LayerCall
REMOTE · WWW.LAYERCALL.COM · SCANNED SEP 24
Score an IP, email, phone, domain or device for fraud in one call, with the signals behind it.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 7 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability73
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 959 tokens (~137/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage89
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 67% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 7 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
How do I install the LayerCall MCP server?
LayerCall is a hosted endpoint at https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · www.layercall.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-layercall-trust-api 'https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-layercall-trust-api": {
"url": "https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"com-layercall-trust-api": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.com-layercall-trust-api] url = "https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-layercall-trust-api": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-layercall-trust-api --url 'https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-layercall-trust-api:
url: "https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"com-layercall-trust-api": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add com-layercall-trust-api -t streamable-http -u 'https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-layercall-trust-api": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 1 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 31 Aug 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “score_user” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 29 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 27 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 73 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 22 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 26 Aug 26 74
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 11 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 24 Sept 2026 · Probed https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=www.layercall.com | CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 22 Jul 2026 | 20 Oct 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 5be74ceca741f35093dfa5b6a40a262e6cb |
| SANs: www.layercall.com | ||||||
| CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of www.layercall.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| layercall.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https://*.supabase.co; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; object-src 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://www.layercall.com/api/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
lookup_phone Validate a phone number ~107
Validate a phone number worldwide against its national numbering plan. Returns E.164, country, line type (mobile/fixed/VoIP/toll-free/premium) and a risk score. Works globally, not US-only.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| country | string | – | ISO 3166-1 alpha-2, required only for national-format numbers |
| phone | string | yes | Number in international form (+14155552671) or national form with country set |
| strictness | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
score_device Score a device fingerprint ~106
Judge a browser fingerprint from /fp.js: headless detection, automation frameworks (Selenium, Puppeteer, Playwright), timezone-versus-IP mismatch and repeat-device history. Note the ceiling honestly — the declared signals it relies on are the first thing stealth tooling patches, so a clean result is weaker evidence than a dirty one.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| device_id | string | yes | Hex fingerprint from /fp.js |
| ip | string | – | Visitor IP, so timezone-vs-country can be checked |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
score_domain Score a domain ~75
Profile a domain: registration date from RDAP, registrar, MX/SPF/DMARC configuration, disposable-mail and risky-TLD detection. newly_registered is null when the age genuinely could not be determined — treat that as unknown, not as 'established'.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Bare domain, e.g. example.com |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
score_ip Score an IP address ~130
Risk-score an IPv4 or IPv6 address. Detects commercial VPNs (naming the provider where its own published list confirms it), proxies, Tor exit nodes and datacenter hosting, and returns geolocation, ASN and a 0-100 risk score with an allow/review/block verdict.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ip | string | yes | IPv4 or IPv6 address, e.g. 8.8.8.8 |
| strictness | integer | – | 0 lenient, 1 balanced (default), 2 strict, 3 paranoid. Moves the verdict thresholds only; the score is unchanged. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
score_user Score a whole signup ~156
Score an entire signup in one call — any combination of IP, email, phone and domain — returning a single weighted risk score, a verdict, and the top contributing signals. A hard block on any component is never averaged away. This is the tool to use when judging a person rather than a value. Costs one lookup PER COMPONENT supplied, not one per call, so four identifiers cost four; the response reports the exact figure as billable_lookups, and cached components are refunded.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | – | – | |
| ip | string | – | – |
| phone | string | – | – |
| phone_country | string | – | ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 for national-format numbers |
| strictness | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_agent Verify a signed AI agent (Web Bot Auth) ~164
Cryptographically verify a Web Bot Auth signature (RFC 9421) — proof of WHICH agent is calling, not a guess from the user-agent. Returns verified true/false plus the agent's identity and declared purpose. This is the only check here that proves rather than infers, so it carries no score and no verdict: a verified assistant acting for a real user is usually welcome, a verified scraper usually is not, and that policy is the caller's. Pass the request the agent made to YOU — the signature covers its method, authority and path.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| headers | object | yes | Request headers, including signature, signature-input and signature-agent |
| method | string | – | HTTP method, default GET |
| url | string | yes | Absolute URL the agent requested from you |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_email Verify an email address ~75
Check an email for syntax, MX records, disposable/throwaway providers, role accounts (info@, admin@), homograph lookalikes and domain age. Returns a 0-100 risk score and an allow/review/block verdict.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | Full email address | |
| strictness | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the LayerCall MCP server?
LayerCall is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.layercall/trust-api. Score an IP, email, phone, domain or device for fraud in one call, with the signals behind it. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://www.layercall.com/api/mcp).
Is the LayerCall MCP server safe to use?
LayerCall scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the LayerCall MCP server expose?
LayerCall exposes 7 tools: score_ip, verify_email, lookup_phone, score_domain, score_device, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 813 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the LayerCall MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to LayerCall without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the LayerCall MCP server still maintained?
LayerCall is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 24 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.