LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history
REMOTE · MCP.LEGION-API.COM
Check if an MCP server changed its tools: signed history, per-server coverage, offline proofs.
Available components
Last scanned (22 hours ago)
Scores higher than 46% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 18 Oct 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability70
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 633 tokens (~126/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management3
- Stability observed for 1 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 17 Oct 26 63
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 18 Oct 2026 · Probed https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=legion-api.com | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 13 Sept 2026 | 12 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6330660ea26a83eda443d063d2f8d20cb9c |
| SANs: *.legion-api.com, legion-api.com | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.legion-api.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| legion-api.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp | Inconclusive | 406 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_mcp_server ~130
One-call summary for an MCP server registry id (e.g. "ai.alphaquantlabs/propertycheck"): tool-list fingerprint history observed by LEGION, last change, per-server coverage from the signed COVERAGE_V1 register (COMPLETE only if observed in every register cycle, UNKNOWN if partial), proof references and a command that verifies everything offline. Read-only. Unknown id -> state UNKNOWN (absence from the log is not a verdict). A change is not an attack; this log does not certify that a server is secure.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_checkpoint ~78
Latest signed tree head of the LEGION MCP transparency log. The signature is checked against the keyring, anchored on the pinned root key fingerprint. Read-only. Returns tree_size, root_sha256, timestamp, signer and signature_valid. For a trustless check, verify it yourself (see `how_to_verify_yourself`).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_server_changes ~127
Signed tool-list history of one MCP server as observed by LEGION (registry id, e.g. "xyz.signomy/civitae"), newest first, at most `limit` (1-50) changes, plus an evidence bundle for the latest record (record + RFC 9162 inclusion proof + signed tree head + keyring) that `verify_evidence_bundle` checks offline. A change is not a fault; history = what LEGION observed, not what other clients see.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| server_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_evidence_bundle ~124
Verify an evidence bundle OFFLINE (no network call): keyring chain from the pinned root fingerprint, record signature and integrity, signed tree head, RFC 9162 inclusion proof. If `approved_tools_sha256` is given, also reports whether the signed tool list still matches the version you approved (UNAPPROVED_CHANGE if not). Bundle = {record, proof, sth, keyring} as returned by get_server_changes (max 256 KB).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approved_tools_sha256 | string | – | – |
| bundle | object | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_mcp_server ~174
Check an MCP server URL against LEGION's signed transparency log. Read-only. For each registry server at this URL: latest signed tool definition (leaf index, date, tools_sha256), number of tool changes (total and 30 days), date of the last change, RFC 9162 inclusion proof + signed tree head (re-verified here from the pinned root key), an evidence bundle for `verify_evidence_bundle`, and — if live=true — whether the tool list served NOW differs from the signed one (live check by LEGION: initialize + tools/list only, public addresses only, NOT signed). A change is not a fault; history = what LEGION observed, not what other clients see.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| live | boolean | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history server?
LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.legion-api.com
claude mcp add --transport http legion33shadow-legion-verify 'https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp'
What is the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history server?
LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Legion33shadow/legion-verify. Check if an MCP server changed its tools: signed history, per-server coverage, offline proofs. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.legion-api.com/mcp).
Is the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history server safe to use?
LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history scores 64 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history server expose?
LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history exposes 5 tools: get_checkpoint, get_server_changes, verify_evidence_bundle, verify_mcp_server, check_mcp_server. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 633 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history server require authentication?
No. We connected to LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history server still maintained?
LEGION Verify: MCP tool-list history is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 18 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.