MandateShield AI Payment Evidence
REMOTE · MANDATESHIELD.COM · SCANNED SEP 20
Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability79
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1466 tokens (~122/item across 12 items; 3 tools + 9 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage87
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 56% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
- Supports UI / widget rendering.Pass
How do I install the MandateShield AI Payment Evidence MCP server?
MandateShield AI Payment Evidence is a hosted endpoint at https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mandateshield.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-mandateshield-payment-authority 'https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
"url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.com-mandateshield-payment-authority] url = "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-mandateshield-payment-authority --url 'https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-mandateshield-payment-authority:
url: "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add com-mandateshield-payment-authority -t streamable-http -u 'https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 29 Aug 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 28 Aug 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Aug 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 23 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 1 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mandateshield.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 23 Jul 2026 | 21 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 554139946bd85bf30ec4c04fcc33112e |
| SANs: mandateshield.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mandateshield.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| mandateshield.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; worker-src 'self' blob:; manifest-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | accelerometer=(), browsing-topics=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mandateshield.com/api/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 302 | https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_ai_payment_authority Check AI Payment Authority ~408
Use before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized=false; use the strict cryptographic tool for a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Stable identifier for the acting AI agent. |
| amount | object | yes | – |
| asset_id | string | – | Exact token or asset identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| checkout_hash | string | – | Digest or stable identifier for the exact final checkout. |
| created_at | string | – | – |
| credential_binding | string | – | – |
| expires_at | string | – | – |
| http_request | object | – | Optional signed HTTP action projection used by the narrow first-party x402 v2 exact/EIP-3009 Gate adapter. |
| idempotency_key | string | yes | Unique identifier for this intended payment attempt. |
| intent_hash | string | – | – |
| limits | object | – | Sandbox analysis policy. Live v2 ignores caller policy and loads the registered mandate. |
| mandate_id | string | yes | Stable identifier for the user-approved authority. |
| merchant_id | string | yes | Stable identifier for the final seller or payee. |
| network | string | – | Exact network or chain identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| payee_identity | object | – | Versioned canonical payee identity bound into the signed purchase envelope. The model records exact provider identifiers and verification evidence; it does not independently validate an external regi… |
| protocol | string | yes | Source protocol or CUSTOM for a normalized envelope. |
| purpose | string | – | Non-sensitive plain-language purchase purpose. |
| resource | string | – | Exact paid resource identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| user_consent | boolean | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| controls | object | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| enforcement_authorized | boolean | yes | True only when strict live verification durably creates a trusted, consumable execution reservation. It never permits a direct provider call. |
| error | string | – | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| persisted | boolean | yes | – |
| protocol | string | yes | – |
| receipt | string | yes | – |
| recommended_action | string | yes | – |
| risk | object | yes | – |
| score | integer | yes | Deterministic control-coverage indicator, not a calibrated probability of fraud or loss. |
No examples provided.
normalize_agent_payment_protocol Project Agent Payment Fields ~193
Use when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope. X402 requires source-matched network+payTo identity and MPP requires source-matched HTTPS service-origin+method identity; merchant_id alone is insufficient. Evidence references are not independently verified. projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance: this tool never verifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authorized=false under assurance.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adapter | string | yes | – |
| context | object | yes | – |
| selection | object | – | – |
| source | – | yes | Raw protocol input: AP2 compact SD-JWT, x402 PAYMENT-REQUIRED base64 JSON, MPP WWW-Authenticate Payment challenge, or the documented decoded object. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adapter | string | yes | – |
| adapter_version | string | yes | – |
| assurance | object | yes | – |
| envelope | object | yes | – |
| envelope_digest | string | yes | – |
| next_step | string | yes | – |
| protocol | string | yes | – |
| source_digest | string | yes | – |
| warnings | array | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_cryptographic_payment_authority Verify Cryptographic Payment Authority ~183
Use only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 checkout/delegate-chain and Visa TAP structured-field/trust-store processing remain external. A qualifying live ALLOW creates only a short RESERVED authorization and cumulative-budget allocation. This MCP tool never executes payment and exposes no processor transition: a separate trusted gateway with an audience-bound PROCESSOR key must CONSUME and freshly redeem the provider-bound permit before attempting an idempotent provider operation, then reconcile the outcome.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| envelope | object | yes | – |
| evidence | object | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assurance | object | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| controls | object | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| enforcement_authorized | boolean | yes | True only when strict live verification durably creates a trusted, consumable execution reservation. It never permits a direct provider call. |
| error | string | – | – |
| execution_authorization | object | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| mode | string | yes | – |
| persisted | boolean | yes | – |
| protocol | string | yes | – |
| receipt | string | yes | – |
| recommended_action | string | yes | – |
| risk | object | yes | – |
| score | integer | yes | Deterministic control-coverage indicator, not a calibrated probability of fraud or loss. |
| signed_receipt | object | yes | – |
| transparency | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
What is the MandateShield AI Payment Evidence MCP server?
MandateShield AI Payment Evidence is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.mandateshield/payment-authority. Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp).
Is the MandateShield AI Payment Evidence MCP server safe to use?
MandateShield AI Payment Evidence scores 87 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the MandateShield AI Payment Evidence MCP server expose?
MandateShield AI Payment Evidence exposes 3 tools: check_ai_payment_authority, normalize_agent_payment_protocol, verify_cryptographic_payment_authority. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 784 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the MandateShield AI Payment Evidence MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to MandateShield AI Payment Evidence without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the MandateShield AI Payment Evidence MCP server still maintained?
MandateShield AI Payment Evidence is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.