SanctionScreen
REMOTE · API.SANCTIONSSCREEN.IO · SCANNED SEP 29
Screen counterparties and enrich companies for AI agents — sanctions checks, cited sources.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security71
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1592 tokens (~796/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management10
- Stability observed for 3 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 2 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
How do I install the SanctionScreen MCP server?
SanctionScreen is a hosted endpoint at https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · api.sanctionsscreen.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen 'https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
"url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen] url = "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen --url 'https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen:
url: "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 +1
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 27 Sept 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 26 Sept 26 66
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 29 Sept 2026 · Probed https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=sanctionsscreen.io | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 26 Sept 2026 | 25 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | d3e26b18090cbca50e95b39786c212d7 |
| SANs: sanctionsscreen.io, api.sanctionsscreen.io, *.api.sanctionsscreen.io | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of api.sanctionsscreen.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | present | 57355 | 8 | Verified |
| sanctionsscreen.io. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
Protected resource metadata
| Retrieved | No |
|---|---|
| Problem | no_resource_metadata |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
enrich_company ~567
Resolve a company domain or legal name to structured company facts via the free public GLEIF LEI registry. Inputs: {domain? e.g. "apple.com", name? e.g. "Apple Inc.", request_id? (idempotency)}. At least one of domain/name is required. v1 boundaries (returned honestly, never invented): - GLEIF has no domain index: domain-only lookups are best-effort (registrable-name candidates are tried). Provide the legal company name for reliable resolution. - GLEIF does not publish industry, industry_code, size_band, or employee_range: those come back null, each with a sources[] entry documenting the gap. - founded is the legal-entity creation date (GLEIF publishes no true founding date). - Unresolvable input -> tool error with code UNRESOLVABLE. Output: {company_id, legal_name, domain, industry, industry_code, size_band, employee_range, hq: {country, city}, founded, sources: [{field, source, url}], confidence, generated_at}. EXAMPLE 1: Input: {"domain": "apple.com", "request_id": "demo-e1"} Output: {"company_id": "cs_co_...", "legal_name": "Apple Inc.", "domain": "apple.com", "industry": null, "industry_code": null, "size_band": null, "employee_range": null, "hq": {"country": "US", "city": "Cupertino"}, "founded": "1980-12-12", "sources": [{"field": "legal_name", "source": "GLEIF LEI (api.gleif.org)", "url": "https://api.gleif.org/api/v1/lei-records/..."}, {"field": "industry", "source": "GLEIF LEI — field not published by GLEIF (null by design in v1)", "url": "https://api.gleif.org/api/v1/lei-records/..."}], "confidence": "high", "generated_at": "2026-09-26T...Z"} EXAMPLE 2 — unresolvable: Input: {"name": "Nonexistent Widgets Pty Ltd ZZ"} Tool error: {"code": "UNRESOLVABLE", "message": "No GLEIF LEI record matched ..."}
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | – | Company domain, e.g. "apple.com". Best-effort in v1 (GLEIF has no domain index). |
| name | string | – | Legal company name, e.g. "Apple Inc.". Reliable path. |
| request_id | string | – | Client idempotency key; safe retries. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
screen_counterparty ~1,025
Screen a counterparty name against the indexed sanctions lists (OFAC SDN, UK FCDO consolidated). What it does: normalizes the query (Unicode NFKD fold, punctuation strip, lowercase, Cyrillic/Greek transliteration; tolerant to token order e.g. "Putin Vladimir" vs "Vladimir Putin"), looks it up in the sanctions index, and returns EVERY match at low confidence or above with a per-match citation. Low-confidence matches are never hidden. Inputs: - name (required, string): full name of the person or entity. - country (optional, ISO-3166 alpha-2, e.g. "RU"): corroborates nationality/citizenship identifiers. - dob (optional, "YYYY-MM-DD"): a dob match adds +15 to the score — the strongest corroborator. - identifiers (optional, [{type, value}]): extra identifiers to check against the record, e.g. [{"type":"passport","value":"719023441"}]. - request_id (optional, string): idempotency key; safe to retry. - include_low_confidence (optional, boolean, default true): fuzzy matches (Jaro-Winkler >= 0.92) land in the low tier. Keep true — hiding low matches is a compliance liability. Output: {screening_id, disposition, matches[], disclaimer, generated_at}. - disposition: "clear" (no matches) | "potential_match" (any medium/low match) | "review_advised" (any high-confidence match — human review required before any adverse action). - Each match: {list, list_date, record_uid, matched_name, name_kind (primary|alias_strong|alias_weak), confidence (high|medium|low), confidence_score (0-100), matched_fields, citation {source, url, accessed_at}}. - Confidence math: exact primary 80 / alias_strong 70 / alias_weak 55; dob match +15. Tiers: high >= 85, medium >= 60, low >= 30. Fuzzy (JW >= 0.92) -> low tier, score 30-55. - LANGUAGE RULE: report "potential match", never "sanctioned". Screening is informational only — not a legal verdict. Every response carries the fixed disclaimer. EXAMPLE 1 — listed individual with corroborating dob: Input: {"name": "Vladimir Putin", "dob": "1952-10-07",…
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| country | string | – | ISO-3166 alpha-2 country code, e.g. RU. |
| dob | string | – | Date of birth YYYY-MM-DD. Strongest corroborator (+15 score). |
| identifiers | array | – | Extra identifiers to check against the matched record. |
| include_low_confidence | boolean | – | Return fuzzy low-tier matches (default true). Never hide them. |
| name | string | yes | Full name of the person or entity to screen. |
| request_id | string | – | Client idempotency key; safe retries. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the SanctionScreen MCP server?
SanctionScreen is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.sanctionsscreen/sanctionscreen. Screen counterparties and enrich companies for AI agents, sanctions checks, cited sources. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp).
Is the SanctionScreen MCP server safe to use?
SanctionScreen scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the SanctionScreen MCP server expose?
SanctionScreen exposes 2 tools: screen_counterparty, enrich_company. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,592 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the SanctionScreen MCP server require authentication?
Yes. SanctionScreen asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the SanctionScreen MCP server still maintained?
SanctionScreen is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 29 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.