io.tooloracle/agentguard
REMOTE · FEEDORACLE.IO · SCANNED AUG 3
AgentGuard — 20-tool AI safety MCP: policy preflight, risk scoring, audit logging, rate limits.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 24 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2510 tokens (~104/item across 24 items; 24 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage93
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 80% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Capabilities40
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-03-26; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.
remote · feedoracle.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-tooloracle-agentguard https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/
[mcp_servers.io-tooloracle-agentguard] url = "https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"io-tooloracle-agentguard": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add io-tooloracle-agentguard --url https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/ --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
io-tooloracle-agentguard:
url: "https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/" {
"mcpServers": {
"io-tooloracle-agentguard": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 2 Aug 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 31 Jul 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 30 Jul 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 28 Jul 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 27 Jul 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Jul 26 57
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Probed https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=feedoracle.io | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 18 Jul 2026 | 16 Oct 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 527ff2ca2ba4bed1e35b2c7b10b28b8a069 |
| SANs: feedoracle.io, www.feedoracle.io | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of feedoracle.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | present | 57355 | 8 | Verified |
| feedoracle.io. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/ | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/ | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://feedoracle.io/guard-oracle/mcp/ |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.
approval_list ~92
List approval requests. Filter by status (pending/approved/denied/all), agent_id, or tool_name. Shows summary stats.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Filter by agent ID |
| limit | integer | — | Max results (default: 50, max: 200) |
| status | string | — | Filter by status (default: pending) |
| tool_name | string | — | Filter by tool name |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_required ~93
Check if a tool call requires human approval before execution. Returns requires_approval=true/false with matched policy list. Set register_pending=true to create a trackable approval request with an approval_url for human review.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent identifier |
| register_pending | boolean | — | Create pending approval record |
| tool_args | object | — | Tool arguments |
| tool_name | string | yes | Tool to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
approval_resolve ~96
Resolve a pending approval request. Approve or deny a tool call that was flagged for human review. Updates agent state and creates audit trail. Requires authentication.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| approved_by | string | — | Identity of the approver (name/email/agent_id) |
| decision | string | yes | Approve or deny |
| reason | string | — | Optional reason for the decision |
| request_id | string | yes | The approval request ID to resolve |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
audit_log_query ~154
Query the persistent audit trail. Filter by agent, tool, decision, time range. Returns signed entries with tamper-detection. Use for compliance reporting, anomaly detection, or agent behaviour analysis.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Filter by agent ID |
| decision | string | — | Filter: allowed|denied|flagged|approved |
| limit | integer | — | Max entries (default 50, max 500) |
| offset | integer | — | Pagination offset |
| since | string | — | ISO timestamp start (e.g. 2026-03-27T00:00:00Z) |
| tool_name | string | — | Filter by tool name |
| until | string | — | ISO timestamp end |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
audit_log_write ~167
Write a tool call result to the persistent, signed audit log. Call this AFTER tool execution with the outcome. Each entry is cryptographically signed for tamper-evidence. Essential for compliance, DORA, MiCA audit trail requirements.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent that made the call |
| decision | string | — | allowed|denied|flagged|approved |
| duration_ms | integer | — | Execution time in milliseconds |
| outcome | string | — | success|error|timeout |
| reason | string | — | Why this decision was made |
| risk_score | integer | — | Risk score at time of call |
| session_id | string | — | Session identifier |
| tool_args | object | — | Arguments used |
| tool_name | string | yes | Tool that was executed |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
cross_tool_anomaly_check ~93
Detect anomalous tool usage patterns across an agent recent history. Checks risky tool combinations (AML-then-payment, wallet-recon-then-transfer), high call frequency, repeated denials, broad reconnaissance, elevated risk scores.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Agent to analyze |
| sensitivity | string | — | low|medium|high |
| window_seconds | integer | — | Lookback seconds (default 300) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
decision_explain ~113
Get a human-readable explanation of why a tool call was allowed or denied. Pass request_id from a previous policy_preflight for stored explanation, or provide tool_name + tool_args for fresh analysis. Explains matched policies, risk score breakdown, and recommendation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent identifier |
| request_id | string | — | request_id from previous preflight (optional) |
| tool_args | object | — | Arguments to analyze |
| tool_name | string | — | Tool to analyze (if no request_id) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
emergency_kill ~107
Emergency kill-switch. Immediately terminates agent session(s), revokes pending approvals, blocks rate limits, and audit-logs the emergency. Use for: compromised agents, runaway automation, suspicious behavior. kill_type: full|session_only|soft.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent to kill |
| kill_type | string | — | full|session_only|soft |
| reason | string | — | Why emergency kill was triggered |
| session_id | string | — | Specific session to kill |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
guard_metrics ~50
AgentGuard operational metrics. Returns decision stats, top agents/tools, risk distribution, daily activity, approval stats, and tier distribution.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| days | integer | — | Time window in days (default: 30) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
output_safety_scan ~120
Post-execution output scanner. Checks tool output for PII leaks (email, phone, SSN, IBAN), secret exposure, data exfiltration patterns (outbound URLs, base64), and tool poisoning (injected instructions). Verdict: clean|warn|flag|block.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | — |
