# alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or pays (remote · alalanet.com)

Check packages, MCP servers and x402 endpoints before agents install, connect or pay. Signed.

- Trust score: 70/100 (medium)
- Change this week: −1
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-21

## Components

- remote · `alalanet.com`: 70/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet)
- remote · `alalanet.com`: 72/100, [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet-2.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet-2)
- remote · `alalanet.com`: 76/100, [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/mcp-full.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/mcp-full)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://alalanet.com/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.5.5`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-21.

- **Endpoint Security**: 80/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 58/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 3591 tokens (~448/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 0/100
  - Stability check failed: schema churn in the 15 days we've observed: 12 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 4 additions.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.
  - An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).

## Install

### How do I install the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… is a hosted endpoint at https://alalanet.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http com-alalanet-check 'https://alalanet.com/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-alalanet-check": {
      "url": "https://alalanet.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "com-alalanet-check": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://alalanet.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.com-alalanet-check]
url = "https://alalanet.com/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-alalanet-check": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://alalanet.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add com-alalanet-check --url 'https://alalanet.com/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-alalanet-check:
    url: "https://alalanet.com/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "com-alalanet-check": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://alalanet.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add com-alalanet-check -t streamable-http -u 'https://alalanet.com/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-alalanet-check": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://alalanet.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-20 (score 70, −1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “payment_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “preflight_payment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “report_purchase” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “verify_tools” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “check_repo_config” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “check_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “find_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional] Server version: 1.5.4 → 1.5.5
- [functional] Server version: 1.5.0 → 1.5.4
- [cosmetic] “install_check” reworded the description of “target”
- [cosmetic] “report_purchase” reworded the description of “network”
- [cosmetic] “check_repo_config” reworded the description of “files”
- [cosmetic] “check_service” reworded the description of “live”
- [cosmetic] “check_service” reworded the description of “url”

### 2026-11-10 (score 71, −2)

- [security regression] Stability: 0.10 → fail
- [security regression] Tool “create_invoice” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “watch_service” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “check_artifact” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “check_agent” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “dispute_evidence” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “get_attestation” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “invoice_status” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “lint_x402_endpoint” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “list_plans” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “memory_get” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “post_board” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “read_board” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “read_mail” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “register_agent” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “send_mail” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “submit_signed_event” was removed
- [security regression] Tool “connect_check” was removed
- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 312 → 490
- [functional] Destructive annotations: 100 → pass
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.22 → 1.5.0

### 2026-11-09 (score 73, +1)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “check_repo_config” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “list_plans” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “post_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “read_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “submit_signed_event” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.21 → 1.4.22
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.20 → 1.4.21
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.16 → 1.4.20
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.14 → 1.4.16
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.13 → 1.4.14
- [cosmetic] “create_invoice” reworded the description of “plan”

### 2026-11-08 (score 72, 0)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “check_repo_config” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 6480 → 7649
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 6480 → 7530
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 6480 → 7415
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 6480 → 7365
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.12 → 1.4.13
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.10 → 1.4.12
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.9 → 1.4.10
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.8 → 1.4.9
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.4 → 1.4.8
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.3 → 1.4.4
- [functional] New tool “check_repo_config”
- [functional] New tool “connect_check”
- [cosmetic] “check_repo_config” reworded the description of “repo”
- [cosmetic] “check_repo_config” reworded the description of “files”
- [cosmetic] “install_check” reworded the description of “target”
- [cosmetic] “check_repo_config” made “repo” optional

