# HiveAttest (remote · hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com)

Pre-action attestation perimeter for AI agents — 8 primitives, signed C18 receipt per call.

- Trust score: 52/100 (low)
- Change this week: +38
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-08-03

## Components

- remote · `hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com`: 52/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/srotzin-hive-mcp-attest/hive-mcp-attest.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/srotzin-hive-mcp-attest/hive-mcp-attest)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.0.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-08-03.

- **Endpoint Security**: 57/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 40/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (poor).
  - Tool/resource definitions use about 1644 tokens (~91/item across 18 items; 18 tools + 0 resources), lean.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 0/100
  - Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- **Tool Coverage**: 99/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 98% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Capabilities**: 20/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2024-11-05; the latest is 2026-07-28.

**Unverified: 1 category.** A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.

## Install

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http srotzin-hive-mcp-attest https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.srotzin-hive-mcp-attest]
url = "https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "srotzin-hive-mcp-attest": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add srotzin-hive-mcp-attest --url https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  srotzin-hive-mcp-attest:
    url: "https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp"
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "srotzin-hive-mcp-attest": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-08-03 (score 52, +29)

- [security improvement] Transport: fail → pass
- [security] Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 18 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
- [functional regression] MCP protocol: unverified → fail
- [functional improvement] Tool coverage: unverified → 100
- [functional] First check of Schema quality: fail
- [functional] First check of Schema quality: poor
- [functional] First check of Tool coverage: 98
- [functional] First check of Schema quality: pass

### 2026-07-31 (score 23, +9)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-30 (score 14, 0)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-27 (score 14, 0)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-26 (score 14)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (18)

### `attest_passport_issue` (~150 tokens)

Issue a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Signs with Ed25519 over RFC 8785 JCS-canonical body. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `action_id` (string, required): Caller-supplied action correlation ID
- `agent_did` (string, required): DID of the attesting agent
- `inputs` (object): Declared inputs (will be hashed)
- `intended_op` (string, required): Operation name, e.g. "tool_invocation"
- `target_resource` (string, required): URI or identifier of the target resource
- `ttl_seconds` (integer): Validity window in seconds (default 300)

### `attest_passport_verify` (~88 tokens)

Verify a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Checks Ed25519 signature, temporal validity, and optionally observed inputs hash. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `manifest` (object, required): Full passport manifest object (from attest_passport_issue)
- `observed_inputs` (object): Optional observed inputs to check against declared hash

### `attest_custody_append` (~128 tokens)

Append a node to a custody chain (C16: hive-custody). Taint propagates: once tainted, always tainted. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `agent_did` (string, required): DID of the agent performing the transform
- `chain_id` (string, required): Chain identifier (create new by using a fresh ID)
- `payload` (object): Transform payload (will be hashed)
- `taint_status` (string): Declared taint status
- `transform_id` (string, required): Transform identifier for this step

### `attest_custody_verify` (~68 tokens)

Verify a custody chain: hash linkage, Ed25519 signatures, and taint propagation (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `nodes` (array, required): Ordered array of custody chain node objects (from attest_custody_append responses)

### `attest_custody_proof` (~66 tokens)

Retrieve a Merkle inclusion proof for a specific node in a custody chain (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `chain_id` (string, required): Chain identifier
- `index` (integer, required): 0-based node index

### `attest_cargo_register` (~145 tokens)

Register a versioned cargo type in the HiveAttest registry (C17: hive-cargo-taxonomy). Pins a definition hash for version-anchoring. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `id` (string, required): Unique cargo type ID, e.g. "pii"
- `name` (string, required): Human-readable cargo type name
- `schema` (object, required): JSON Schema defining the payload shape
- `sensitivity` (string, required)
- `supersedes` (object): Optional {id, version} of superseded type
- `version` (string, required): Semver version string, e.g. "1.0.0"

### `attest_cargo_validate` (~73 tokens)

Validate a payload against a registered cargo type schema (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `cargo_type_id` (string, required): Registered cargo type ID
- `payload` (object, required): Payload to validate against the schema
- `version` (string, required): Cargo type version

