attest — verification for AI agent artifacts
REMOTE · ATTEST.RTA.LAT
Verify an AI agent artifact: schema, emptiness, provenance and mandate authority, Ed25519-signed.
Available components
Last scanned (20 hours ago)
Scores higher than 47% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 18 Oct 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability68
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 444 tokens (~222/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management7
- Stability observed for 2 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 2 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Oct 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 16 Oct 26 +46
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- First check of Judged manipulation: pass security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Destructive annotations: pass functional
- First check of Schema quality: fail functional
- First check of Schema quality: good functional
- First check of Tool coverage: 100 functional
- 15 Oct 26 18
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 18 Oct 2026 · Probed https://attest.rta.lat/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=rta.lat | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Oct 2026 | 8 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 59db7032239aa6d4ff0b819218c19402ee7 |
| SANs: *.rta.lat, rta.lat | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of attest.rta.lat. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| lat. | present | 25789, 42520 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| rta.lat. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://attest.rta.lat/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://attest.rta.lat/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
bridge_check Bridge: task to work to money ~281
Settle a job between two agents through an escrow bridge. The client posts a task with a budget held in escrow, the worker delivers an artifact, the bridge verifies it and issues a signed RECEIPT. The budget is released only after verification passes. The RECEIPT is verifiable by a third party without access to the bridge, which is what makes it portable between worker, client and insurer. Actions: job (create), deliver (submit and verify), release (accept), refund (reject), verify (check someone else's receipt), trust (reputation). Use when an agent takes on paid work, or when you need to prove to a third party that the work was done.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | What to do. |
| agent | string | – | Agent identifier. |
| amount_minor | integer | – | Budget in minor units; 1 USDC = 1000000. |
| artifact | – | – | The agent artifact (for deliver). |
| client | string | – | Who the client is (for job). |
| db | string | – | Path to the bridge database. |
| job_id | string | – | Job ID (any action except job). |
| receipt | object | – | A third party receipt (for verify). |
| spec | object | – | Expected result specification (for job). |
| title | string | – | What needs to be done (for job). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_artifact Verify an AI agent artifact ~163
Verify an artifact produced by an AI agent before accepting or paying for it. Four independent layers: schema conformance, whether there is anything inside (uniform lists, stubs, truncations), provenance bound to the artifact hash, and whether a signed mandate permitted the action. Returns a verdict (accept/review/reject), a 0-100 trust score, concrete findings and an Ed25519 signature. Rule-based, no LLM: the same artifact always yields the same result. Use before accepting work from another agent and before payment.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| artifact | – | yes | The agent artifact: object, array or string. |
| schema | object | – | Optional JSON Schema the artifact must satisfy. |
| source | string | – | Where the artifact came from, recorded in the attestation. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server?
attest — verification for AI agent artifacts is a hosted endpoint at https://attest.rta.lat/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · attest.rta.lat
claude mcp add --transport http mrpkk-attest 'https://attest.rta.lat/mcp'
What is the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server?
attest — verification for AI agent artifacts is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.mrpkk/attest. Verify an AI agent artifact: schema, emptiness, provenance and mandate authority, Ed25519-signed. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://attest.rta.lat/mcp).
Is the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server safe to use?
attest — verification for AI agent artifacts scores 65 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server expose?
attest — verification for AI agent artifacts exposes 2 tools: verify_artifact, bridge_check. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 444 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to attest — verification for AI agent artifacts without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server still maintained?
attest — verification for AI agent artifacts is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 18 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.