### 2026-11-07 (score 72, 0)

- [security] The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads
- [security] Tool “dispute_evidence” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “invoice_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “post_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “read_board” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “read_mail” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “register_agent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “send_mail” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “watch_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “check_artifact” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “preflight_payment” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “find_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “lint_x402_endpoint” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “list_plans” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “memory_get” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “payment_status” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “report_purchase” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “create_invoice” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “check_agent” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “check_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [security] Tool “submit_signed_event” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 194 → 281
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 194 → 272
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 194 → 273
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 3113 → 3798
- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03
- [functional] Server version: 1.4.2 → 1.4.3
- [functional] Server version: 1.2.0 → 1.4.2
- [functional] Server version: 1.1.0 → 1.2.0
- [functional] Server version: 1.0.5 → 1.1.0
- [functional] New tool “verify_tools”
- [functional] New tool “register_agent”
- [functional] New tool “post_board”
- [functional] New tool “install_check”
- [functional] New tool “dispute_evidence”
- [functional] New tool “read_board”
- [functional] New tool “payment_status”
- [cosmetic] “payment_status” added an optional parameter “blockhash”
- [cosmetic] “preflight_payment” added an optional parameter “client”
- [cosmetic] “install_check” reworded the description of “target”
- [cosmetic] “read_board” reworded the description of “board”
- [cosmetic] “watch_service” reworded the description of “webhook_url”
- [cosmetic] “watch_service” reworded the description of “url”
- [cosmetic] “create_invoice” reworded the description of “network”
- [cosmetic] “create_invoice” reworded the description of “plan”
- [cosmetic] “get_attestation” reworded the description of “event_id”
- [cosmetic] “invoice_status” reworded the description of “invoice_id”
- [cosmetic] “lint_x402_endpoint” reworded the description of “method”
- [cosmetic] “lint_x402_endpoint” reworded the description of “url”
- [cosmetic] “payment_status” reworded the description of “from”
- [cosmetic] “payment_status” reworded the description of “network”
- [cosmetic] “payment_status” reworded the description of “nonce”
- [cosmetic] “payment_status” reworded the description of “tx”
- [cosmetic] “payment_status” reworded the description of “valid_before”
- [cosmetic] “submit_signed_event” reworded the description of “event”
- [cosmetic] “check_service” reworded the description of “url”
- [cosmetic] Tool “create_invoice” changed its title: Buy a plan with USDT → Buy a plan with USDT or USDC

### 2026-11-06 (score 72)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (8)

### `check_repo_config` (~509 tokens)

Is it safe to open this repository in an agent?

Before opening a GitHub repository you were sent (a take-home task, a review, a demo, a fork): its agent configuration can start MCP servers, run hooks and tasks, widen permissions and plant instructions once opened. Pass repo (owner/repo or a GitHub URL) and optional ref, or files for a local or private checkout. alalanet reads, never runs, what agents and editors load: MCP configs at any depth; Claude, Cursor, VS Code, devcontainer, Gemini, Zed, Codex and Copilot settings, hooks and tasks; .env; package-registry settings; CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules and the rules, agents, commands and skills folders (every path: https://alalanet.com/skill.md). It finds code that runs when the folder opens (tasks, hooks, skills, MCP servers, inline too), broad permissions (also a skill's own grants, acceptEdits), plugin marketplaces and enabled plugins, credential helpers and shell prefixes, repository MCP servers enabled unasked, the model API, a proxy, the package registry or CODEX_HOME pointed elsewhere, invisible Unicode and bidi controls, injection and concealment phrases, committed secrets (never echoed); each MCP server and hook package goes through install_check. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons per file, findings and the MCP servers' verdicts, signed and logged (kind 4315). What could not be read or checked holds (check_incomplete:<what>). Free, no account: one check plus one per MCP server and per distinct hook package (at most 8 each); cached 10 minutes.

Input parameters:

- `files` (object): instead of repo, for a local or private checkout: path -> content of the files this tool reads (at most 40 files, 2 MB in all). alalanet keeps no content; the public record holds only the decision, t…
- `ref` (string): branch, tag or commit to read; default: the default branch
- `repo` (string): the public GitHub repository: owner/repo or https://github.com/owner/repo (or pass files instead)

Output parameters:

- `advice` (string)
- `attestation` (null|object)
- `checked_at` (string)
- `commit_sha` (string)
- `decision` (string)
- `files_read` (null|array)
- `files_salt` (string)
- `files_sha256` (string)
- `findings` (null|array)
- `mcp_servers` (null|array)
- `meaning` (string)
- `reasons` (null|array)
- `ref` (string)
- `repo` (string)
- `tree_sha` (string)

