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threatcrush

REMOTE · THREATCRUSH.COM

Reputation + security findings (threatcrush.com)

Available components

+3 this week 78 Trust /100

Last scanned (21 hours ago)

Scores higher than 71% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Security

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security94
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Tool/resource definitions use about 2032 tokens (~101/item across 20 items; 20 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
  • Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage80
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 39% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 21 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
What we tested

Checks we ran (13)

  • TLS certificate
  • Authorization
  • HTTPS
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 20 Nov 26 0
    • Server version: 1.0.0 → 1.0.1 functional
  • 19 Nov 26 +17
    • Authorization: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
    • MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
    • Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
    • Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • Stability: unverified → 0.23 ▲ functional
  • 18 Nov 26 −15

    The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.

  • 16 Nov 26 0
    • Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
    • Stability: 0.10 → unverified ▼ security
    • Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Authorization: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • HSTS header: pass → unverified ▼ security
    • Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
    • Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
    • Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
  • 15 Nov 26 +1
    • Server version: 0.13 → 1.0.0 functional
  • 13 Nov 26 +1
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
  • 12 Nov 26 +70
    • Authorization: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
    • Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
    • First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
    • First check of Authorization: partial security
    • MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
    • Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
    • First check of Schema quality: fail functional
    • First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
    • First check of Schema quality: pass functional
    • First check of Schema quality: good functional
    • First check of Tool coverage: 39 functional
  • 11 Nov 26 4

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=www.threatcrush.com CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US 25 Sept 2026 24 Dec 2026 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 6ea567b4221219ceabb84dca048fcae079d
SANs: supabase.threatcrush.com, threatcrush.com, www.threatcrush.com
CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US 3 Sept 2025 2 Sept 2028 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe
CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a
CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of threatcrush.com. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
com. DS published 19718 13 Verified
threatcrush.com. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication Enforced and verified

The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.

Result Enforced and verified
Enforced On tool calls
HTTP status 200

WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://threatcrush.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="mcp"

Bearer resource_metadata="https://threatcrush.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="mcp"
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
content-security-policy default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://robauto.ai https://datafa.st https://crawlproof.com https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com; connect-src 'self' https:; frame-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self' https://pit.world; object-src 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options SAMEORIGIN
referrer-policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
permissions-policy camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=()

Protected resource metadata

Document https://threatcrush.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Retrieved Yes
Resource https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp
Authorisation server https://threatcrush.com

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://threatcrush.com/api/mcp HTTPS enforced 301 https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp
MCP tools · 20 exposed · ~1,793 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
av_hash_lookup ~133

CrushAV file reputation, no key needed: look up up to 100 SHA-256 file hashes. For each hash something is known about, returns `knownMalicious` (the source listing it as malware), `malwareName`, `trust` (0-100: how sure CIRCL hashlookup is that this is a published, known-good file from NSRL or a major OS/package repo) and a `fileName` it was seen as. Unknown hashes are omitted. Send hashes only, never file contents.

NameTypeReqDescription
hashesarrayyesLower-case hex SHA-256 hashes (max 100)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

create_invite ~64

Create one invite link (each account has 3, single use, 30 days). When a new account joins on it and confirms its email, both get bonus credits. Session token only.

NameTypeReqDescription
notestring–Who it is for (only you see it)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

findings_get ~43

One tracked finding with its details (code snippet, remediation, evidence), property and history.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesFinding id
org_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

findings_list ~151

Your org's tracked findings from threatcrush scan, pentest and ai-scan (deduped across runs, with a triage status). Default: open + acknowledged. Session token or tc_agent_ key.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitnumber–Max 500, default 100
org_idstring–Organization id (default: the key's org, or your first org)
severitystring–Comma list of critical, high, medium, low, info
sourcestring–Comma list of scan, pentest, ai-scan
statusstring–Comma list of open, acknowledged, fixed, false_positive, ignored, or all

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

findings_triage ~91

Set the status and/or note of up to 500 findings: acknowledged, fixed, false_positive, ignored or open. fixed is reopened by a later run that still sees it; false_positive and ignored never are. Needs write.

NameTypeReqDescription
idsarrayyes–
notestring–Why (shown everywhere the finding is)
org_idstring––
statusstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

incidents_get ~83

One incident: linked forensic evidence, recent events from the same observed source IP on its server, block history for that IP, saved AI assessment, multi-person assignees, fix and test progress, work history, recorded resolution/operator, findings, timeline, notes and who was paged.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyesIncident id
org_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

incidents_list ~172

Your org's incidents: what `threatcrush investigate --raise`, the daemon (critical detections) and people raised to humans. Filter by host and explicit since timestamp; only teams you can see. Session token or tc_agent_ key.