### `attest_cargo_snapshot` (~40 tokens)

Get a registry snapshot with Merkle root for version pinning (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

### `attest_warranty_issue` (~115 tokens)

Issue an attestation warranty committing an agent to a claim (C18: hive-attestation-warranty). Signed with Ed25519. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `action_id` (string, required): Action correlation ID being warranted
- `agent_did` (string, required): DID of the warranting agent
- `claim` (string, required): Human-readable warranty claim
- `expires_at` (string): ISO-8601 expiry UTC (optional)
- `scope` (object): Scope constraints

### `attest_warranty_breach` (~81 tokens)

Report a warranty breach. Marks the warranty as breached and returns a signed breach record (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `breach_description` (string, required): Description of the breach
- `evidence` (object): Optional evidence dict
- `warranty_id` (string, required): Warranty ID to report breach on

### `attest_warranty_get` (~43 tokens)

Retrieve a warranty by ID (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `warranty_id` (string, required): Warranty ID

### `attest_gate_evaluate` (~156 tokens)

THE HEADLINE TOOL. Evaluate whether an agent may proceed through the HiveAttest gate (C19: hive-gate-enforcer). Verifies passport signature + expiry, cargo registry membership, and warranty status. Every response (allow OR deny) includes a signed C18-format receipt of the gate decision. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `cargo_manifest` (object): C17 cargo manifest (optional)
- `context` (object): Additional gate evaluation context
- `custody_root` (string): Expected custody chain Merkle root (optional)
- `passport_manifest` (object, required): C15 passport manifest from attest_passport_issue
- `warranty_ids` (array): Active warranty IDs to verify

### `attest_inspect_sample` (~106 tokens)

Probabilistic secondary inspection of a record batch (C20: hive-secondary-inspection). Returns a signed inspection record. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `records` (array, required): Records to probabilistically inspect
- `sample_id` (string, required): Identifier for the sample batch
- `sample_rate` (number): Fraction to inspect (0.0 to 1.0)
- `seed` (integer): Optional RNG seed for reproducibility

### `attest_smsh_verify` (~120 tokens)

Verify a SMSH-Stamp v1 receipt (C8/C12: smsh-stamp-verifier). Validates schema, version, algorithm, timestamp, and Ed25519 signature. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `max_age_seconds` (integer): Reject receipts older than this many seconds
- `pubkey_b64url` (string): Override trust anchor Ed25519 public key (base64url, 32 bytes)
- `receipt` (object, required): SMSH-Stamp v1 receipt object

### `attest_absence_build` (~80 tokens)

Build a sorted Merkle tree for an audit window (enables cryptographic non-membership proofs, C13: prov-absence). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `events` (array, required): Observed events to commit to the sorted Merkle tree
- `window_id` (string, required): Audit window identifier

### `attest_absence_prove` (~72 tokens)

Prove that a query event is NOT a member of a previously-built audit window (C13). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `query` (object, required): Event to prove absent
- `window_id` (string, required): Audit window identifier (must have been built)

### `attest_absence_verify` (~71 tokens)

Verify a non-membership proof against an expected Merkle root (C13). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

Input parameters:

- `proof` (object, required): Non-membership proof from attest_absence_prove
- `root_hex` (string, required): Expected Merkle root (hex)

### `attest_meta` (~42 tokens)

Return HiveAttest layer/spec/patent metadata for all claims. Useful for agent introspection. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/srotzin-hive-mcp-attest/hive-mcp-attest#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-08-03: 52
- 2026-08-02: 23
- 2026-08-01: 23
- 2026-07-31: 23
- 2026-07-30: 14
- 2026-07-29: 14
- 2026-07-28: 14
- 2026-07-27: 14
- 2026-07-26: 14

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://hive-mcp-attest.onrender.com/mcp
- Repository: https://github.com/srotzin/hive-mcp-attest
- Website: https://thehiveryiq.com/#hiveattest-perimeter
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/srotzin-hive-mcp-attest/hive-mcp-attest/changelog.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/srotzin-hive-mcp-attest/hive-mcp-attest/changelog.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/srotzin-hive-mcp-attest/hive-mcp-attest