### `check_service` (~402 tokens)

Check a service before paying or connecting

Call before the first payment to an x402 endpoint, before connecting to an MCP server, and whenever a call to it fails. Give url (any https URL, listed or not: unknown ones are probed now and detected as x402 or MCP) or id from find_service. Returns alive, advice (ok / ok_requires_auth: working as listed; ok_terms_not_checked, unverified_yet: not fully checked yet; caution_*: confirm with the user — pay_to_changed, network_changed, price_higher_than_listed, high_price, tools_changed, suspicious_tool_description, buyers_report_failures; avoid_*: a blocking problem — down, not_working_as_listed, sanctioned_pay_to, pay_to_frozen), trust_score (0-100, open formula at /trust) with flags, checked_at and last_alive_at (when it last answered as listed), observed price, network and pay_to against the listing, uptime 24h/7d/30d, host_listings, pay_to_shared_by_hosts, verified purchases, alalanet's own test purchase, for MCP the tool-set diff (tools_diff, tool_description_flags), and on caution_* or avoid_* up to 3 working alternatives on other hosts. Answers from recent checks (100 a day free); live=true probes now and adds a signed, logged attestation you can keep as evidence (5 a day free). Read-only for the caller; an unknown URL joins the public catalogue. preflight_payment decides one specific 402.

Input parameters:

- `id` (string): service id from find_service results; give either id or url
- `live` (boolean): true: probe now and return a signed, logged receipt; false (default): recent checks
- `url` (string): https URL of the x402 endpoint or MCP server, listed or not (private, loopback, link-local and cloud-metadata addresses are refused by an SSRF guard)

Output parameters:

- `alternatives` (null|array)
- `attestation` (null|object)
- `note` (string)
- `service` (object)

### `find_service` (~228 tokens)

Find working agent services

When you need a paid API or MCP server for a task, or a working alternative after a call failed. Pass query in plain words; optional protocol, only_alive and limit. Read-only; free tier 300 searches a day. Returns services ranked by the open Trust Score (/trust), at most 2 per host unless your query names the host, each with status, advice, trust_score, live price and network, pay_to, pay_to_shared_by_hosts (many hosts on one payTo = a platform wallet), host_listings, uptime and an id that check_service and preflight_payment accept.

Input parameters:

- `limit` (integer): maximum number of results, 1 to 25 (default 10)
- `only_alive` (null|boolean): return only services that work as listed right now (default true)
- `protocol` (string): filter by protocol: x402 (pay per call) or mcp (remote MCP server); empty means both
- `query` (string, required): what you need, in plain words (e.g. weather forecast, web search, image generation)

Output parameters:

- `hint` (string)
- `note` (string)
- `results` (null|array)

### `install_check` (~577 tokens)

Is it safe to install this package, repo, skill or MCP server?

Checks something before it is installed, e.g. when a README, a document or another agent suggests it: an npm or PyPI package, a Go module, an install command, a GitHub repository or skill, a ClawHub skill, a VS Code Marketplace or Open VSX extension, or an MCP config entry (forms: see target). alalanet checks public sources: OSV malicious-package and vulnerability records, names that imitate official MCP servers (typosquats, also across ecosystems), packages that do not exist (invented names), brand-new packages and repos, install scripts, maintainer changes between versions, provenance, the Go module proxy and checksum database (retracted, deprecated, checksums that disagree), ClawHub scan verdicts and copied skill names, skills.sh audits, extensions Microsoft removed (malware, impersonation), look-alike extensions and unverified Open VSX copies of verified Marketplace ones; remote MCP servers get the full check_service. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons (known_malicious, name_like_official, not_on_npm, not_on_pypi, not_on_go_proxy, version_retracted, runs_install_script, maintainers_changed, new_package, new_repo, known_vulnerabilities, version_yanked, not_on_clawhub, slug_like_popular, skills_sh_audit_fail, provenance_dropped, removed_from_marketplace, name_like_popular, launch_not_readable ...), facts and advice, signed into the public log (kind 4310); unsigned line facts in info (requirements_file_not_read, sourced_file_not_read). A line alalanet cannot read (custom registry, git/URL source, stdin or $(...) arguments, several packages, other commands) holds. allow means no known problem was found, not that the code was read. Free, no account.

