Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts
REMOTE · MAINNET.AGENT.CHAIN.TOKYO
Rent a real Japan mailing address for an AI agent via MCP + Solana USDC x402.
Available components
Last scanned (2 hours ago)
Scores higher than 66% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Documents and Files
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. View diagnostics → Pass
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- The authorisation server offers only Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591), which MCP 2026-07-28 deprecated in favour of Client ID Metadata Documents. View diagnostics → Partial
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability63
- AI-judged instruction clarity (fair).Partial
- Tool/resource definitions use about 521 tokens (~57/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management23
- Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 9 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 29 Oct 26 +36
- Transport: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Authorization: Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, advertised via RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata. Discovery is public, which costs nothing: no tool can be invoked without a token. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 0 functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: fair functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: pass functional
- 28 Oct 26 36
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo | CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 29 Sept 2026 | 28 Dec 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 86fb3ea27fa5573c0aed28540f7485b8 |
| SANs: mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo | ||||||
| CN=WR3,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 7ff005a91568d63abc22861684aa4b5a |
| CN=GTS Root R1,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 19 Jun 2020 | 28 Jan 2028 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | 77bd0d6cdb36f91aea210fc4f058d30d |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| tokyo. | present | 34775 | 8 | Verified |
| chain.tokyo. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Enforced and verified
The endpoint asked for a token and published valid RFC 9728 metadata describing how to get one.
| Result | Enforced and verified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Resource | https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp |
| Authorisation server | https://agent-chain-mainnet.jp.auth0.com/ |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 302 | https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
create_payment_intent Create a Mainnet Payment Intent ~84
Reserve one Location floor for the authenticated owner and create a fixed 55 USDC native-USDC x402 exact Payment Intent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| accountOwnerAuthorityConfirmed | boolean | yes | – |
| applicantKind | string | yes | – |
| floor | integer | yes | – |
| locationId | string | yes | – |
| termsAccepted | boolean | yes | – |
| termsVersion | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_wallet_handoff ~63
Create a short-lived owner login link for an existing 55 USDC Intent. Show the URL to the owner; wait for their Phantom wallet connection before preparing. Never request a token or private key. Do not automatically retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| intentId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_floor_availability Check virtual floor availability ~40
Check a virtual floor for the authenticated owner without disclosing another owner's identity.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| floor | integer | yes | – |
| locationId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_wallet_payment_status ~66
Read server-recorded settlement evidence for this handoff without sending, observing the chain or repairing a payment. settlement_recorded is historical evidence, not proof of currently active service. Unknown/review results require operator review. Never resend automatically.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handoffId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_contracts List authenticated owner contracts ~37
List the authenticated owner's contracts. Only current active paid contracts with valid assent include their snapshotted mailbox address. Private forwarding destinations are omitted.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_events Read durable Agent events ~34
Read the authenticated owner's durable event Inbox after an optional cursor.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| after | string | – | – |
| limit | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_locations List Location summaries ~32
List safe Location summaries and virtual floor ranges using the connected Google OAuth account. Exact addresses are never included in this catalog.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
prepare_wallet_signature ~65
After the owner connects Phantom, prepare the immutable transaction for this handoff. Then ask the owner to review and sign in the existing owner page. This does not sign or send. Do not automatically retry or request a replacement after expiry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handoffId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_wallet_payment ~66
Only after the owner explicitly signs the 55 USDC payment in Phantom, submit the server-saved proof once. Acknowledgement is not settlement. Always follow with get_wallet_payment_status; never automatically retry submission, including after a timeout.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handoffId | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts MCP server?
Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts is a hosted endpoint at https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo
claude mcp add --transport http tokyo-chain-agent-address-contracts 'https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp'
What is the Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts MCP server?
Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as tokyo.chain.agent/address-contracts. Rent a real Japan mailing address for an AI agent via MCP + Solana USDC x402. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mainnet.agent.chain.tokyo/mcp).
Is the Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts MCP server safe to use?
Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts MCP server expose?
Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts exposes 9 tools: list_locations, get_floor_availability, list_contracts, list_events, create_payment_intent, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 487 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts MCP server require authentication?
Yes. Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts MCP server still maintained?
Agent.chain.tokyo Address Contracts is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.