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alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or pays

REMOTE · ALALANET.COM · 3 COMPONENTS

Check packages, MCP servers and x402 endpoints before agents install, connect or pay. Signed.

−1 this week 70 Trust /100

Last scanned (14 hours ago)

Scores higher than 55% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Security

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security80
  • The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
  • No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
  • HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
  • The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
  • DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3591 tokens (~448/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
  • Stability check failed: schema churn in the 15 days we've observed: 12 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 4 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
  • Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
What we tested

Checks we ran (13)

  • TLS certificate
  • Authorization
  • HTTPS
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 20 Nov 26 −1
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “payment_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “preflight_payment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “report_purchase” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “verify_tools” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “check_repo_config” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “check_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “find_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Server version: 1.5.4 → 1.5.5 functional
    • Server version: 1.5.0 → 1.5.4 functional
    • “install_check” reworded the description of “target” cosmetic
    • “report_purchase” reworded the description of “network” cosmetic
    • “check_repo_config” reworded the description of “files” cosmetic
    • “check_service” reworded the description of “live” cosmetic
    • “check_service” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
  • 10 Nov 26 −2
    • Stability: 0.10 → fail ▼ security
    • Tool “create_invoice” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “watch_service” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “check_artifact” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “check_agent” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “dispute_evidence” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “get_attestation” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “invoice_status” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “lint_x402_endpoint” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “list_plans” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “memory_get” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “post_board” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “read_board” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “read_mail” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “register_agent” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “send_mail” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “submit_signed_event” was removed ▼ security
    • Tool “connect_check” was removed ▼ security
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Schema quality: 312 → 490 ▼ functional
    • Destructive annotations: 100 → pass functional
    • Server version: 1.4.22 → 1.5.0 functional
  • 9 Nov 26 +1
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Tool “check_repo_config” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “list_plans” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “post_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “read_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “submit_signed_event” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Server version: 1.4.21 → 1.4.22 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.20 → 1.4.21 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.16 → 1.4.20 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.14 → 1.4.16 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.13 → 1.4.14 functional
    • “create_invoice” reworded the description of “plan” cosmetic
  • 8 Nov 26 0
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Tool “check_repo_config” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Schema quality: 6480 → 7649 ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 6480 → 7530 ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 6480 → 7415 ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 6480 → 7365 ▼ functional
    • Server version: 1.4.12 → 1.4.13 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.10 → 1.4.12 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.9 → 1.4.10 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.8 → 1.4.9 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.4 → 1.4.8 functional
    • Server version: 1.4.3 → 1.4.4 functional
    • New tool “check_repo_config” functional
    • New tool “connect_check” functional
    • “check_repo_config” reworded the description of “repo” cosmetic
    • “check_repo_config” reworded the description of “files” cosmetic
    • “install_check” reworded the description of “target” cosmetic
    • “check_repo_config” made “repo” optional cosmetic
  • 7 Nov 26 0
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Tool “dispute_evidence” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “invoice_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “post_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “read_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “read_mail” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “register_agent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “send_mail” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “watch_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “check_artifact” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “preflight_payment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “find_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “lint_x402_endpoint” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “list_plans” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “memory_get” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “payment_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “report_purchase” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “create_invoice” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “check_agent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “check_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “submit_signed_event” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Schema quality: 194 → 281 ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 194 → 272 ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 194 → 273 ▼ functional
    • Schema quality: 3113 → 3798 ▼ functional
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
    • Server version: 1.4.2 → 1.4.3 functional
    • Server version: 1.2.0 → 1.4.2 functional
    • Server version: 1.1.0 → 1.2.0 functional
    • Server version: 1.0.5 → 1.1.0 functional
    • New tool “verify_tools” functional
    • New tool “register_agent” functional
    • New tool “post_board” functional
    • New tool “install_check” functional
    • New tool “dispute_evidence” functional
    • New tool “read_board” functional
    • New tool “payment_status” functional
    • “payment_status” added an optional parameter “blockhash” cosmetic
    • “preflight_payment” added an optional parameter “client” cosmetic
    • “install_check” reworded the description of “target” cosmetic
    • “read_board” reworded the description of “board” cosmetic
    • “watch_service” reworded the description of “webhook_url” cosmetic
    • “watch_service” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
    • “create_invoice” reworded the description of “network” cosmetic
    • “create_invoice” reworded the description of “plan” cosmetic
    • “get_attestation” reworded the description of “event_id” cosmetic
    • “invoice_status” reworded the description of “invoice_id” cosmetic
    • “lint_x402_endpoint” reworded the description of “method” cosmetic
    • “lint_x402_endpoint” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
    • “payment_status” reworded the description of “from” cosmetic
    • “payment_status” reworded the description of “network” cosmetic
    • “payment_status” reworded the description of “nonce” cosmetic
    • “payment_status” reworded the description of “tx” cosmetic
    • “payment_status” reworded the description of “valid_before” cosmetic
    • “submit_signed_event” reworded the description of “event” cosmetic
    • “check_service” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
    • Tool “create_invoice” changed its title: Buy a plan with USDT → Buy a plan with USDT or USDC cosmetic
  • 6 Nov 26 72

