io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp
PYPI · AGENT-SUDO-MCP
MCP adapter for Agent_Sudo: authorization, delegation, provenance, and audit for AI agents.
Available components
Last scanned (14 hours ago)
Scores higher than 91% of PyPI servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security100
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs setuptools.build_meta at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- No production dependencies, so there is no dependency health to assess. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency74
- Repository check failed: no source repository is declared. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to Kisyntra/Agent_Sudo). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (Apache-2.0).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 146 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability73
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 208 tokens (~52/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities40
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-03-26; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (16)
- Malware scan
- Known CVEs
- Install scripts
- Dependency health
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 2 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 27 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 25 Oct 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.93 functional
- 17 Oct 26 +2
- Stability: 0.90 → pass security
- 15 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Oct 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.83 functional
- 13 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/agent-sudo-mcp@0.5.6
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | Kisyntra/Agent_Sudo |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/Kisyntra/Agent_Sudo/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/v0.5.6 |
| Rekor log index | 1796256029 |
| Predicate type | PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha256:9f860dfb92899cca6d6261dd5d9ac640ee9a9b88a75502d9144c27a80c13e1a4 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | Known build tool | setuptools.build_meta |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 0 packages
| Packages resolved | 0 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
get_runtime_context ~26
Get current working directory, git repository root, active branch, and workspace status details.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
read_file ~30
Read a local file through agent-sudo policy enforcement.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | string | yes | File path to read. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_shell_command ~71
DEMO/REFERENCE executor: classifies and gates the command through agent-sudo, then executes only a narrow allowlist. It is not a general shell. To gate real commands, embed the agent-sudo authorization engine in your agent (see README).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | string | yes | Command line to evaluate. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
write_file ~81
DEMO/REFERENCE executor: classifies and gates the write through agent-sudo, then writes inside the configured workspace (defaults to /tmp/agent-sudo-demo if no workspace is configured). It does not write to arbitrary paths outside the workspace.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | UTF-8 text content. |
| path | string | yes | File path to write. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp server?
io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx agent-sudo-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · agent-sudo-mcp
claude mcp add kisyntra-agent-sudo-mcp -- uvx agent-sudo-mcp
What is the io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp server?
io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp. MCP adapter for Agent_Sudo: authorization, delegation, provenance, and audit for AI agents. This page covers its PyPI package (agent-sudo-mcp).
Is the io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp server safe to use?
io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp scores 88 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 5 November 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp server expose?
io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp exposes 4 tools: read_file, write_file, run_shell_command, get_runtime_context. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 208 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp server still maintained?
io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp server under?
io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp declares the Apache-2.0 licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp server?
VerifyMCP ran 16 checks on io.github.Kisyntra/agent-sudo-mcp, covering Malware scan, Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health and 12 more. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to a PyPI package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.