threatcrush
REMOTE · THREATCRUSH.COM
Reputation + security findings (threatcrush.com)
Available components
Last scanned (21 hours ago)
Scores higher than 71% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security94
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 2032 tokens (~101/item across 20 items; 20 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management30
- Stability observed for 9 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage80
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 39% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 21 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 0
- Server version: 1.0.0 → 1.0.1 functional
- 19 Nov 26 +17
- Authorization: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.23 ▲ functional
- 18 Nov 26 −15
The score moved with no change recorded against any check. We would rather say so than guess.
- 16 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- Stability: 0.10 → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: pass → unverified ▼ security
- TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HSTS header: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 15 Nov 26 +1
- Server version: 0.13 → 1.0.0 functional
- 13 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 12 Nov 26 +70
- Authorization: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- TLS certificate: unverified → pass ▲ security
- HSTS header: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- First check of Authorization: partial security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: 100 functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 39 functional
- 11 Nov 26 4
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=www.threatcrush.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 25 Sept 2026 | 24 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6ea567b4221219ceabb84dca048fcae079d |
| SANs: supabase.threatcrush.com, threatcrush.com, www.threatcrush.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of threatcrush.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| threatcrush.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://threatcrush.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="mcp"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://threatcrush.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", scope="mcp" | Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://robauto.ai https://datafa.st https://crawlproof.com https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; font-src 'self' data: https://fonts.gstatic.com; connect-src 'self' https:; frame-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self' https://pit.world; object-src 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=() |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://threatcrush.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://threatcrush.com |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://threatcrush.com/api/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
av_hash_lookup Look up file hashes (CrushAV) ~133
CrushAV file reputation, no key needed: look up up to 100 SHA-256 file hashes. For each hash something is known about, returns `knownMalicious` (the source listing it as malware), `malwareName`, `trust` (0-100: how sure CIRCL hashlookup is that this is a published, known-good file from NSRL or a major OS/package repo) and a `fileName` it was seen as. Unknown hashes are omitted. Send hashes only, never file contents.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| hashes | array | yes | Lower-case hex SHA-256 hashes (max 100) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_invite Create an invite link ~64
Create one invite link (each account has 3, single use, 30 days). When a new account joins on it and confirms its email, both get bonus credits. Session token only.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | string | – | Who it is for (only you see it) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
findings_get Get a finding ~43
One tracked finding with its details (code snippet, remediation, evidence), property and history.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | Finding id |
| org_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
findings_list List findings ~151
Your org's tracked findings from threatcrush scan, pentest and ai-scan (deduped across runs, with a triage status). Default: open + acknowledged. Session token or tc_agent_ key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | number | – | Max 500, default 100 |
| org_id | string | – | Organization id (default: the key's org, or your first org) |
| severity | string | – | Comma list of critical, high, medium, low, info |
| source | string | – | Comma list of scan, pentest, ai-scan |
| status | string | – | Comma list of open, acknowledged, fixed, false_positive, ignored, or all |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
findings_triage Triage findings ~91
Set the status and/or note of up to 500 findings: acknowledged, fixed, false_positive, ignored or open. fixed is reopened by a later run that still sees it; false_positive and ignored never are. Needs write.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ids | array | yes | – |
| note | string | – | Why (shown everywhere the finding is) |
| org_id | string | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incidents_get Get an incident ~83
One incident: linked forensic evidence, recent events from the same observed source IP on its server, block history for that IP, saved AI assessment, multi-person assignees, fix and test progress, work history, recorded resolution/operator, findings, timeline, notes and who was paged.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | Incident id |
| org_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incidents_list List incidents ~172
Your org's incidents: what `threatcrush investigate --raise`, the daemon (critical detections) and people raised to humans. Filter by host and explicit since timestamp; only teams you can see. Session token or tc_agent_ key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| host | string | – | Filter incidents whose recorded host contains this value (for example dev2) |
| limit | number | – | Max 500, default 100 |
| org_id | string | – | Organization id (default: the key's org, or your first org) |
| since | string | – | Only incidents last seen at or after this timestamp; pass an explicit timezone when interpreting phrases such as last night |
| status | string | – | Comma list of open, acknowledged, resolved, or all (default all) |
| team_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incidents_raise Raise an incident (pages the team) ~115