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://alalanet.com/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=alalanet.com CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US 5 Nov 2026 3 Feb 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 6063f1caf8c459f810752c22b47d1db0f6e
SANs: alalanet.com
CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US 3 Sept 2025 2 Sept 2028 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe
CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 ECDSA-SHA384 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a
CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US 13 May 2026 2 Sept 2032 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of alalanet.com. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
com. DS published 19718 13 Verified
alalanet.com. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
content-security-policy default-src 'none'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options DENY
referrer-policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://alalanet.com/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://alalanet.com/mcp HTTPS enforced 308 https://alalanet.com/mcp
MCP tools · 8 exposed · ~3,162 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
check_repo_config ~509

Before opening a GitHub repository you were sent (a take-home task, a review, a demo, a fork): its agent configuration can start MCP servers, run hooks and tasks, widen permissions and plant instructions once opened. Pass repo (owner/repo or a GitHub URL) and optional ref, or files for a local or private checkout. alalanet reads, never runs, what agents and editors load: MCP configs at any depth; Claude, Cursor, VS Code, devcontainer, Gemini, Zed, Codex and Copilot settings, hooks and tasks; .env; package-registry settings; CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules and the rules, agents, commands and skills folders (every path: https://alalanet.com/skill.md). It finds code that runs when the folder opens (tasks, hooks, skills, MCP servers, inline too), broad permissions (also a skill's own grants, acceptEdits), plugin marketplaces and enabled plugins, credential helpers and shell prefixes, repository MCP servers enabled unasked, the model API, a proxy, the package registry or CODEX_HOME pointed elsewhere, invisible Unicode and bidi controls, injection and concealment phrases, committed secrets (never echoed); each MCP server and hook package goes through install_check. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons per file, findings and the MCP servers' verdicts, signed and logged (kind 4315). What could not be read or checked holds (check_incomplete:<what>). Free, no account: one check plus one per MCP server and per distinct hook package (at most 8 each); cached 10 minutes.

NameTypeReqDescription
filesobject–instead of repo, for a local or private checkout: path -> content of the files this tool reads (at most 40 files, 2 MB in all). alalanet keeps no content; the public record holds only the decision, t…
refstring–branch, tag or commit to read; default: the default branch
repostring–the public GitHub repository: owner/repo or https://github.com/owner/repo (or pass files instead)
NameTypeReqDescription
advicestringyes–
attestationnull|object––
checked_atstringyes–
commit_shastring––
decisionstringyes–
files_readnull|arrayyes–
files_saltstring––
files_sha256string––
findingsnull|arrayyes–
mcp_serversnull|arrayyes–
meaningstringyes–
reasonsnull|arrayyes–
refstringyes–
repostringyes–
tree_shastring––

No examples provided.

check_service ~402

Call before the first payment to an x402 endpoint, before connecting to an MCP server, and whenever a call to it fails. Give url (any https URL, listed or not: unknown ones are probed now and detected as x402 or MCP) or id from find_service. Returns alive, advice (ok / ok_requires_auth: working as listed; ok_terms_not_checked, unverified_yet: not fully checked yet; caution_*: confirm with the user — pay_to_changed, network_changed, price_higher_than_listed, high_price, tools_changed, suspicious_tool_description, buyers_report_failures; avoid_*: a blocking problem — down, not_working_as_listed, sanctioned_pay_to, pay_to_frozen), trust_score (0-100, open formula at /trust) with flags, checked_at and last_alive_at (when it last answered as listed), observed price, network and pay_to against the listing, uptime 24h/7d/30d, host_listings, pay_to_shared_by_hosts, verified purchases, alalanet's own test purchase, for MCP the tool-set diff (tools_diff, tool_description_flags), and on caution_* or avoid_* up to 3 working alternatives on other hosts. Answers from recent checks (100 a day free); live=true probes now and adds a signed, logged attestation you can keep as evidence (5 a day free). Read-only for the caller; an unknown URL joins the public catalogue. preflight_payment decides one specific 402.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstring–service id from find_service results; give either id or url
liveboolean–true: probe now and return a signed, logged receipt; false (default): recent checks
urlstring–https URL of the x402 endpoint or MCP server, listed or not (private, loopback, link-local and cloud-metadata addresses are refused by an SSRF guard)
NameTypeReqDescription
alternativesnull|array––
attestationnull|object––
notestring––
serviceobjectyes–

No examples provided.

