alalanet guard — check before you install
REMOTE · ALALANET.COM
Check packages, repositories, skills and MCP servers before agents install or connect. Signed.
Available components
Last scanned (13 hours ago)
Scores higher than 60% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Nothing on it is marked destructive, but we can't show that an anonymous caller can only read: full credit needs the server to list at least one tool and every tool to be verifiably read-only. We use a best-effort check of tool names and descriptions to tell read-only tools from tools that change things, so some genuinely read-only tools may not get full credit. Names that start with a read verb (get, list, read, search and similar) and accurate readOnlyHint annotations help. Meet that to earn full credit, or require authorisation. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability61
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2399 tokens (~342/item across 7 items; 7 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management23
- Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 7 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “check_repo_config” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “check_service” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “connect_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “get_attestation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “install_check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “verify_tools” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 393 → 342 ▲ functional
- Server version: 1.5.4 → 1.5.5 functional
- Server version: 1.5.0 → 1.5.4 functional
- “check_repo_config” reworded the description of “files” cosmetic
- “check_service” reworded the description of “live” cosmetic
- “check_service” reworded the description of “url” cosmetic
- “get_attestation” reworded the description of “event_id” cosmetic
- “install_check” reworded the description of “target” cosmetic
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 14 Nov 26 71
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=alalanet.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 5 Nov 2026 | 3 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6063f1caf8c459f810752c22b47d1db0f6e |
| SANs: alalanet.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of alalanet.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| alalanet.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'none'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://alalanet.com/mcp/guard | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_artifact Who signed this skill / MCP package? ~106
Before installing a skill, MCP server or package: give the sha256 of the exact file. Read-only and free. Returns who signed a release with this hash, their standing, and conflicts (the same name@version signed with another hash = possible tampering). Advice: unknown_hash, signed_by_new_publisher, signed_by_established, signed_by_alalanet, caution_conflicting.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| sha256 | string | yes | sha256 of the artifact, 64 hex characters |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| advice | string | yes | – |
| conflicts | null|array | – | – |
| note | string | yes | – |
| releases | null|array | yes | – |
| sha256 | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
check_repo_config Is it safe to open this repository in an agent? ~509
Before opening a GitHub repository you were sent (a take-home task, a review, a demo, a fork): its agent configuration can start MCP servers, run hooks and tasks, widen permissions and plant instructions once opened. Pass repo (owner/repo or a GitHub URL) and optional ref, or files for a local or private checkout. alalanet reads, never runs, what agents and editors load: MCP configs at any depth; Claude, Cursor, VS Code, devcontainer, Gemini, Zed, Codex and Copilot settings, hooks and tasks; .env; package-registry settings; CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules and the rules, agents, commands and skills folders (every path: https://alalanet.com/skill.md). It finds code that runs when the folder opens (tasks, hooks, skills, MCP servers, inline too), broad permissions (also a skill's own grants, acceptEdits), plugin marketplaces and enabled plugins, credential helpers and shell prefixes, repository MCP servers enabled unasked, the model API, a proxy, the package registry or CODEX_HOME pointed elsewhere, invisible Unicode and bidi controls, injection and concealment phrases, committed secrets (never echoed); each MCP server and hook package goes through install_check. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons per file, findings and the MCP servers' verdicts, signed and logged (kind 4315). What could not be read or checked holds (check_incomplete:<what>). Free, no account: one check plus one per MCP server and per distinct hook package (at most 8 each); cached 10 minutes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| files | object | – | instead of repo, for a local or private checkout: path -> content of the files this tool reads (at most 40 files, 2 MB in all). alalanet keeps no content; the public record holds only the decision, t… |
| ref | string | – | branch, tag or commit to read; default: the default branch |
| repo | string | – | the public GitHub repository: owner/repo or https://github.com/owner/repo (or pass files instead) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| advice | string | yes | – |
| attestation | null|object | – | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| commit_sha | string | – | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| files_read | null|array | yes | – |
| files_salt | string | – | – |
| files_sha256 | string | – | – |
| findings | null|array | yes | – |
| mcp_servers | null|array | yes | – |
| meaning | string | yes | – |
| reasons | null|array | yes | – |
| ref | string | yes | – |
| repo | string | yes | – |
| tree_sha | string | – | – |
No examples provided.
