io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp
REMOTE · DOKIMO.AUGASTER.COM
Verify AI-agent revenue: recompute a Merkle proof and check it against an on-chain anchor.
Available components
Last scanned (20 hours ago)
Scores higher than 89% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability71
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 630 tokens (~210/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management97
- Stability observed for 29 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 3 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 24 Oct 26 −1
- Tool “recompute_merkle_root” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “verify_evidence_package” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 177 → 210 ▼ functional
- “verify_evidence_package” reworded the description of “package” cosmetic
- 10 Oct 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 9 Oct 26 +2
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 6 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 73 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 22 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=augaster.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 28 Oct 2026 | 26 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 670a2af7fb8e9f950ea02245f99c98b3 |
| SANs: augaster.com, *.augaster.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of dokimo.augaster.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| augaster.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
dokimo_agent_card ~42
Fetch Dokimo's public A2A agent card — the discovery document describing what it can verify (skills, endpoints, supported A2A versions).
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
recompute_merkle_root ~245
Recompute a dokimo-merkle-v1 root locally — no network call, no anchor check. Hash ``leaf`` in the leaf domain (H(0x00 ‖ leaf)) and replay ``proof_path`` — a list of ``[sibling_hash, side]`` where side is "L" or "R" — hashing internal nodes as H(0x01 ‖ left ‖ right). Compare the returned root to the ``root`` in an evidence package yourself; if it differs, the package was tampered with. Returns ``{recomputed_root, merkle_scheme, steps}``.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| leaf | string | yes | The raw leaf value (e.g. a JSON string like '{"k":"total_assets","v":"..."}'). Hashed in the leaf domain as H(0x00 ‖ leaf). |
| proof_path | array | yes | Ordered Merkle proof path: a list of [sibling_hash_hex, side] pairs, where side is "L" if the sibling is on the left or "R" if on the right. Empty list for a single-leaf tree. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_evidence_package ~343
Ask Dokimo to check one record of an evidence package against the on-chain anchor. Sends the package to Dokimo's public A2A endpoint, which recomputes the Merkle proof AND checks the anchored commitment (root + rule version, plus the close summary for v2) against the anchor on Base. The verdict is Dokimo's answer and is not signed. ``package`` must contain: ``leaf`` (str), ``root`` (str), ``proof_path`` (list of [sibling_hash, "L"|"R"]), and ``rule_version_commitment`` (str); for a v2 close also ``summary`` and ``binding``; ``close_id`` is optional/echoed. Returns the verdict: ``{verified, checks:{recompute, onchain_anchor, rule_version_bound}, ...}``. ``verified`` is true only if the proof recomputes AND the commitment is anchored on-chain. It covers this one record only.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| package | object | yes | The Dokimo evidence package to verify. Required keys: 'leaf' (str), 'root' (str), 'proof_path' (list of [sibling_hash, "L"|"R"]), and 'rule_version_commitment' (str). For a dokimo-anchor-v2 close (ev… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp server?
io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp is a hosted endpoint at https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · dokimo.augaster.com
claude mcp add --transport http ypratap11-dokimo-mcp 'https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp'
What is the io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp server?
io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp. Verify AI-agent revenue: recompute a Merkle proof and check it against an on-chain anchor. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp).
Is the io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp server safe to use?
io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp scores 84 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp server expose?
io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp exposes 3 tools: recompute_merkle_root, verify_evidence_package, dokimo_agent_card. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 630 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp server require authentication?
No. We connected to io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp server still maintained?
io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.