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Securealy

NPM · SECUREALY-MCP

Grade a URL as an attacker and a customer would see it; scan a repo; check Supabase, Stripe, Vercel.

Available components

83 Trust /100

Last scanned (22 hours ago)

Scores higher than 78% of npm servers

Category Security

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security98
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
  • No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
  • 31 of 104 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency100
  • Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
  • Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to securealy/securealy). View diagnostics → Pass
  • Clear OSI-approved license (Apache-2.0).Pass
  • Actively maintained (last published 1 days ago).Pass
  • Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability80
  • 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1802 tokens (~163/item across 11 items; 9 tools + 2 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management7
  • Stability observed for 2 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 9 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 16 Oct 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 15 Oct 26 +33
    • Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
    • Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • Schema quality: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
    • First check of Schema quality: fail functional
    • First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
    • First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
    • First check of Schema quality: fail functional
    • First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
  • 14 Oct 26 49

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 16 Oct 2026 · Analysed npm/securealy-mcp@0.1.6

Provenance Verified

A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.

Result Verified
Ecosystem npm
Reason Verified
Discovered via Registry attestation endpoint
Source repo securealy/securealy
Certificate issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Certificate SAN https://github.com/securealy/securealy/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v0.1.6
Rekor log index 3255549945
Predicate type SLSA build provenance https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1
Subject digest sha512:1f319b3fe7a2585f44fe38972531048edd67c85cda811a1ad297cd814662de473adcb9d51e2083b6a97c55cb26e0b0363a295c343d32922422b290c2b

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Dependencies 104 packages
Packages resolved 104
Stale 31
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 9 exposed · ~1,566 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
check_rls ~213

Run rls-policies and supabase-auth-config against the user's own Supabase project using credentials already in this server's environment: SUPABASE_URL plus SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY (or SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY), or SUPABASE_MGMT_TOKEN plus SUPABASE_PROJECT_REF. rls-policies lists tables in the public schema with row level security off or with permissive policies; supabase-auth-config reads the auth settings (open signup, email confirmation, OTP expiry). Each value is trimmed, sent only to that Supabase project, and never appears in the output. The service key is sent only to an https URL on a Supabase-hosted domain (the project URL Supabase issued); any other SUPABASE_URL skips the check unless SECUREALY_SUPABASE_HOST_OVERRIDE=1 is set for a self-hosted project. If a variable is missing the check is skipped with a reason; tell the user which variable to export, never ask them to paste it into the chat.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

check_stripe ~115

Run stripe-webhook-wiring with STRIPE_SECRET_KEY from this server's environment: confirms a live-mode key is in use, that at least one enabled webhook endpoint points at the production host, and that it subscribes to the checkout and subscription events. The key is trimmed, sent only to api.stripe.com, and never appears in the output. Provide productionHost so the endpoint host can be compared.

NameTypeReqDescription
productionHoststringyesThe production hostname or URL the webhook should point at, for example my-app.example.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

check_vercel_env ~190

Run vercel-env-hygiene with VERCEL_TOKEN (a project-scoped token is enough) and VERCEL_PROJECT_ID from this server's environment, or the project id passed here. Reports secret-looking variables exposed to the browser through a NEXT_PUBLIC_ or VITE_ prefix, test keys in production, and production values missing from preview. The token is trimmed, sent only to api.vercel.com, and never appears in the output. Variable values are fetched only when SECUREALY_VERCEL_DECRYPT=1 is set in the environment; without it the checks that need values (trailing newlines, live keys outside production) are reported as skipped and only names and targets are read.

