SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor
REMOTE · HUXIN.ONLINE
RFC 9421 / Web Bot Auth signature doctor: per-check verdicts, digest, freshness, signed receipt.
Available components
Last scanned (21 hours ago)
Scores higher than 45% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability54
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 912 tokens (~228/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management23
- Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage91
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 73% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 4 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “signcheck_trial” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- “signcheck_trial” reworded the description of “keyid” cosmetic
- “signcheck_trial” reworded the description of “proof” cosmetic
- “signcheck_trial” made “key_jwk” optional cosmetic
- “signcheck_trial” made “keyid” optional cosmetic
- “signcheck_trial” made “nonce” optional cosmetic
- “signcheck_trial” made “proof” optional cosmetic
- “signcheck_trial” made “ts” optional cosmetic
- 19 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: 620 → 864 ▼ functional
- New tool “signcheck_trial” functional
- 17 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “signcheck_verify” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 184 → 206 ▼ functional
- Schema quality: fair → good functional
- 16 Nov 26 −1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- New tool “signcheck_redeem” functional
- “signcheck_verify” added an optional parameter “entitlement” cosmetic
- 15 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 14 Nov 26 60
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://huxin.online/signcheck/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=huxin.online | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 4 Nov 2026 | 2 Feb 2027 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 654d0f958924f279b9da6700f73eca84da6 |
| SANs: huxin.online | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of huxin.online. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| online. | DS published | 30961 | 13 | Verified |
| huxin.online. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://huxin.online/signcheck/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://huxin.online/signcheck/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 302 | https://dnspod.qcloud.com/static/webblock.html?d=huxin.online |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
signcheck_pricing ~30
返回当前价格、收款方、付款凭据形状与调用示例。不收费。
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
signcheck_redeem ~199
把爱发电订单上的提取码换成 AK(entitlement):带可用次数与有效期,由卖家私钥签名,可直接用 /seller-key.jwk 自验。不收费;一张码只能换一次,AK 绑定到你这次签证明的 keyid。换到后把 entitlement 传给 signcheck_verify 即可。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | 提取码(SC1.… 整段复制,别只抄一半) |
| key_jwk | object | yes | {kty,crv,x} |
| keyid | string | yes | 已登记钥匙的 keyid(AK 绑到它) |
| nonce | string | yes | – |
| proof | string | yes | 对 signcheck-mcp/v1|signcheck_redeem|参数摘要|ts|nonce 的 Ed25519 签名 |
| ts | integer | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
signcheck_trial ~257
免费试用一次:把自己的请求样本(method/url/headers/body_b64,可选 key_jwk)贴进来,跑同一套 RFC 9421 体检,返回 verdict + 通过/失败计数 + 最多 3 条失败明细(完整 checks 与可兑现收据需要提取码)。不需要注册、不需要钥匙、不需要签名、不需要付款。同一 IP 24h 一次。适合先判断「我的签名到底缺什么」。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| key_jwk | object | – | 签名者的 Ed25519 公钥 {kty,crv,x} |
| keyid | string | – | 可选:已登记钥匙的 keyid。给了就按这把钥匙限额度(校验更严) |
| max_age | integer | – | created 允许的最大年龄(秒) |
| nonce | string | – | – |
| proof | string | – | 可选:对 signcheck-mcp/v1|signcheck_trial|参数摘要|ts|nonce 的 Ed25519 签名 |
| request | object | yes | {method,url,headers,body_b64} |
| ts | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
signcheck_verify ~286
确定性体检一份 HTTP 消息签名样本(RFC 9421):逐项 checks 给出缺哪个头/覆盖组件够不够/content-digest 是否对得上/created 是否新鲜/签名能否用给定公钥验过,返回 verdict 与可兑现收据。按次计费,0.002 USD/call(demo 账本,仅联调);真实收款:19.00 CNY / 200 次提取码。先付后跑。
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| entitlement | string | – | signcheck_redeem 发出的 AK(提款码换来的次数包);传了它就不用 payment |
| key_jwk | object | yes | 签名者的 Ed25519 公钥 {kty,crv,x} |
| keyid | string | yes | 已登记钥匙的 keyid(URL) |
| max_age | integer | – | created 允许的最大年龄(秒) |
| nonce | string | yes | – |
| payment | – | – | X-PAYMENT 同形:dict 或 base64url(JSON) |
| proof | string | yes | 对 signcheck-mcp/v1|工具|参数摘要|ts|nonce 的 Ed25519 签名 |
| request | object | yes | {method,url,headers,body_b64} |
| ts | integer | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor MCP server?
SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor is a hosted endpoint at https://huxin.online/signcheck/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · huxin.online
claude mcp add --transport http online-huxin-signcheck 'https://huxin.online/signcheck/mcp'
What is the SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor MCP server?
SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as online.huxin/signcheck. RFC 9421 / Web Bot Auth signature doctor: per-check verdicts, digest, freshness, signed receipt. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://huxin.online/signcheck/mcp).
Is the SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor MCP server safe to use?
SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor scores 61 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor MCP server expose?
SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor exposes 4 tools: signcheck_verify, signcheck_redeem, signcheck_trial, signcheck_pricing. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 772 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor MCP server still maintained?
SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about SigLint — HTTP Message Signature Doctor: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.