writ
PYPI · WRIT-MCP
Commit-time policy checks for AI agent writes (ALLOW/DENY/STEP_UP) with a tamper-evident audit log.
Available components
Last scanned (5 hours ago)
Scores higher than 61% of PyPI servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security50
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 0 of 28 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency19
- Repository check failed: the declared repository URL redirects; it must resolve directly. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 16 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability73
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 865 tokens (~108/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management57
- Stability observed for 17 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "writ_revoke" implies "revoke" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 8 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 17 Oct 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 16 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 15 Oct 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 14 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 13 Oct 26 +6
- Stability: unverified → 0.40 ▲ functional
- 2 Oct 26 −5
- Source repository: pass → fail ▼ security
- 1 Oct 26 66
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 18 Oct 2026 · Analysed pypi/writ-mcp@0.1.2
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | No attestation published |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | allowlisted | setuptools.build_meta |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 28 packages
| Packages resolved | 28 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
writ_check ~313
Ask Writ whether an action may proceed. CALL THIS BEFORE any consequential write. A consequential write is anything hard to undo: sending money or messages, changing access or identity records, deleting data, calling an external API that acts in the world. Args: sponsor_id: The human sponsor accountable for this action (e.g. a user id or email). agent_id: The agent or workflow performing the action. verb: What is being done (e.g. "verify_human", "send_payment"). target: What it acts on (e.g. "benefit-case-123"). purpose: Why, in plain words. Be specific — the approval is bound to this purpose. Returns a decision: ALLOW — proceed. You get an authToken valid 90 seconds, bound to this exact sponsor/agent/verb/target/purpose. Call writ_verify_token against the intended write immediately before executing it. DENY — do NOT perform the action. Explain the receipt reason to the user. STEP_UP — a human sponsor must approve first. Tell the user what needs approval; they can approve via writ_grant (or the dashboard), then call writ_check again. Every outcome creates an audit receipt with a receiptId.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | – |
| purpose | string | yes | – |
| sponsor_id | string | yes | – |
| target | string | yes | – |
| verb | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
writ_grant ~116
SPONSOR ONLY. Mint a one-time grant approving a specific action. Use this when writ_check returned STEP_UP and the human sponsor approves. The grant is single-use: the next writ_check consumes it and returns ALLOW. The grant is scoped to your tenant. Requires WRIT_SPONSOR_TOKEN.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | – |
| purpose | string | yes | – |
| sponsor_id | string | yes | – |
| target | string | yes | – |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | – |
| verb | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
writ_policy ~29
Read the tenant's verb policy: which verbs allow, deny, require a grant, or step up.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
writ_receipts ~28
List recent decision receipts (audit trail). Newest first.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
writ_reinstate ~57
SPONSOR ONLY. Undo writ_revoke: the principal is evaluated by policy again. Scoped to your tenant. Requires WRIT_SPONSOR_TOKEN.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | – |
| sponsor_id | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
writ_revoke ~84
SPONSOR ONLY. Kill switch: immediately deny all future checks for this principal. Revocation overrides live grants and tenant policy. Use when a principal is compromised, misbehaving, or its task is done. Scoped to your tenant. Requires WRIT_SPONSOR_TOKEN.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | – |
| sponsor_id | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
writ_sandbox ~103
Get a free 90-second sandbox grant for a demo write. No API key needed. Issues a live grant for verb "demo_write" on a target starting with "demo-", then runs writ_check so you get back an ALLOW decision plus auth token to practice the verify-before-write flow end to end.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | – |
| purpose | string | yes | – |
| sponsor_id | string | yes | – |
| target | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
writ_verify_token ~135
Verify a Writ auth token against the write you are about to execute. Call this IMMEDIATELY before executing an ALLOWed write, with the exact verb/target/purpose you intend. If valid is false — expired, tampered, or bound to a different purpose — do NOT execute the write; call writ_check again. This is the commit-time enforcement: the check authorizes, the token proves the authorization still matches what you are actually doing.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| auth_token | string | yes | – |
| purpose | string | yes | – |
| target | string | yes | – |
| verb | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the writ MCP server?
writ runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx writ-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · writ-mcp
claude mcp add avenuedadmin-writ -- uvx writ-mcp
What is the writ MCP server?
writ is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.AvenueDAdmin/writ. Commit-time policy checks for AI agent writes (ALLOW/DENY/STEP_UP) with a tamper-evident audit log. This page covers its PyPI package (writ-mcp).
Is the writ MCP server safe to use?
writ scores 54 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 18 October 2026. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the writ MCP server expose?
writ exposes 8 tools: writ_check, writ_verify_token, writ_grant, writ_revoke, writ_reinstate, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 865 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the writ MCP server still maintained?
writ is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 18 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the writ MCP server under?
writ declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.