MandateShield AI Payment Evidence
REMOTE · MANDATESHIELD.COM · SCANNED AUG 3
Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (poor).Fail
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1466 tokens (~122/item across 12 items; 3 tools + 9 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage87
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 56% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
- Supports UI / widget rendering.Pass
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
remote · mandateshield.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-mandateshield-payment-authority https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp
[mcp_servers.com-mandateshield-payment-authority] url = "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-mandateshield-payment-authority --url https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-mandateshield-payment-authority:
url: "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp" {
"mcpServers": {
"com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 2 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Aug 26 +4
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 31 Jul 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Jul 26 +1
- Server version: 1.10.0 → 1.11.0 functional
- 27 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Jul 26 63
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Probed https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mandateshield.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 23 Jul 2026 | 21 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 554139946bd85bf30ec4c04fcc33112e |
| SANs: mandateshield.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mandateshield.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| mandateshield.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; worker-src 'self' blob:; manifest-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | accelerometer=(), browsing-topics=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=() |
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mandateshield.com/api/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 302 | https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
check_ai_payment_authority Check AI Payment Authority ~408
Use before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized=false; use the strict cryptographic tool for a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Stable identifier for the acting AI agent. |
| amount | object | yes | — |
| asset_id | string | — | Exact token or asset identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| checkout_hash | string | — | Digest or stable identifier for the exact final checkout. |
| created_at | string | — | — |
| credential_binding | string | — | — |
| expires_at | string | — | — |
| http_request | object | — | Optional signed HTTP action projection used by the narrow first-party x402 v2 exact/EIP-3009 Gate adapter. |
| idempotency_key | string | yes | Unique identifier for this intended payment attempt. |
| intent_hash | string | — | — |
| limits | object | — | Sandbox analysis policy. Live v2 ignores caller policy and loads the registered mandate. |
| mandate_id | string | yes | Stable identifier for the user-approved authority. |
| merchant_id | string | yes | Stable identifier for the final seller or payee. |
| network | string | — | Exact network or chain identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| payee_identity | object | — | Versioned canonical payee identity bound into the signed purchase envelope. The model records exact provider identifiers and verification evidence; it does not independently validate an external regi… |
| protocol | string | yes | Source protocol or CUSTOM for a normalized envelope. |
| purpose | string | — | Non-sensitive plain-language purchase purpose. |
| resource | string | — | Exact paid resource identifier; required for atomic X402 payments. |
| user_consent | boolean | — | — |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checked_at | string | yes | — |
| controls | object | yes | — |
| decision | string | yes | — |
| enforcement_authorized | boolean | yes | True only when strict live verification durably creates a trusted, consumable execution reservation. It never permits a direct provider call. |
| error | string | — | — |
| findings | array | yes | — |
| mode | string | yes | — |
| persisted | boolean | yes | — |
| protocol | string | yes | — |
| receipt | string | yes | — |
| recommended_action | string | yes | — |
| risk | object | yes | — |
| score | integer | yes | Deterministic control-coverage indicator, not a calibrated probability of fraud or loss. |
No examples provided.
normalize_agent_payment_protocol Project Agent Payment Fields ~193
Use when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope. X402 requires source-matched network+payTo identity and MPP requires source-matched HTTPS service-origin+method identity; merchant_id alone is insufficient. Evidence references are not independently verified. projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance: this tool never verifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authorized=false under assurance.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adapter | string | yes | — |
| context | object | yes | — |
| selection | object | — | — |
| source | — | yes | Raw protocol input: AP2 compact SD-JWT, x402 PAYMENT-REQUIRED base64 JSON, MPP WWW-Authenticate Payment challenge, or the documented decoded object. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| adapter | string | yes | — |
| adapter_version | string | yes | — |
| assurance | object | yes | — |
| envelope | object | yes | — |
| envelope_digest | string | yes | — |
| next_step | string | yes | — |
| protocol | string | yes | — |
| source_digest | string | yes | — |
| warnings | array | yes | — |
No examples provided.
verify_cryptographic_payment_authority Verify Cryptographic Payment Authority ~183
Use only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 checkout/delegate-chain and Visa TAP structured-field/trust-store processing remain external. A qualifying live ALLOW creates only a short RESERVED authorization and cumulative-budget allocation. This MCP tool never executes payment and exposes no processor transition: a separate trusted gateway with an audience-bound PROCESSOR key must CONSUME and freshly redeem the provider-bound permit before attempting an idempotent provider operation, then reconcile the outcome.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| envelope | object | yes | — |
| evidence | object | yes | — |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assurance | object | yes | — |
| checked_at | string | yes | — |
| controls | object | yes | — |
| decision | string | yes | — |
| enforcement_authorized | boolean | yes | True only when strict live verification durably creates a trusted, consumable execution reservation. It never permits a direct provider call. |
| error | string | — | — |
| execution_authorization | object | yes | — |
| findings | array | yes | — |
| mode | string | yes | — |
| persisted | boolean | yes | — |
| protocol | string | yes | — |
| receipt | string | yes | — |
| recommended_action | string | yes | — |
| risk | object | yes | — |
| score | integer | yes | Deterministic control-coverage indicator, not a calibrated probability of fraud or loss. |
| signed_receipt | object | yes | — |
| transparency | object | yes | — |
No examples provided.