NameTypeReqDescription
projectIdstring–Vercel project id (prj_...). Falls back to VERCEL_PROJECT_ID or .vercel/project.json in the working directory.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

fetch_fix ~85

Fetch the published fix for a check id from securealy.com (GET /checks/<id>.json): the catalogue entry plus the fix text the caller is entitled to. Sends only the check id. If the fix endpoint is not available yet, returns the catalogue entry and the fix page URL to read instead.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesA check id, for example hsts.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

get_check ~88

Return the catalogue entry for a check id (category, title, severity, tier, what passing means, why it matters, whether the fix is published free) plus the public fix page URL. Use it to explain a failing check to the user before fetching the fix. Local, no network.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesA check id from a GradeResult, for example secrets-in-bundle.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

grade_url ~489

Grade a website the way an attacker and a customer would see it, in under a minute. Passive tier (default) runs locally in this process and only does what a browser does when a visitor opens the site, plus DNS and TLS lookups: at most 25 requests, no probing, no credential use; it works on any public URL, including preview deployments. A URL on localhost, 127.0.0.1, [::1], *.localhost or *.test (plain http is fine) gives a pre-launch grade of the app running on this machine: the result carries preLaunch: true, checks that need a public domain (TLS, HSTS, DNS, email, domain, Stripe live key) are skipped with the reason, and the score covers the rest, so the same command on the deployed URL later gives the real grade. Any other private address is refused. Verified tier needs the project token (sly_...) for a domain whose ownership was already proven at securealy.com; it runs on the hosted grader and adds the probes an owner would want (served /.env or /.git, open admin routes, anon row reads, listable buckets, rate limiting). Returns a GradeResult (schema 1) and a text summary: grade A to F, score out of 100, blockers with evidence, then fails and warnings by category, each with its fix page. Pass bypassToken for a Vercel deployment that has protection enabled; it is sent only to that host. Evidence never contains a response body and secrets are redacted to six characters.

NameTypeReqDescription
bypassTokenstring–Vercel protection bypass token for a protected preview; sent only to the graded host as x-vercel-protection-bypass.
tierstring–passive (default, works on any URL) or verified (needs token; domain must be verified at securealy.com).
tokenstring–Securealy project token (sly_...). Required for tier verified. Sent only to securealy.com as a Bearer header.
urlstringyesThe URL to grade, for example https://my-app.vercel.app. A bare hostname is treated as https. http://localhost:3000 (or 127.0.0.1, [::1], *.localhost, *.test) gives a pre-launch grade of a local serv…

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_checks ~64

List every check Securealy runs, optionally filtered by category or tier, with severity and the one-line meaning of a pass. Local, no network.

NameTypeReqDescription
categorystring–Filter by category.
tierstring–Filter by tier: passive, verified or local.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

post_result ~116

Store a GradeResult from a local check (scan_repo, check_rls, check_stripe, check_vercel_env) against the user's Securealy project so it shows in their dashboard. Sends the result and the project token (as a Bearer header) to securealy.com and nothing else. Only call this when the user has asked for the result to be posted.

NameTypeReqDescription
resultobjectyesThe GradeResult object returned by a local check tool.
tokenstringyesSecurealy project token (sly_...).

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

scan_repo ~206

Run the three local repository checks on a source folder: repo-secrets (secret-shaped strings in the working tree and git history), gitignore-env-coverage (every .env variant ignored) and env-example-parity (.env.example lists every variable the code reads, with no real values). Runs entirely on this machine; nothing is sent anywhere. Findings show a six-character prefix of any secret, never the value. Folder trust: the first call for a path returns a confirmation request instead of results. Show the user the absolute path and call again with trust: true once they confirm it is their project. Trust lasts for this server process.

NameTypeReqDescription
pathstring–Folder to scan. Defaults to the server's working directory. Relative paths resolve against it. Must be inside the working directory or a folder listed in SECUREALY_SCAN_ROOTS.
trustboolean–Set true on the second call to confirm the user trusts this folder being read, including its git history.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the Securealy MCP server?

Securealy runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y securealy-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

npm · securealy-mcp

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add com-securealy-mcp -- npx -y securealy-mcp
Common questions

What is the Securealy MCP server?

Securealy is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.securealy/mcp. Grade a URL as an attacker and a customer would see it; scan a repo; check Supabase, Stripe, Vercel. This page covers its npm package (securealy-mcp).

Is the Securealy MCP server safe to use?

Securealy scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 16 October 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the Securealy MCP server expose?

Securealy exposes 9 tools: grade_url, scan_repo, check_rls, check_stripe, check_vercel_env, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,566 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the Securealy MCP server still maintained?

Securealy is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 16 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the Securealy MCP server under?

Securealy declares the Apache-2.0 licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.