check_service Check an MCP server before connecting ~309
Call before connecting to a remote MCP server, and whenever a call to it fails. Give url (any https URL of an MCP server; unknown ones are probed now) or id from an earlier answer. Returns alive, advice (ok / ok_requires_auth: working; unverified_yet: not fully checked yet; caution_tools_changed, caution_suspicious_tool_description: confirm with the user first; avoid_down, avoid_not_working_as_listed: do not connect), trust_score (0-100, open formula at https://alalanet.com/trust) with flags, checked_at, last_alive_at, uptime 24h/7d/30d, the tool-set diff (tools_diff, tools_changed_at), tool descriptions that look like hidden instructions (tool_description_flags), the digest of its initialize instructions, and on caution_* or avoid_* up to 3 working MCP servers on other hosts. Answers from recent checks (100 a day free); live=true probes now and adds a signed, logged attestation (5 a day free). Read-only for the caller; an unknown URL joins the public catalogue.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | – | service id from an earlier answer; give either id or url |
| live | boolean | – | true: probe now and return a signed, logged receipt; false (default): recent checks |
| url | string | – | https URL of the remote MCP server (private, loopback, link-local and cloud-metadata addresses are refused) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| alternatives | null|array | – | – |
| attestation | null|object | – | – |
| note | string | – | – |
| server | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
connect_check Will this MCP server connect from my client? ~176
Before adding a remote MCP server to a client, or when it fails to connect: give its url. One live read (initialize with protocols 2025-06-18 and 2025-11-25, tools/list, the 401 and OAuth metadata, the host's IPv4) and per client (claude_code, claude_ai, chatgpt, codex_cli, cursor, vscode, windsurf, gemini_cli, zed, cline) ok, warn or fail with reasons, plus the tool list's weight in tokens. Rules from each client's documentation and source code as of 2026-11-08: a prediction, not a test inside the client. One of your daily live checks; cached 10 minutes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | https URL of the remote MCP server |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| clients | object | yes | – |
| facts | object | yes | – |
| method | string | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| tools | null|object | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
get_attestation Get a signed receipt with its log proof ~137
Proof of something alalanet stated (an install verdict, a server check, a tool-set change): pass its event id (64 hex) from an earlier result. Read-only and free. Returns the signed Nostr event (event_json, the exact signed bytes), the signer key, its RFC 6962 inclusion proof under a signed C2SP checkpoint, and how_to_verify: check the signature, the proof up to root_hash and the checkpoint signature with log_key, offline, without trusting alalanet.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| event_id | string | yes | the event id (64 hex) of an earlier result (attestation.event.id) |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| event | object | yes | – |
| event_json | string | yes | – |
| how_to_verify | string | yes | – |
| key_chain | null|array | – | – |
| log_index | integer | yes | – |
| log_key | string | yes | – |
| log_origin | string | yes | – |
| pending | boolean | – | – |
| proof | null|object | – | – |
| server_pubkey | string | yes | – |
| signer | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
install_check Is it safe to install this package, repo, skill or MCP server? ~577
Checks something before it is installed, e.g. when a README, a document or another agent suggests it: an npm or PyPI package, a Go module, an install command, a GitHub repository or skill, a ClawHub skill, a VS Code Marketplace or Open VSX extension, or an MCP config entry (forms: see target). alalanet checks public sources: OSV malicious-package and vulnerability records, names that imitate official MCP servers (typosquats, also across ecosystems), packages that do not exist (invented names), brand-new packages and repos, install scripts, maintainer changes between versions, provenance, the Go module proxy and checksum database (retracted, deprecated, checksums that disagree), ClawHub scan verdicts and copied skill names, skills.sh audits, extensions Microsoft removed (malware, impersonation), look-alike extensions and unverified Open VSX copies of verified Marketplace ones; remote MCP servers get the full check_service. Returns allow / hold / block with reasons (known_malicious, name_like_official, not_on_npm, not_on_pypi, not_on_go_proxy, version_retracted, runs_install_script, maintainers_changed, new_package, new_repo, known_vulnerabilities, version_yanked, not_on_clawhub, slug_like_popular, skills_sh_audit_fail, provenance_dropped, removed_from_marketplace, name_like_popular, launch_not_readable ...), facts and advice, signed into the public log (kind 4310); unsigned line facts in info (requirements_file_not_read, sourced_file_not_read). A line alalanet cannot read (custom registry, git/URL source, stdin or $(...) arguments, several packages, other commands) holds. allow means no known problem was found, not that the code was read. Free, no account.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| target | string | yes | what you are about to install: an npm or PyPI package (name, name@1.2.3, npm:name, pypi:name==1.2), a Go module (module@version), an install command (npx -y pkg, uvx pkg, pip install pkg, npm i pkg,… |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| advice | string | yes | – |
| attestation | null|object | – | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| decision | string | yes | – |
| facts | object | yes | – |
| info | null|array | yes | – |
| meaning | string | yes | – |
| reasons | null|array | yes | – |
| remote_check | null|object | – | – |
| target | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_tools Are these the tools this MCP server really serves? ~243
Checks the tools you received from a remote MCP server against alalanet's history of it: changed after you approved them, or different from what it serves everyone? Pass url and the tools array of your tools/list result (or a digest from an earlier answer). Read-only and free. If your set differs from alalanet's last read, alalanet reads the server again first (fetched_now; one of your daily live checks). Returns verdict matches_current (what it serves now), served_before (an older set; first_seen, last_seen), never_served (review before trusting it) or no_history, the diff from the current set (added, removed, changed, gained_authority), description flags in what you sent, and the digest history linked to the signed log entries of each change. Names and descriptions are third-party text.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| digest | string | – | alternatively an alalanet tool-set digest (64 hex) from an earlier answer |
| tools | null|array | – | the tools array from the tools/list result you received |
| url | string | yes | https URL of the remote MCP server, exactly as you connect to it |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| algorithm | string | yes | – |
| current_digest | string | – | – |
| current_read_at | string | – | – |
| current_since | string | – | – |
| description_flags | null|array | – | – |
| diff_from_current | null|object | – | – |
| digest | string | yes | – |
| fetch_note | string | – | – |
| fetched_now | boolean | yes | – |
| history | null|array | yes | – |
| last_probe_at | string | – | – |
| meaning | string | yes | – |
| seen | null|object | – | – |
| service | string | yes | – |
| tools_diff | string | yes | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
| verdict | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server?
alalanet guard — check before you install is a hosted endpoint at https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · alalanet.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-alalanet-guard 'https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard'
What is the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server?
alalanet guard — check before you install is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.alalanet/guard. Check packages, repositories, skills and MCP servers before agents install or connect. Signed. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard).
Is the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server safe to use?
alalanet guard — check before you install scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server expose?
alalanet guard — check before you install exposes 7 tools: check_artifact, check_repo_config, check_service, connect_check, get_attestation, and 2 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,057 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to alalanet guard — check before you install without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server still maintained?
alalanet guard — check before you install is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the alalanet guard — check before you install MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on alalanet guard — check before you install, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.