Raise an incident report (report_version 1: title, severity, source, dedupe_key, summary, verdict, findings, timeline, recommendations, optional team_id/server_id). The same dedupe_key while open updates it; a new incident pages the team by SMS and email once. Reports that contain anything shaped like a private key or mnemonic are refused. Needs write.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| org_id | string | – | – |
| report | object | yes | The report body, as POST /api/orgs/{id}/incidents takes it |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
incidents_update Update an incident ~187
Update fix work performed by your assigned agent or human: set multiple assignees, fix status, PR URL, test status and evidence, verification or blocker, and/or add a note. ThreatCrush catalogs the incident and does not execute remediation. Closing requires status fixed with passing tests and verification, or false_positive with a reason and verification, plus resolution.reason/action/verification. Needs write.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assignee_id | string|null | – | – |
| assignee_ids | array | – | Replace the assignee list with these active org/team member user IDs; [] clears it. An assignee receives write access to this incident. Use incidents_get to find member IDs and emails. |
| fix_work | object | – | – |
| id | string | yes | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| org_id | string | – | – |
| resolution | object | – | – |
| status | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_invites List my invites ~39
The signed-in account's invites: how many are left of 3, who joined, and whether the bonus credits were paid. Session token only.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
redeem_credit_code Redeem a credit code ~87
Redeem a ThreatCrush credit code (CR-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX) into the signed-in account's credit balance (1 credit = $1.00). Needs the account's session token (`threatcrush login`), not a tc_agent_ key: agent keys belong to a team, not a person.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | The credit code |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
reputation_bulk Look up many IPs or domains ~56
Look up many IPs or domains at once (up to 100 with a free key, 1,000 with Reputation Pro). Results come back in request order; each counts against the daily allowance.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| indicators | array | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
reputation_lookup Look up an IP or domain ~157
Look up an IP address or a domain against the ThreatCrush community threat database (what every linked ThreatCrush daemon blocked). Returns `listed` (the corroboration bar: independent reporters agree), a 0-100 `score`, severity, reports, reporters, rules and country; a domain is answered from its A/AAAA addresses plus nichedb.dev's public answer (abuse.ch, SURBL). With Reputation Pro: 90 days of history, the /24 neighbourhood, the network owner (ASN) and how much of it is listed, city and the reasons behind the score. Registered servers, allowlisted addresses and anyone who logged in are never reported.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| indicator | string | yes | An IP address or a domain |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
webhooks_create Add a webhook endpoint ~74
Add a webhook endpoint (public https URL). Returns the endpoint and its signing secret (whsec_…), shown once.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| description | string | – | – |
| events | array | – | Event patterns: *, detection.created, findings.*, ... (default *) |
| org_id | string | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
webhooks_delete Delete a webhook endpoint ~33
Remove a webhook endpoint and its delivery log.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
| org_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
webhooks_deliveries List webhook deliveries ~58
Recent webhook deliveries (status, attempts, last HTTP status/error, payload), for one endpoint or all.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | – | Endpoint id (optional) |
| limit | number | – | – |
| org_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
webhooks_list List webhook endpoints ~89
Your org's webhook endpoints (signed Standard Webhooks deliveries, retried for about three days) and the events ThreatCrush emits: detection.created, findings.raised, reputation.changed. Endpoints behind a Webhook alert destination follow your alert rules; the others get every event they subscribe to. Org owner/admin session token or an admin tc_agent_ key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| org_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
webhooks_rotate_secret Rotate a webhook signing secret ~45
Replace an endpoint's signing secret; the old one stops working at once. Returns the new secret.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
| org_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
webhooks_test Send a test webhook ~40
Send a signed webhook.test event to one endpoint now and say how it went.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | – |
| org_id | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
webhooks_update Change a webhook endpoint ~76
Change a webhook endpoint's url, events, description, or switch it on/off (on again clears its failure count).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| description | string | – | – |
| enabled | boolean | – | – |
| events | array | – | – |
| id | string | yes | – |
| org_id | string | – | – |
| url | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the threatcrush MCP server?
threatcrush is a hosted endpoint at https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · threatcrush.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-profullstack-threatcrush 'https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp'
What is the threatcrush MCP server?
threatcrush is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.profullstack/threatcrush. Reputation + security findings (threatcrush.com). This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://threatcrush.com/api/mcp).
Is the threatcrush MCP server safe to use?
threatcrush scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the threatcrush MCP server expose?
threatcrush exposes 20 tools: av_hash_lookup, reputation_lookup, reputation_bulk, redeem_credit_code, list_invites, and 15 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,793 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the threatcrush MCP server require authentication?
Yes. threatcrush asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the threatcrush MCP server still maintained?
threatcrush is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the threatcrush MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on threatcrush, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.