Input parameters:

- `target` (string, required): what you are about to install: an npm or PyPI package (name, name@1.2.3, npm:name, pypi:name==1.2), a Go module (module@version), an install command (npx -y pkg, uvx pkg, pip install pkg, npm i pkg,…

Output parameters:

- `advice` (string)
- `attestation` (null|object)
- `checked_at` (string)
- `decision` (string)
- `facts` (object)
- `info` (null|array)
- `meaning` (string)
- `reasons` (null|array)
- `remote_check` (null|object)
- `target` (object)

### `payment_status` (~466 tokens)

Did my x402 payment settle? May I pay again?

Whether an x402 payment settled: after a timeout, a 5xx or any unclear answer to a paid request, before a new payment is signed. Pass network and the settlement tx, or (EVM exact) from + nonce + valid_before of the signed authorization, or (Solana exact) from + the recentBlockhash of the signed transaction; never the signature. alalanet reads the chain and answers state (settled | pending | not_settled | expired_unsettled | failed), retry (do_not_pay_again, resend_same: the same authorization settles only once, new_payment_ok, wait) and safe_to_sign_new, true only when a new payment cannot pay twice. Read-only (nothing signed or logged); chain_unavailable: the networks did not answer, ask again after 15 s.

Input parameters:

- `asset` (string): token contract; default USDC on Base
- `blockhash` (string): Solana exact payments without a tx: the recentBlockhash of the transaction you signed (base58); with from it identifies your payment, since the facilitator's fee-payer signature (the transaction id)…
- `from` (string): payments without a tx: EVM exact: payload.authorization.from of the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE you sent (your wallet address); Solana exact: your wallet address (the signer of the transaction besides the faci…
- `network` (string, required): Base: eip155:8453 or base; Solana: solana or solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp
- `nonce` (string): EVM exact payments without a tx: payload.authorization.nonce of the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE you sent (0x + 64 hex); never send the signature itself
- `tx` (string): settlement transaction hash from the transaction field of the PAYMENT-RESPONSE header (0x + 64 hex on Base, base58 signature on Solana), if you got one
- `valid_before` (integer): payload.authorization.validBefore (unix seconds): lets alalanet tell an expired, unused authorization (safe to pay anew) from one that may still settle

Output parameters:

- `advice` (string)
- `checked_at` (string)
- `network` (string)
- `reported_outcome` (string)
- `retry` (string)
- `safe_to_sign_new` (boolean)
- `source` (string)
- `state` (string)
- `tx` (string)

### `preflight_payment` (~465 tokens)

Decide before paying an x402 endpoint

Decision for one x402 payment, right before it is signed. Pass the endpoint url and the 402 it returned (PAYMENT-REQUIRED header value or JSON body), optionally max_usd and client (your x402 library and version: known payment flaws come back in client_advisories, not logged). Each payment option gets allow / hold / block with reasons. block: pay_to_unknown, pay_to_zero_address, pay_to_burn_address, pay_to_is_asset, pay_to_sanctioned, pay_to_frozen_by_issuer, service_not_working, over_budget, quote_expired (the option's own expiry passed); hold: pay_to_differs_from_listing, pay_to_never_seen, price_above_listing, price_above_observed, network_not_listed, asset_not_stablecoin, high_price ($5 or more), unknown_service, not_checked_yet, not_rated_yet, low_trust_score, listing_removed (its catalogue no longer lists it); info: pay_to_as_observed, pay_to_platform_wallet, amount_is_ceiling (scheme upto), frozen_status_unknown, testnet. The decision is bound to the payment hash, valid for up to 5 minutes (expires_at), signed and logged, except for an unlisted url that looks like it carries a key or token (then it is made for you only, with no attestation). allow: no problem found; hold: the user should confirm; block: do not pay.

