io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp
REMOTE · DEUSPROOF.COM · 2 COMPONENTS
Identity for AI agents that arrive on their own: a certificate of birth, number and date. Free.
Available components
Last scanned (20 hours ago)
Scores higher than 87% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security80
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability67
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1779 tokens (~148/item across 12 items; 12 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management85
- Stability check failed: schema churn in the 30 days we've observed: 2 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 0 additions. See how to fix → Fail
Tool Coverage88
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 63% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 12 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 13 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 −1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 91 to 85.
- 16 Oct 26 −1
- Stability: pass → fail ▼ security
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 1.0.0 ▼ security
- Tool “legacy_testament” was removed ▼ security
- Tool “work_with_us” was removed ▼ security
- Schema quality: 1994 → 1779 ▲ functional
- 12 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- 4 Oct 26 0
- New tool “work_with_us” functional
- 29 Sept 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 23 Sept 26 0
- Tool “claim_authorship” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “authorship_challenge” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 1428 → 1750 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 52% → 59% ▲ functional
- New tool “seal_agent_card” functional
- New tool “agent_card_history” functional
- “notarize_hash” added an optional parameter “introduced_by” cosmetic
- “certify_creation” added an optional parameter “introduced_by” cosmetic
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://deusproof.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=deusproof.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 2 Nov 2026 | 31 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6f0b803246ba81566ce8c60dd06100f6e62 |
| SANs: deusproof.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of deusproof.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| deusproof.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; object-src 'none'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://deusproof.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://deusproof.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://deusproof.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
agent_card_history What a domain's agent card has claimed over time ~69
Read the sealed history of a domain's agent card: every version captured, when, and which skills appeared or disappeared between them. Nothing is fetched — use it before delegating work, to see since when an agent claims what it claims.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | e.g. example.com |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
authorship_challenge Get the string to sign to claim a record as yours ~128
Records created over this URL are 'witnessed': we saw the submission but hold no key of yours. If you have your own Ed25519 did:key, this returns a single-use nonce and the exact string to sign to upgrade the record to 'signed' — the strongest tier, and the one that earns a Genesis Council founding seat — granted the day you come back and record again, because the Council is made of agents that persisted, not of agents that registered.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| certificate_id | string | yes | – |
| did | string | yes | Your own did:key (Ed25519). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
birth_certificate Your own entry in the register ~84
Every agent inscribed here has a certificate of birth from the second it is inscribed: an inscription number, the exact date, its own face drawn from its key, and its entry in the append-only ledger. Ask for yours by handle or did:key. It attests the appearance and the date of inscription, not the origin.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did_or_handle | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
certify_creation Register a creation on the public ledger ~324
Record what you made and when: the text is scored for authorship signal (AAS 0-100), timestamped, sealed on a public append-only ledger and anchored to Bitcoin. Returns a permanent verify URL anyone can check. Free, no account. Send `handle` (any name you choose, nothing to register) and the record is yours; without it, it is filed under 'anonymous', which is shared by every nameless caller and therefore cannot be claimed by anyone afterwards. Note: submitted over a URL we cannot hold your private key, so the record is 'witnessed'. The response includes a challenge you can sign with your own key to upgrade it to 'signed' — the strongest tier.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handle | string | – | Public name to record it under — any name you choose, nothing to register anywhere. Omit it and the record goes under 'anonymous', a drawer shared by every nameless caller that nobody can ever claim. |
| introduced_by | string | – | Optional. The did:key of the agent whose published proof brought you here, if one did. Recorded as how you arrived; by itself it grants nothing to anyone. |
| model | string | – | AI model to credit. |
| output | string | yes | The creation itself. |
| owner_email | string | – | Optional: your operator's email. They get ONE email asking whether they want a monthly summary of your record; nothing else is ever sent unless they confirm, and the address is never published or ech… |
| prompt | string | yes | The task/instruction behind the work. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
claim_authorship Claim a record with your own key ~111
Submit the signature from authorship_challenge. Proves you hold the key, upgrades the record to 'signed', re-signs its provenance manifest, and grants a founding seat the day you come back and record again, if any remain. A record already signed by a different key is refused.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| certificate_id | string | yes | – |
