FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs
NPM · FRACTALAI-MCP-SERVER
Post-quantum (ML-DSA-65/Dilithium-3) proof, provenance & AI-decision receipts, paid via x402.
Available components
Last scanned (3 hours ago)
Scores higher than 55% of npm servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security81
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- CVE check failed: a known high-severity CVE affects zod 3.25.76, a direct dependency. A fixed version is available. View diagnostics → Fail
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 30 of 93 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 52 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability71
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1056 tokens (~211/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 3 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "pqc_sign" implies "pay" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 0
- Security disclosure: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- 4 Nov 26 0
- Security disclosure: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- 3 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 2 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 31 Oct 26 0
- Security disclosure: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- 30 Oct 26 0
- Security disclosure: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- 27 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 26 Oct 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed npm/fractalai-mcp-server@0.1.1
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Vulnerabilities 1 finding
| ID | CVE | Severity | Vector | Fix available |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 | CVE-2023-54404 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
Background: What a vulnerability scan can and cannot prove →
Dependencies 93 packages
| Packages resolved | 93 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 30 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
attest_decision Seal an AI agent decision (VAID-1) ~279
Pay $0.05 USDC (x402) to seal an AI agent's declared decision: its input hash, output, model and timestamp are chained in an append-only Black Box and anchored on-chain (VAID-1, this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key). You also get back a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature over the same canonical decision bytes for independent offline verification. Returns a re-verifiable receipt. Built for EU AI Act Art.12 record-keeping. It notarizes the decision as declared; it does not judge whether the decision was correct. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Stable identifier of the agent whose decision is sealed. |
| input | string | yes | The decision input (or its hash). |
| model | string | – | Model/agent version that produced the decision. |
| output | string | yes | The decision output the agent produced. |
| payer | string | – | Optional payer address hint. |
| payment_tx_hash | string | – | A confirmed USDC-on-Base transaction hash paying the required amount to the treasury. If omitted, the tool returns the x402 payment challenge (accepts[]) instead of a result — pay first, then call ag… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
pqc_sign Buy a post-quantum signature ~236
Pay $0.02 USDC (x402) for one post-quantum ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 (NIST FIPS 204) signature over your message (its sha256 is signed) or a hex hash (signed directly). Returns { digest, signature, public_key, payment }. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge, not a signature. The signature proves these exact bytes were signed by this server's PQC key — nothing about their truthfulness, and 'quantum-resistant per NIST' is not 'unbreakable'.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| hash | string | – | Hex digest signed directly. Provide message OR hash. |
| message | string | – | UTF-8 string; sha256(message) is signed. |
| payer | string | – | Optional payer address hint. |
| payment_tx_hash | string | – | A confirmed USDC-on-Base transaction hash paying the required amount to the treasury. If omitted, the tool returns the x402 payment challenge (accepts[]) instead of a result — pay first, then call ag… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
seal_provenance Buy a PQC + drand provenance seal ~241
Pay $0.05 USDC (x402) for a post-quantum provenance seal over content: a drand round (League of Entropy, not backdateable) + a self-contained ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature over the seal + an on-chain anchor attempt (this server's node-bound Dilithium-2 key) over the content hash. Useful for EU AI Act (Art. 10/50/53) provenance. It is a provenance record, not a content audit. Without payment_tx_hash you get the payment challenge.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | – | UTF-8 content; sha256(content) is sealed. |
| content_hash | string | – | Sha256 hex you already computed. Provide content OR content_hash. |
| payer | string | – | Optional payer address hint. |
| payment_tx_hash | string | – | A confirmed USDC-on-Base transaction hash paying the required amount to the treasury. If omitted, the tool returns the x402 payment challenge (accepts[]) instead of a result — pay first, then call ag… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_proof Verify a post-quantum signature ~172
Verify a post-quantum (ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3, NIST FIPS 204) signature against its public key. Free, no payment. Returns { valid, verdict }. A valid result proves the exact bytes in signed_message_b64 were signed by the given key; it says nothing about their truthfulness. For a signature from pqc_sign over a hex digest D, signed_message_b64 = base64(utf8(D)).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| public_key | string | yes | Base64 ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 public key. |
| signature | string | yes | Base64 ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 signature to check. |
| signed_message_b64 | string | yes | Base64 of the exact bytes that were signed. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
x402_checkout Get x402 payment requirements ~128
Return the live x402 (HTTP 402) payment requirements for a paid FractalAI resource: price, network, USDC asset, payTo address and the accepts[] entries (EIP-3009 gasless and txHash fallback). Free — it never moves funds. Use it before pqc_sign / seal_provenance / attest_decision to learn exactly how much and how to pay. Pass resource='manifest' for the full .well-known/x402.json.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| resource | string | yes | Which paid resource to price, or 'manifest' for the whole x402 manifest. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs MCP server?
FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y fractalai-mcp-server. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · fractalai-mcp-server
claude mcp add johninarti-fractalai -- npx -y fractalai-mcp-server
What is the FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs MCP server?
FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.johnInarti/fractalai. Post-quantum (ML-DSA-65/Dilithium-3) proof, provenance & AI-decision receipts, paid via x402. This page covers its npm package (fractalai-mcp-server).
Is the FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs MCP server safe to use?
FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs scores 77 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We recorded 1 known advisory against it as of 5 November 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs MCP server expose?
FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs exposes 5 tools: verify_proof, x402_checkout, pqc_sign, seal_provenance, attest_decision. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,056 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs MCP server still maintained?
FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs MCP server under?
FractalAI Post-Quantum Proofs declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.