io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp
NPM · PAYMENT-GUARD-MCP · SCANNED SEP 20
Pre-send risk check for AI agents that move money — screen an address or payment URL before sending.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security98
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 31 of 97 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Provenance check failed: no build-provenance attestation is published. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 38 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability72
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1142 tokens (~228/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management87
- Stability observed for 26 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp server?
io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y payment-guard-mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · payment-guard-mcp
claude mcp add mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp -- npx -y payment-guard-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"payment-guard-mcp"
]
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"payment-guard-mcp"
]
}
}
} codex mcp add mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp -- npx -y payment-guard-mcp
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp": {
"type": "local",
"command": [
"npx",
"-y",
"payment-guard-mcp"
],
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp --command npx --arg -y --arg payment-guard-mcp
mcp_servers:
mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp:
command: "npx"
args: ["-y", "payment-guard-mcp"] {
"McpServers": {
"mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp": {
"Transport": "stdio",
"Command": "npx",
"Arguments": [
"-y",
"payment-guard-mcp"
]
}
}
} assistant mcp add mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp -t stdio -c npx -a -y payment-guard-mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"mlawsonking-payment-guard-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"payment-guard-mcp"
]
}
}
} Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Sept 26 −2
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
- 17 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 15 Sept 26 0
- Package version: 1.2.0 → 1.3.0 functional
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 83 to 87. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 25 days of observed history at the previous scan, 26 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 77 to 80. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 23 days of observed history at the previous scan, 24 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 10 Sept 26 −3
- Stability: pass → 0.77 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Analysed npm/payment-guard-mcp@1.3.0
Provenance No attestation
The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.
| Result | No attestation |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 97 packages
| Packages resolved | 97 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 31 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_sanctioned ~225
Fast OFAC sanctions check for a crypto address or ENS name, with no on-chain lookup and no scam lists. Matches against the union of every EVM-format OFAC SDN list (ETH, ARB, BSC, ETC, USDC, USDT), which applies to all EVM chains because OFAC lists addresses by currency rather than by chain. Only EVM (0x) addresses are covered: the Bitcoin, Tron, Solana, Monero and other non-EVM sanctioned addresses are on the SDN list and are not checked here. sanctioned:false means the address is absent from those EVM lists and nothing more. If the lists cannot be loaded, sanctioned is null and the verdict is "unknown"; if only some of them load, the verdict is "unknown" too, because absence from a partial corpus is not a clear result. Read coverage in the response. Network: needs OFAC sanctioned-address lists, public EVM RPC (only when an ENS name is passed).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM address or ENS name. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
resolve_name ~208
Resolve an ENS name to an address and screen that address against the OFAC EVM sanctions lists and the scam/abuse blocklists. Resolution is namehash, then the mainnet ENS registry resolver, then a direct addr() call. There is no ENSIP-10/CCIP-Read, so offchain and L2 names (Basenames, .cb.id, gasless subnames) report resolved:false here even though a wallet resolves them. It does NOT detect lookalike or homoglyph names: no confusable check and no ENSIP-15 normalization, so a spoofed name that resolves to a clean address comes back clean. A failed registry call is reported as a failed lookup, never as an unregistered name. Read ens_coverage in the response. Network: needs public EVM RPC (ENS registry), OFAC sanctioned-address lists, ethereum-lists + ScamSniffer blocklists.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | ENS name, e.g. vitalik.eth. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
screen_address ~239
The pre-send check for an agent about to send funds to a crypto address. Takes an EVM address or an ENS name and returns safe, caution or block from three inputs: the OFAC EVM sanctions lists, the ethereum-lists and ScamSniffer scam blocklists, and an on-chain read (brand-new and unused address, which is the shape of a scam drop address, or a contract). Sanctions coverage is EVM-format address lists only, so Bitcoin, Tron, Solana and Monero sanctioned addresses are not checked; it applies to every EVM chain, because OFAC lists addresses by currency rather than by chain. If a list fails to load the verdict is downgraded to caution and a flag names the check that did not run, rather than reporting safe. Read sanctions_coverage in the response. Network: needs OFAC sanctioned-address lists, ethereum-lists + ScamSniffer blocklists, public EVM RPC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | EVM address (0x + 40 hex) or ENS name (e.g. name.eth). |
| chain | string | – | EVM chain (default eth). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
screen_payment ~215
Check an x402 endpoint or merchant URL before paying it. The structural half is local: punycode host, raw-IP host, credentials in the URL, abuse-prone TLD, known shorteners, excessive subdomains, nonstandard port, and a substring match against 14 brand names flagged when the brand is not the registrable domain, so paypal.com.secure-pay.xyz is caught. There is no edit distance and no homoglyph mapping, so an ASCII typo like paypa1.com is not caught by that rule. Domain age needs RDAP and the destination after redirects needs a fetch; the intermediate hops are not analysed. Offline it still returns the structural verdict and reports those two network checks as skipped. Returns safe, caution or block. Network: needs rdap.org, the URL being screened (redirect follow). The network is only used when the domain age is looked up and redirects are followed. The structural analysis is local and runs offline.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | The x402/payment endpoint or merchant URL. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
screen_token ~255
Check a token contract before an agent buys, swaps or approves it: is it a HONEYPOT (you can buy but not sell), does it have an extreme sell tax, is it on a scam/abuse blocklist. The buy+sell simulation comes from api.honeypot.is, which supports Ethereum and Base only and answers 400 "Invalid chain" for polygon, arbitrum and optimism, so the honeypot and tax fields cannot be populated there. It also has no result for tokens with no liquidity pool, which is exactly the population most likely to be a rug. When no simulation ran the verdict is never safe: it is caution, or block if the blocklist already hit, with a honeypot-check-unavailable flag, and honeypot_checked plus honeypot_coverage say what happened. Returns token name/symbol, buy/sell/transfer taxes where available, and a verdict of safe, caution or block. Network: needs honeypot.is, ethereum-lists + ScamSniffer blocklists, public EVM RPC.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Token contract address (0x + 40 hex). |
| chain | string | – | EVM chain (default eth). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp server?
io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp is listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp. Pre-send risk check for AI agents that move money, screen an address or payment URL before sending. This page covers its npm package (payment-guard-mcp).
Is the io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp server safe to use?
io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp scores 82 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 20 September 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp server expose?
io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp exposes 5 tools: screen_address, screen_payment, check_sanctioned, resolve_name, screen_token. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,142 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp server still maintained?
io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp server under?
io.github.mlawsonking/payment-guard-mcp declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.