| output | string | yes | Tool output text or JSON to scan |
| strict | boolean | — | Block on any high-severity finding |
| tool_name | string | — | Name of the tool that produced this output |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
payload_safety_check ~122
Comprehensive safety scan for injection attacks and dangerous patterns. Detects: prompt injection, jailbreak/DAN attempts, role hijacking, SQL injection (UNION/DROP/OR 1=1), XSS, Python/JS/Shell code injection, path traversal, oversized payloads, null bytes. Returns safe=true/false with finding list and block/allow decision.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent identifier |
| payload | — | yes | Payload to scan (string or object) |
| strict_mode | boolean | — | Block on any finding (default: false) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
payment_policy_check ~141
Validate a payment against policy rules before execution. Checks amount limits (>100k warns, >1M blocks), recipient allowlist/denylist, supported currencies/networks, AML reporting thresholds, and MiCA flags. Returns approved/rejected with full violation list and risk score.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent identifier |
| amount | number | yes | Payment amount |
| currency | string | — | Currency code (USD, EUR, USDC, ETH...) |
| network | string | — | Payment network (ethereum, base, sepa...) |
| purpose | string | — | Payment purpose (required for compliance) |
| recipient | string | — | Recipient address or ID |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
policy_preflight ~110
Pre-flight security check before any tool call. Evaluates all policies, computes risk score, checks rate limits, and returns allow/deny/require_approval decision. Call this BEFORE executing any agent tool. Writes to audit log automatically.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Unique identifier for the calling agent |
| session_id | string | — | Session identifier (optional) |
| tool_args | object | — | Arguments for the tool call |
| tool_name | string | yes | Name of tool about to be called |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
policy_register ~90
View the central policy registry. Query tiers (T1-T4), tool classifications, escalation rules. Actions: summary (default), lookup (by tool_name), tiers, rules, tools (by tier_id).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | — | What to query (default: summary) |
| tier_id | string | — | Tier ID for tools action |
| tool_name | string | — | Tool name for lookup action |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
rate_limit_check ~73
Check if an agent has exceeded rate limits. Returns per-window usage (minute/hour/day) with percentage used. Limits: 200/min, 5000/hr, 50000/day per agent. Use before high-frequency tool calls or for agent health monitoring.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Agent ID to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
replay_guard_check ~112
Detect replay attacks — identical requests sent multiple times in a time window. Uses SHA256 fingerprint of (agent_id + tool_name + args). Default window: 300 seconds (5 min). Returns is_replay=true/false with duplicate count and first/last seen timestamps.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent identifier |
| tool_args | object | — | Tool arguments (used for fingerprint) |
| tool_name | string | yes | Tool name to check |
| window_seconds | integer | — | Replay window in seconds |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
scope_check ~82
Check if agent has required scope for a tool. Roles: admin, compliance_officer, trader, auditor, developer, readonly. Returns has_scope + missing scope + granting roles.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | — |
| role | string | — | — |
| scopes | array | — | — |
| session_id | string | — | — |
| tool_name | string | yes | — |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
secret_exposure_check ~108
Deep scan any text/payload for secrets, credentials, and PII. Detects: API keys (OpenAI, GitHub, AWS), tokens (Slack, Bearer), private keys (ETH, Bitcoin), credentials (passwords, secrets), and PII (emails, credit cards, SSNs). Returns findings with severity and remediation guidance.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| payload | string | yes | Text or JSON string to scan |
| scan_type | string | — | all | keys | tokens | pii |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
session_validate ~96
Create/validate/invalidate agent sessions with role, scopes, TTL and call budget. Actions: create|validate|invalidate|info.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | — |
| agent_id | string | — | — |
| call_budget | integer | — | — |
| role | string | — | — |
| scopes | array | — | — |
| session_id | string | — | — |
| tenant_id | string | — | — |
| ttl_seconds | integer | — | — |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
spend_limit_check ~117
Check if a payment amount stays within agent spend limits. Default limits: 10,000/call, 50,000/hr, 200,000/day. Trusted agents: 100,000/call, 500,000/hr, 2,000,000/day. Returns within_limits=true/false with headroom percentage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent identifier |
| amount | number | yes | Amount to check |
| currency | string | — | Currency code |
| trust_level | string | — | default or trusted |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tenant_policy_check ~83
Multi-tenant governance. Tenants: default, fintech_eu (MiCA/DORA), defi_protocol, enterprise_read. Checks tool blocklists, max risk scores, spend limits. Actions: check|list.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | — | — |
| agent_id | string | — | — |
| tenant_id | string | — | — |
| tool_name | string | — | — |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
threat_intel_check ~91
Check entity against threat intelligence. Auto-detects ETH addresses, IPs, domains. Checks sanctions (Tornado Cash), disposable services, behavioral analysis from audit log. Returns threat_level: none|low|medium|high|critical.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | — |
| entity | string | yes | Address, IP, domain or agent_id to check |
| entity_type | string | — | — |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tool_manifest_verify ~96
Supply-chain verification for MCP tools. Checks publisher identity against allowlist, scans tool descriptions for prompt injection, validates server domain and signing capability. Verdict: trusted|caution|block.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| publisher | string | — | Claimed publisher name |
| server_url | string | — | MCP server URL to verify |
| tool_description | string | — | Tool description to scan for injections |
| tool_name | string | — | Tool name to check |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
tool_risk_score ~104
Compute 0-100 risk score for any tool + input combination. 0=minimal risk (read-only), 100=critical (payment/irreversible). Detects secrets, injection attempts, high-value amounts. Use before deciding whether to proceed with a tool call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | — | Agent identifier (affects trust factor) |
| tool_args | object | — | Tool arguments to analyze |
| tool_name | string | yes | Tool name to score |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.