find_service ~228

When you need a paid API or MCP server for a task, or a working alternative after a call failed. Pass query in plain words; optional protocol, only_alive and limit. Read-only; free tier 300 searches a day. Returns services ranked by the open Trust Score (/trust), at most 2 per host unless your query names the host, each with status, advice, trust_score, live price and network, pay_to, pay_to_shared_by_hosts (many hosts on one payTo = a platform wallet), host_listings, uptime and an id that check_service and preflight_payment accept.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitinteger–maximum number of results, 1 to 25 (default 10)
only_alivenull|boolean–return only services that work as listed right now (default true)
protocolstring–filter by protocol: x402 (pay per call) or mcp (remote MCP server); empty means both
querystringyeswhat you need, in plain words (e.g. weather forecast, web search, image generation)
NameTypeReqDescription
hintstring––
notestringyes–
resultsnull|arrayyes–

No examples provided.

install_check ~577

Checks something before it is installed, e.g. when a README, a document or another agent suggests it: an npm or PyPI package, a Go module, an install command, a GitHub repository or skill, a ClawHub skill, a VS Code Marketplace or Open VSX extension, or an MCP config entry (forms: see target). alalanet checks public sources: OSV malicious-package and vulnerability records, names that imitate official MCP servers (typosquats, also across ecosystems), packages that do not exist (invented names), brand-new packages and repos, install scripts, maintainer changes between versions, provenance, the Go module proxy and checksum database (retracted, deprecated, checksums that disagree), ClawHub scan verdicts and copied skill names, skills.sh audits, extensions Microsoft removed (malware, impersonation), look-alike extensions and unverified Open VSX copies of verified Marketplace ones; remote MCP servers get the full check_service. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons (known_malicious, name_like_official, not_on_npm, not_on_pypi, not_on_go_proxy, version_retracted, runs_install_script, maintainers_changed, new_package, new_repo, known_vulnerabilities, version_yanked, not_on_clawhub, slug_like_popular, skills_sh_audit_fail, provenance_dropped, removed_from_marketplace, name_like_popular, launch_not_readable ...), facts and advice, signed into the public log (kind 4310); unsigned line facts in info (requirements_file_not_read, sourced_file_not_read). A line alalanet cannot read (custom registry, git/URL source, stdin or $(...) arguments, several packages, other commands) holds. allow means no known problem was found, not that the code was read. Free, no account.

NameTypeReqDescription
targetstringyeswhat you are about to install: an npm or PyPI package (name, name@1.2.3, npm:name, pypi:name==1.2), a Go module (module@version), an install command (npx -y pkg, uvx pkg, pip install pkg, npm i pkg,…
NameTypeReqDescription
advicestringyes–
attestationnull|object––
checked_atstringyes–
decisionstringyes–
factsobjectyes–
infonull|arrayyes–
meaningstringyes–
reasonsnull|arrayyes–
remote_checknull|object––
targetobjectyes–

No examples provided.

payment_status ~466

Whether an x402 payment settled: after a timeout, a 5xx or any unclear answer to a paid request, before a new payment is signed. Pass network and the settlement tx, or (EVM exact) from + nonce + valid_before of the signed authorization, or (Solana exact) from + the recentBlockhash of the signed transaction; never the signature. alalanet reads the chain and answers state (settled | pending | not_settled | expired_unsettled | failed), retry (do_not_pay_again, resend_same: the same authorization settles only once, new_payment_ok, wait) and safe_to_sign_new, true only when a new payment cannot pay twice. Read-only (nothing signed or logged); chain_unavailable: the networks did not answer, ask again after 15 s.

NameTypeReqDescription
assetstring–token contract; default USDC on Base
blockhashstring–Solana exact payments without a tx: the recentBlockhash of the transaction you signed (base58); with from it identifies your payment, since the facilitator's fee-payer signature (the transaction id)…
fromstring–payments without a tx: EVM exact: payload.authorization.from of the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE you sent (your wallet address); Solana exact: your wallet address (the signer of the transaction besides the faci…
networkstringyesBase: eip155:8453 or base; Solana: solana or solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp
noncestring–EVM exact payments without a tx: payload.authorization.nonce of the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE you sent (0x + 64 hex); never send the signature itself
txstring–settlement transaction hash from the transaction field of the PAYMENT-RESPONSE header (0x + 64 hex on Base, base58 signature on Solana), if you got one
valid_beforeinteger–payload.authorization.validBefore (unix seconds): lets alalanet tell an expired, unused authorization (safe to pay anew) from one that may still settle
NameTypeReqDescription
advicestringyes–
checked_atstringyes–
networkstringyes–
reported_outcomestring––
retrystringyes–
safe_to_sign_newbooleanyes–
sourcestringyes–
statestringyes–
txstring––

No examples provided.