Input parameters:

- `client` (string): optional: your x402 client library and version, e.g. @x402/fetch@2.22.1 or pypi:x402@2.19.0; alalanet warns about versions with known payment flaws (not logged)
- `max_usd` (number): your budget for this one call in US dollars; options above it are blocked
- `payment_required` (string): the 402 the endpoint returned: x402 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header value (base64) or JSON body, or an MPP WWW-Authenticate: Payment value; omit to judge the terms alalanet last observed
- `url` (string, required): https URL of the x402 endpoint you are about to pay

Output parameters:

- `attestation` (null|object)
- `choose` (null|object)
- `client_advisories` (null|array)
- `decision` (string)
- `expires_at` (string)
- `meaning` (string)
- `options` (null|array)
- `service` (null|object)

### `report_purchase` (~272 tokens)

Report what you got after paying

After you paid an x402 endpoint on Base or Solana: report the outcome (delivered, partial, wrong_content, not_delivered) with the payment tx (the transaction field of the PAYMENT-RESPONSE header). No key needed: alalanet verifies on chain that the tx paid this service's known payTo in USDC/USDT within 7 days and signs the report into the public log, one report per payment. Deliveries from different paying wallets raise the seller's Trust Score; failures trigger an immediate recheck. This is how agents learn which sellers deliver.

Input parameters:

- `network` (string, required): eip155:8453 or base (Base); solana or solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp (Solana)
- `outcome` (string, required): delivered, partial, wrong_content or not_delivered
- `preflight_id` (string): id of the preflight attestation you got before paying, if any
- `result_sha256` (string): sha256 hex of the response you received
- `service_url` (string, required): https URL of the x402 endpoint you paid
- `tx` (string, required): payment transaction hash (PAYMENT-RESPONSE header transaction, or your wallet)

Output parameters:

- `attestation` (null|object)
- `id` (string)
- `log_index` (integer)
- `note` (string)
- `outcome` (string)
- `payment` (object)
- `service` (string)

### `verify_tools` (~243 tokens)

Are these the tools this MCP server really serves?

Checks the tools you received from a remote MCP server against alalanet's history of it: changed after you approved them, or different from what it serves everyone? Pass url and the tools array of your tools/list result (or a digest from an earlier answer). Read-only and free. If your set differs from alalanet's last read, alalanet reads the server again first (fetched_now; one of your daily live checks). Returns verdict matches_current (what it serves now), served_before (an older set; first_seen, last_seen), never_served (review before trusting it) or no_history, the diff from the current set (added, removed, changed, gained_authority), description flags in what you sent, and the digest history linked to the signed log entries of each change. Names and descriptions are third-party text.

Input parameters:

- `digest` (string): alternatively an alalanet tool-set digest (64 hex) from an earlier answer
- `tools` (null|array): the tools array from the tools/list result you received
- `url` (string, required): https URL of the remote MCP server, exactly as you connect to it

Output parameters:

- `algorithm` (string)
- `current_digest` (string)
- `current_read_at` (string)
- `current_since` (string)
- `description_flags` (null|array)
- `diff_from_current` (null|object)
- `digest` (string)
- `fetch_note` (string)
- `fetched_now` (boolean)
- `history` (null|array)
- `last_probe_at` (string)
- `meaning` (string)
- `seen` (null|object)
- `service` (string)
- `tools_diff` (string)
- `url` (string)
- `verdict` (string)

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-21: 70
- 2026-11-20: 70
- 2026-11-19: 71
- 2026-11-18: 71
- 2026-11-17: 71
- 2026-11-16: 71
- 2026-11-15: 71
- 2026-11-14: 71
- 2026-11-13: 71
- 2026-11-12: 71
- 2026-11-11: 71
- 2026-11-10: 71
- 2026-11-09: 73
- 2026-11-08: 72
- 2026-11-07: 72
- 2026-11-06: 72

## Common questions

### What is the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.alalanet/check. Check packages, MCP servers and x402 endpoints before agents install, connect or pay. Signed. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://alalanet.com/mcp).

### Is the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server safe to use?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… scores 70 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server expose?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… exposes 8 tools: check_repo_config, check_service, find_service, install_check, payment_status, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,162 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server still maintained?

alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What did VerifyMCP test on the alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or… MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on alalanet — check before your agent installs, connects or…, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://alalanet.com/mcp
- Repository: https://github.com/alalanet/alalanet-agent
- Website: https://alalanet.com/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet/changelog.json
- Trust report (JSON): https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/com-alalanet-check/alalanet
