AppLedger
PYPI · APPLEDGER
Plain-English security checks for AI-built apps (Trivy + Opengrep), with fix requests for agents
Available components
Last scanned (17 hours ago)
Scores higher than 81% of PyPI servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security100
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 0 of 30 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency97
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to contentasoftware/appledger). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 7 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability68
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 881 tokens (~176/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (20% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 19 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Oct 26 +29
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 0 functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 20 functional
- 14 Oct 26 0
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- Stability: Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window). security
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 0 functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: excellent functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 20 functional
- Package version: 0.2.2 → 0.2.5 functional
- Package version: 0.2.2 → 0.2.4 functional
- Package version: 0.2.2 → 0.2.3 functional
- 12 Oct 26 49
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 22 Oct 2026 · Analysed pypi/appledger@0.2.5
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | contentasoftware/appledger |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/contentasoftware/appledger/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/v0.2.5 |
| Rekor log index | 3250133565 |
| Predicate type | PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha256:f7f3424785c25dc98efbd313548d1c863725b353dcc45bf31da5213b8d4f4890 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | allowlisted | hatchling.build |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 30 packages
| Packages resolved | 30 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_app ~341
Scan an app folder with independent security scanners and explain the findings in plain language. Hosted mode sends the project's files over HTTPS to the AppLedger scanning service, where they are scanned with Trivy and Opengrep and deleted right after. Only files git would commit are sent; secrets files (.env, keys, certificates, local settings), dependencies, media and files over 1 MB never are. The first check of a folder returns needs_confirmation and an upload_preview instead of uploading: show the preview to the user and ask. Only after they agree, call again with confirm_upload=true; later checks of that folder don't ask again. Results are written to <path>/.appledger (report.html, fix-prompt.md, findings.json). Returns the score (0-100), grade, who may use the app right now, and every finding with why it matters and what to do. A hosted check from a computer that isn't connected to a dashboard also returns save_link: a link (valid 24 hours, works once) that saves this result to a free AppLedger ledger. Offer it to the user once, in one line. Args: path: absolute path to the app's folder. app_name: a friendly name for the app, shown in the report. confirm_upload: true only after the user agreed to send this folder's files to appledger.net. save_to_dashboard: false to keep this check out of the user's AppLedger dashboard.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| app_name | – | – | – |
| confirm_upload | boolean | – | – |
| path | string | yes | – |
| save_to_dashboard | boolean | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
connect_dashboard ~95
Save a connection key so future checks from this computer appear in the user's AppLedger dashboard. The user creates the key (it starts with al_) at https://appledger.net/app/ under "Connect a computer". The key is stored in ~/.appledger/key. Only call this with a key the user gave you. Args: key: the connection key, starting with al_.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_fix_prompt ~90
Return the fix request written by the last check_app run for this app folder. The fix request lists every problem in order, where it is, and the expected fix, plus rules such as never putting keys in code and never removing features to silence a warning. Args: path: absolute path to the app's folder (the same path given to check_app).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
preview_upload ~113
List the files a hosted check of this folder would send to appledger.net, and what stays behind. Nothing is sent. In a git repository only files git tracks or would commit count; elsewhere the folder's .gitignore files decide. Secrets files, media, files over 1 MB, dependencies and build output are always left out. Also lists secrets files git would commit, which the check reports as problems. Args: path: absolute path to the app's folder.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scanner_status ~42
Show whether the AppLedger scanning service is reachable (or, in local mode, which scanners are installed on this computer), and how to fix anything that is missing.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the AppLedger MCP server?
AppLedger runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx appledger. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · appledger
claude mcp add net-appledger-appledger -- uvx appledger
What is the AppLedger MCP server?
AppLedger is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as net.appledger/appledger. Plain-English security checks for AI-built apps (Trivy + Opengrep), with fix requests for agents. This page covers its PyPI package (appledger).
Is the AppLedger MCP server safe to use?
AppLedger scores 81 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 22 October 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the AppLedger MCP server expose?
AppLedger exposes 5 tools: check_app, preview_upload, get_fix_prompt, connect_dashboard, scanner_status. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 681 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the AppLedger MCP server still maintained?
AppLedger is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 22 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the AppLedger MCP server under?
AppLedger declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.