NameTypeReqDescription
hoststring–Filter incidents whose recorded host contains this value (for example dev2)
limitnumber–Max 500, default 100
org_idstring–Organization id (default: the key's org, or your first org)
sincestring–Only incidents last seen at or after this timestamp; pass an explicit timezone when interpreting phrases such as last night
statusstring–Comma list of open, acknowledged, resolved, or all (default all)
team_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

incidents_raise ~115

Raise an incident report (report_version 1: title, severity, source, dedupe_key, summary, verdict, findings, timeline, recommendations, optional team_id/server_id). The same dedupe_key while open updates it; a new incident pages the team by SMS and email once. Reports that contain anything shaped like a private key or mnemonic are refused. Needs write.

NameTypeReqDescription
org_idstring––
reportobjectyesThe report body, as POST /api/orgs/{id}/incidents takes it

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

incidents_update ~187

Update fix work performed by your assigned agent or human: set multiple assignees, fix status, PR URL, test status and evidence, verification or blocker, and/or add a note. ThreatCrush catalogs the incident and does not execute remediation. Closing requires status fixed with passing tests and verification, or false_positive with a reason and verification, plus resolution.reason/action/verification. Needs write.

NameTypeReqDescription
assignee_idstring|null––
assignee_idsarray–Replace the assignee list with these active org/team member user IDs; [] clears it. An assignee receives write access to this incident. Use incidents_get to find member IDs and emails.
fix_workobject––
idstringyes–
notestring––
org_idstring––
resolutionobject––
statusstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

list_invites ~39

The signed-in account's invites: how many are left of 3, who joined, and whether the bonus credits were paid. Session token only.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

redeem_credit_code ~87

Redeem a ThreatCrush credit code (CR-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX) into the signed-in account's credit balance (1 credit = $1.00). Needs the account's session token (`threatcrush login`), not a tc_agent_ key: agent keys belong to a team, not a person.

NameTypeReqDescription
codestringyesThe credit code

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

reputation_bulk ~56

Look up many IPs or domains at once (up to 100 with a free key, 1,000 with Reputation Pro). Results come back in request order; each counts against the daily allowance.

NameTypeReqDescription
indicatorsarrayyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

reputation_lookup ~157

Look up an IP address or a domain against the ThreatCrush community threat database (what every linked ThreatCrush daemon blocked). Returns `listed` (the corroboration bar: independent reporters agree), a 0-100 `score`, severity, reports, reporters, rules and country; a domain is answered from its A/AAAA addresses plus nichedb.dev's public answer (abuse.ch, SURBL). With Reputation Pro: 90 days of history, the /24 neighbourhood, the network owner (ASN) and how much of it is listed, city and the reasons behind the score. Registered servers, allowlisted addresses and anyone who logged in are never reported.

NameTypeReqDescription
indicatorstringyesAn IP address or a domain

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

webhooks_create ~74

Add a webhook endpoint (public https URL). Returns the endpoint and its signing secret (whsec_…), shown once.

NameTypeReqDescription
descriptionstring––
eventsarray–Event patterns: *, detection.created, findings.*, ... (default *)
org_idstring––
urlstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

webhooks_delete ~33

Remove a webhook endpoint and its delivery log.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyes–
org_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

webhooks_deliveries ~58

Recent webhook deliveries (status, attempts, last HTTP status/error, payload), for one endpoint or all.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstring–Endpoint id (optional)
limitnumber––
org_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

webhooks_list ~89

Your org's webhook endpoints (signed Standard Webhooks deliveries, retried for about three days) and the events ThreatCrush emits: detection.created, findings.raised, reputation.changed. Endpoints behind a Webhook alert destination follow your alert rules; the others get every event they subscribe to. Org owner/admin session token or an admin tc_agent_ key.

NameTypeReqDescription
org_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

webhooks_rotate_secret ~45

Replace an endpoint's signing secret; the old one stops working at once. Returns the new secret.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyes–
org_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

webhooks_test ~40

Send a signed webhook.test event to one endpoint now and say how it went.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyes–
org_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

webhooks_update ~76

Change a webhook endpoint's url, events, description, or switch it on/off (on again clears its failure count).

NameTypeReqDescription
descriptionstring––
enabledboolean––
eventsarray––
idstringyes–
org_idstring––
urlstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the threatcrush MCP server?

threatcrush is a hosted endpoint at https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · threatcrush.com

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http com-profullstack-threatcrush 'https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp'
Common questions

What is the threatcrush MCP server?

threatcrush is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.profullstack/threatcrush. Reputation + security findings (threatcrush.com). This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp).

Is the threatcrush MCP server safe to use?

threatcrush scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the threatcrush MCP server expose?

threatcrush exposes 20 tools: av_hash_lookup, reputation_lookup, reputation_bulk, redeem_credit_code, list_invites, and 15 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,793 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the threatcrush MCP server require authentication?

Yes. threatcrush asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.

Is the threatcrush MCP server still maintained?

threatcrush is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the threatcrush MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on threatcrush, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.