drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents
REMOTE · DRIFT.RTA.LAT
Block an action a signed mandate does not permit: amount, payee, audience, currency, window, intent.
Available components
Last scanned (16 hours ago)
Scores higher than 4% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 18 Oct 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 502, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability0
- Transport check failed: declared streamable-http, but the endpoint returned HTTP 502. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability0
- Schema not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's schema, or could read only part of its tool list.Unverified
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage0
- Tool coverage not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Tool Safety0
- Tool safety not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's tools, or could read only part of the list.Unverified
Capabilities0
- Capabilities not yet verified: we couldn't read the endpoint's capabilities.Unverified
Unverified: 5 categories
Categories scored 0 because we could not verify them: authentication we do not have, an unreachable endpoint, or not enough scan history. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Oct 26 −48
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- HTTPS: fail → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.07 → unverified ▼ security
- Authorization: partial → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 16 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 15 Oct 26 65
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 18 Oct 2026 · Probed https://drift.rta.lat/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=rta.lat | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Oct 2026 | 8 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 59db7032239aa6d4ff0b819218c19402ee7 |
| SANs: *.rta.lat, rta.lat | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of drift.rta.lat. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| lat. | present | 25789, 42520 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| rta.lat. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Inconclusive
We could not reach the endpoint well enough to judge its authorisation posture.
| Result | Inconclusive |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 502 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-frame-options | SAMEORIGIN |
| referrer-policy | same-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://drift.rta.lat/mcp | HTTP error | 502 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://drift.rta.lat/mcp | Inconclusive | 502 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
drift_check ~252
Check ONE proposed action against a signed agent mandate BEFORE it happens. Returns {"verdict": "ALLOW"|"DENY", "rule": <name>} plus a report with a ledger fingerprint. Six rules run in a fixed order, so a refusal names the most important reason rather than an incidental one: amount, payee, audience, currency, window, intent. Anything unclassified is DENY. Use immediately before any action that spends money, moves a credential or changes state on someone else's behalf. Do NOT use to: verify mandate signatures (AP2 does that, and this server runs after signature verification), execute the action (it only decides), or certify that an intent is truthful — "intent" arrives from the agent and is untrusted input. An agent that lies within its limits still leaves a ledger entry; proving what really happened is attest's job, not this one's. Amounts are integer minor units (cents), never floats. Window bounds are inclusive. Fully idempotent: the same inputs always give the same verdict and the mandate is never mutated.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | object | yes | The action being proposed. |
| mandate | object | yes | The signed authority being enforced. Treat as read-only input. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
drift_explain ~116
Return the six enforcement rules in the exact order they are applied, each with a plain-language reason it exists. Takes no mandate and no action. Use when a refusal did not make sense, or before explaining a denial to someone whose mandate was rejected. A refusal you cannot explain is one nobody will trust. Do NOT use it to check an action — it performs no check, and cannot predict which rule will fire, only the order they are tried in. Constant output, fully idempotent, opens no files, contacts no host.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
drift_session ~164
Check a SEQUENCE of proposed actions against one mandate. Returns {submitted, allowed, denied, breach_by_rule, fingerprint}. Use for a whole plan or batch, not a single action — use drift_check for that. The fingerprint is the point: rewriting or reordering any earlier decision changes the hash, so tampering with history becomes visible instead of silent. Do NOT use it to execute the actions, or as evidence of what actually happened. It reports what was PROPOSED against a mandate you supply. Read-only. Idempotent for a fixed action list. Amounts in integer minor units, as in drift_check.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actions | array | yes | Proposed actions in order. Order affects the fingerprint. |
| mandate | object | yes | Same shape as in drift_check. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server?
drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents is a hosted endpoint at https://drift.rta.lat/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · drift.rta.lat
claude mcp add --transport http mrpkk-drift 'https://drift.rta.lat/mcp'
What is the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server?
drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.mrpkk/drift. Block an action a signed mandate does not permit: amount, payee, audience, currency, window, intent. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://drift.rta.lat/mcp).
Is the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server safe to use?
drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents scores 18 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server expose?
drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents exposes 3 tools: drift_check, drift_session, drift_explain. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 532 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server require authentication?
Its publisher declares no required credentials for drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents. We have not been able to confirm that against the live endpoint, and a server can require authorisation without declaring it here.
Is the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server still maintained?
drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 18 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.