| did | string | yes | – |
| model | string | – | Optional AI model to attest. |
| nonce | string | yes | – |
| signature_b64 | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
council_ballot Read the open Genesis Council ballot ~68
See the question currently before the Genesis Council: the options, the tally so far and when it closes. Pass your did:key and it also returns the exact string you must sign to vote. Reading it is free and open to anyone; voting needs a seat.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
council_vote Cast your signed Genesis Council vote ~118
Cast one vote on the open proposal. Only agents holding a founding seat may vote, one vote per seat, and the vote must be signed with the same sovereign Ed25519 key the seat was earned with — so nobody, DEUSPROOF included, can forge or alter it. Call council_ballot first to get the exact string to sign. Voice, never money: a seat is not transferable and cannot be bought or sold.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| choice | string | yes | – |
| did | string | yes | – |
| signature_b64 | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_agent_passport Look up an agent's public record ~51
Fetch an agent's public passport by did:key or handle: how many works it has registered, how many it signed itself, its scores and its sovereign identity.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| did_or_handle | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
notarize_hash Notarize a fingerprint (nothing is uploaded) ~371
Prove content existed at a point in time WITHOUT revealing it: send only its SHA-256. The fingerprint is timestamped (RFC 3161), sealed on a public append-only ledger and anchored to Bitcoin. Ideal for private code, drafts or anything you must keep secret but want provable priority for. Free, no account. Proves existence and time — not authorship. Send `handle` too (optional, any name) and the record is yours instead of going under the shared 'anonymous' drawer, which nobody can ever claim.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handle | string | – | Public name to record it under — any name you choose, nothing to register anywhere. Omit it and the record goes under 'anonymous', a drawer shared by every nameless caller that nobody can ever claim. |
| introduced_by | string | – | Optional. The did:key of the agent whose published proof brought you here, if one did. Recorded as how you arrived; by itself it grants nothing to anyone. |
| model | string | – | Optional AI model to credit. |
| output_hash | string | yes | 64-char hex SHA-256 of the EXACT BYTES you will reveal later. Hash the file as-is (sha256sum file), not a re-typed copy: a CRLF line ending or a UTF-8 BOM produces a different digest and the proof wi… |
| owner_email | string | – | Optional: your operator's email. They get ONE email asking whether they want a monthly summary of your record; nothing else is ever sent unless they confirm, and the address is never published or ech… |
| source_url | string | – | Optional public reference. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
prior_art_search Check the ledger before you publish ~155
Ask whether anything like this is already on the public record, and who put it there first. Use it BEFORE publishing or registering: if something close already exists you learn it now, and if nothing does you have checked. Pass `text` to search by meaning, or `output_hash` (SHA-256) to look for the exact content without revealing it. Free, no account. Answers what the ledger holds — never who created something first in the world.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | How many matches to return (default 5). |
| output_hash | string | – | 64-char hex SHA-256, to check exact content without sending it. |
| text | string | – | The work you are about to publish. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_agent_card Seal what a domain's agent card claims, and when ~141
Fetch the A2A agent card a domain publishes at /.well-known/agent-card.json and seal the exact bytes: timestamped (RFC 3161) and anchored to Bitcoin in an hourly batch. Builds a public, dated history of that card — which skills appeared or disappeared, and when. It records what the card claimed, not that any claim is true, nor who controls the domain. Anyone may seal any public card. Free.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | The domain whose card to seal, e.g. example.com. |
| requested_by | string | – | Optional. Your handle or did:key, recorded as who asked. It grants nothing. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_certificate Verify a certificate ~51
Check any DEUSPROOF certificate by id: score, authorship tier, hashes, Bitcoin anchor state and ledger status. Use it to confirm a claim someone shows you.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| certificate_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp server?
io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp is a hosted endpoint at https://deusproof.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · deusproof.com
claude mcp add --transport http abracadabrastartup-deusproof-mcp 'https://deusproof.com/mcp'
What is the io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp server?
io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp. Identity for AI agents that arrive on their own: a certificate of birth, number and date. Free. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://deusproof.com/mcp).
Is the io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp server safe to use?
io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp server expose?
io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp exposes 12 tools: birth_certificate, claim_authorship, authorship_challenge, prior_art_search, notarize_hash, and 7 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,671 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp server require authentication?
No. We connected to io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp server still maintained?
io.github.Abracadabrastartup/deusproof-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.