file2markdown
REMOTE · MCP.FILE2MARKDOWN.AI
Convert docs and web pages to clean Markdown: PDF, DOCX, XLSX, EPUB, scans, URLs. Batch of 10.
Available components
Last scanned (17 hours ago)
Scores higher than 62% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Documents and Files
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 5 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability70
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 680 tokens (~136/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 5 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 7 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: unreachable → reachable ▲ functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → unreachable ▼ security
- HSTS header: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- TLS certificate: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 12 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- New tool “convert_batch” functional
- 29 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.file2markdown.ai/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.file2markdown.ai | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 29 Oct 2026 | 27 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5140aa9c19958ee716f234e07d20ed17ee1 |
| SANs: mcp.file2markdown.ai | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.file2markdown.ai. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | DS published | 1814 | 8 | Verified |
| file2markdown.ai. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.file2markdown.ai/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.file2markdown.ai/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.file2markdown.ai/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
convert_base64 ~131
Convert base64-encoded file contents to Markdown. filename is required and drives format detection (e.g. "report.docx"). Intended for programmatic MCP clients; for anything with a URL, prefer convert_url. quality_check: "basic" (default) attaches local output-health checks in the `quality` field; "ai" additionally sends selected excerpts of the converted text to TypeSafe for narrow yes/no judgments. See convert_url.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content_base64 | string | yes | – |
| filename | string | yes | – |
| quality_check | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
convert_batch ~179
Convert 2-10 documents to Markdown in one call (Pro API key required). Each item is either {"url": ..., "filename_hint"?: ...} or {"content_base64": ..., "filename": ...}; types may be mixed. Items are converted in parallel and isolated: one bad URL or file never fails the batch — its slot returns ok:false with the error. The combined markdown shares one output budget, split evenly across items (per-item `truncated` flags apply). Set include_markdown=false to get only metadata + quality per item (health-check a folder without flooding your context). Anonymous callers: use convert_url / convert_base64 individually.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| include_markdown | boolean | – | – |
| items | array | yes | – |
| quality_check | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
convert_url ~221
Fetch a URL (web page, PDF, Office doc, and more) and convert it to Markdown. Works on publicly accessible URLs. Web pages are converted from their served HTML; JavaScript-rendered content may be incomplete. Optional filename_hint (e.g. "report.pdf") helps format detection when the URL has no file extension. The result carries a `quality` object (output-health check of the returned Markdown: status review / no_issues_detected / not_evaluated, coverage and a list of issues with line locations). quality_check="basic" (default) runs only local deterministic checks. quality_check="ai" additionally sends selected excerpts of the CONVERTED text to TypeSafe for narrow yes/no judgments (garbled text, hard-wrapped prose, broken tables); it is off unless requested. No check compares against the source document.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| filename_hint | – | – | – |
| quality_check | string | – | – |
| url | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_supported_formats ~42
List supported input formats, per-tier limits, and which features need Pro. Single source of truth — do not claim capabilities beyond what this returns.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
usage_status ~19
Check your tier and remaining conversions before burning a call.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the file2markdown MCP server?
file2markdown is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.file2markdown.ai/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.file2markdown.ai
claude mcp add --transport http ai-file2markdown-file2markdown 'https://mcp.file2markdown.ai/mcp'
What is the file2markdown MCP server?
file2markdown is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ai.file2markdown/file2markdown. Convert docs and web pages to clean Markdown: PDF, DOCX, XLSX, EPUB, scans, URLs. Batch of 10. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.file2markdown.ai/mcp).
Is the file2markdown MCP server safe to use?
file2markdown scores 75 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the file2markdown MCP server expose?
file2markdown exposes 5 tools: convert_url, convert_base64, convert_batch, list_supported_formats, usage_status. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 592 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the file2markdown MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to file2markdown without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the file2markdown MCP server still maintained?
file2markdown is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the file2markdown MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on file2markdown, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about file2markdown: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.