warranting agent |
| claim | string | yes | Human-readable warranty claim |
| expires_at | string | – | ISO-8601 expiry UTC (optional) |
| scope | object | – | Scope constraints |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the HiveAttest MCP server?
HiveAttest is a hosted endpoint at https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com
claude mcp add --transport http srotzin-hive-mcp-attest 'https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp'
What is the HiveAttest MCP server?
HiveAttest is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.srotzin/hive-mcp-attest. Pre-action attestation perimeter for AI agents, 8 primitives, signed C18 receipt per call. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp).
Is the HiveAttest MCP server safe to use?
HiveAttest scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the HiveAttest MCP server expose?
HiveAttest exposes 18 tools: attest_passport_issue, attest_passport_verify, attest_custody_append, attest_custody_verify, attest_custody_proof, and 13 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,644 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the HiveAttest MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to HiveAttest without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the HiveAttest MCP server still maintained?
HiveAttest is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 6 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the HiveAttest MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on HiveAttest, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about HiveAttest: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.