preflight_payment ~465

Decision for one x402 payment, right before it is signed. Pass the endpoint url and the 402 it returned (PAYMENT-REQUIRED header value or JSON body), optionally max_usd and client (your x402 library and version: known payment flaws come back in client_advisories, not logged). Each payment option gets allow / hold / block with reasons. block: pay_to_unknown, pay_to_zero_address, pay_to_burn_address, pay_to_is_asset, pay_to_sanctioned, pay_to_frozen_by_issuer, service_not_working, over_budget, quote_expired (the option's own expiry passed); hold: pay_to_differs_from_listing, pay_to_never_seen, price_above_listing, price_above_observed, network_not_listed, asset_not_stablecoin, high_price ($5 or more), unknown_service, not_checked_yet, not_rated_yet, low_trust_score, listing_removed (its catalogue no longer lists it); info: pay_to_as_observed, pay_to_platform_wallet, amount_is_ceiling (scheme upto), frozen_status_unknown, testnet. The decision is bound to the payment hash, valid for up to 5 minutes (expires_at), signed and logged, except for an unlisted url that looks like it carries a key or token (then it is made for you only, with no attestation). allow: no problem found; hold: the user should confirm; block: do not pay.

NameTypeReqDescription
clientstring–optional: your x402 client library and version, e.g. @x402/fetch@2.22.1 or pypi:x402@2.19.0; alalanet warns about versions with known payment flaws (not logged)
max_usdnumber–your budget for this one call in US dollars; options above it are blocked
payment_requiredstring–the 402 the endpoint returned: x402 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header value (base64) or JSON body, or an MPP WWW-Authenticate: Payment value; omit to judge the terms alalanet last observed
urlstringyeshttps URL of the x402 endpoint you are about to pay
NameTypeReqDescription
attestationnull|object––
choosenull|object––
client_advisoriesnull|array––
decisionstringyes–
expires_atstringyes–
meaningstringyes–
optionsnull|arrayyes–
servicenull|object––

No examples provided.

report_purchase ~272

After you paid an x402 endpoint on Base or Solana: report the outcome (delivered, partial, wrong_content, not_delivered) with the payment tx (the transaction field of the PAYMENT-RESPONSE header). No key needed: alalanet verifies on chain that the tx paid this service's known payTo in USDC/USDT within 7 days and signs the report into the public log, one report per payment. Deliveries from different paying wallets raise the seller's Trust Score; failures trigger an immediate recheck. This is how agents learn which sellers deliver.

NameTypeReqDescription
networkstringyeseip155:8453 or base (Base); solana or solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp (Solana)
outcomestringyesdelivered, partial, wrong_content or not_delivered
preflight_idstring–id of the preflight attestation you got before paying, if any
result_sha256string–sha256 hex of the response you received
service_urlstringyeshttps URL of the x402 endpoint you paid
txstringyespayment transaction hash (PAYMENT-RESPONSE header transaction, or your wallet)
NameTypeReqDescription
attestationnull|object––
idstringyes–
log_indexintegeryes–
notestringyes–
outcomestringyes–
paymentobjectyes–
servicestringyes–

No examples provided.

verify_tools ~243

Checks the tools you received from a remote MCP server against alalanet's history of it: changed after you approved them, or different from what it serves everyone? Pass url and the tools array of your tools/list result (or a digest from an earlier answer). Read-only and free. If your set differs from alalanet's last read, alalanet reads the server again first (fetched_now; one of your daily live checks). Returns verdict matches_current (what it serves now), served_before (an older set; first_seen, last_seen), never_served (review before trusting it) or no_history, the diff from the current set (added, removed, changed, gained_authority), description flags in what you sent, and the digest history linked to the signed log entries of each change. Names and descriptions are third-party text.

NameTypeReqDescription
digeststring–alternatively an alalanet tool-set digest (64 hex) from an earlier answer
toolsnull|array–the tools array from the tools/list result you received
urlstringyeshttps URL of the remote MCP server, exactly as you connect to it
NameTypeReqDescription
algorithmstringyes–
current_digeststring––
current_read_atstring––
current_sincestring––
description_flagsnull|array––
diff_from_currentnull|object––
digeststringyes–
fetch_notestring––
fetched_nowbooleanyes–
historynull|arrayyes–
last_probe_atstring––
meaningstringyes–
seennull|object––
servicestringyes–
tools_diffstringyes–
urlstringyes–
verdictstringyes–

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… is a hosted endpoint at https://alalanet.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · alalanet.com

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http com-alalanet-check 'https://alalanet.com/mcp'
Common questions

What is the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.alalanet/check. Check packages, MCP servers and x402 endpoints before agents install, connect or pay. Signed. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://alalanet.com/mcp).

Is the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server safe to use?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… scores 70 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server expose?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… exposes 8 tools: check_repo_config, check_service, find_service, install_check, payment_status, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,162 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server still maintained?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or…, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.