# SanctionScreen (remote · api.sanctionsscreen.io)

Screen counterparties and enrich companies for AI agents — sanctions checks, cited sources.

- Trust score: 67/100 (medium)
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-09-29

## Components

- remote · `api.sanctionsscreen.io`: 67/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen/api.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen/api)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `required`
- Version: `1.0.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-09-29.

- **Endpoint Security**: 71/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token.
  - HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
  - HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 60/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1592 tokens (~796/item across 2 items; 2 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 10/100
  - Stability observed for 3 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - We read all 2 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.
  - An AI judge read all 2 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 60/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the SanctionScreen MCP server?

SanctionScreen is a hosted endpoint at https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen 'https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
      "url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen]
url = "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen --url 'https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen:
    url: "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen -t streamable-http -u 'https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-09-28 (score 67, +1)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-09-27 (score 66, 0)

- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03

### 2026-09-26 (score 66)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (2)

### `screen_counterparty` (~1025 tokens)

Screen a counterparty name against the indexed sanctions lists (OFAC SDN, UK FCDO consolidated).

What it does: normalizes the query (Unicode NFKD fold, punctuation strip, lowercase, Cyrillic/Greek transliteration; tolerant to token order e.g. "Putin Vladimir" vs "Vladimir Putin"), looks it up in the sanctions index, and returns EVERY match at low confidence or above with a per-match citation. Low-confidence matches are never hidden.

Inputs:
\- name (required, string): full name of the person or entity.
\- country (optional, ISO-3166 alpha-2, e.g. "RU"): corroborates nationality/citizenship identifiers.
\- dob (optional, "YYYY-MM-DD"): a dob match adds +15 to the score — the strongest corroborator.
\- identifiers (optional, [{type, value}]): extra identifiers to check against the record, e.g. [{"type":"passport","value":"719023441"}].
\- request_id (optional, string): idempotency key; safe to retry.
\- include_low_confidence (optional, boolean, default true): fuzzy matches (Jaro-Winkler >= 0.92) land in the low tier. Keep true — hiding low matches is a compliance liability.

Output: {screening_id, disposition, matches[], disclaimer, generated_at}.
\- disposition: "clear" (no matches) | "potential_match" (any medium/low match) | "review_advised" (any high-confidence match — human review required before any adverse action).
\- Each match: {list, list_date, record_uid, matched_name, name_kind (primary|alias_strong|alias_weak), confidence (high|medium|low), confidence_score (0-100), matched_fields, citation {source, url, accessed_at}}.
\- Confidence math: exact primary 80 / alias_strong 70 / alias_weak 55; dob match +15. Tiers: high >= 85, medium >= 60, low >= 30. Fuzzy (JW >= 0.92) -> low tier, score 30-55.
\- LANGUAGE RULE: report "potential match", never "sanctioned". Screening is informational only — not a legal verdict. Every response carries the fixed disclaimer.

EXAMPLE 1 — listed individual with corroborating dob:
Input:  {"name": "Vladimir Putin", "dob": "1952-10-07",…

Input parameters:

- `country` (string): ISO-3166 alpha-2 country code, e.g. RU.
- `dob` (string): Date of birth YYYY-MM-DD. Strongest corroborator (+15 score).
- `identifiers` (array): Extra identifiers to check against the matched record.
- `include_low_confidence` (boolean): Return fuzzy low-tier matches (default true). Never hide them.
- `name` (string, required): Full name of the person or entity to screen.
- `request_id` (string): Client idempotency key; safe retries.

### `enrich_company` (~567 tokens)

Resolve a company domain or legal name to structured company facts via the free public GLEIF LEI registry.

Inputs: {domain? e.g. "apple.com", name? e.g. "Apple Inc.", request_id? (idempotency)}. At least one of domain/name is required.

v1 boundaries (returned honestly, never invented):
\- GLEIF has no domain index: domain-only lookups are best-effort (registrable-name candidates are tried). Provide the legal company name for reliable resolution.
\- GLEIF does not publish industry, industry_code, size_band, or employee_range: those come back null, each with a sources[] entry documenting the gap.
\- founded is the legal-entity creation date (GLEIF publishes no true founding date).
\- Unresolvable input -> tool error with code UNRESOLVABLE.

Output: {company_id, legal_name, domain, industry, industry_code, size_band, employee_range, hq: {country, city}, founded, sources: [{field, source, url}], confidence, generated_at}.

EXAMPLE 1:
Input:  {"domain": "apple.com", "request_id": "demo-e1"}
Output: {"company_id": "cs_co_...", "legal_name": "Apple Inc.", "domain": "apple.com",
  "industry": null, "industry_code": null, "size_band": null, "employee_range": null,
  "hq": {"country": "US", "city": "Cupertino"}, "founded": "1980-12-12",
  "sources": [{"field": "legal_name", "source": "GLEIF LEI (api.gleif.org)", "url": "https://api.gleif.org/api/v1/lei-records/..."},
              {"field": "industry", "source": "GLEIF LEI — field not published by GLEIF (null by design in v1)", "url": "https://api.gleif.org/api/v1/lei-records/..."}],
  "confidence": "high", "generated_at": "2026-09-26T...Z"}

EXAMPLE 2 — unresolvable:
Input:  {"name": "Nonexistent Widgets Pty Ltd ZZ"}
Tool error: {"code": "UNRESOLVABLE", "message": "No GLEIF LEI record matched ..."}

Input parameters:

- `domain` (string): Company domain, e.g. "apple.com". Best-effort in v1 (GLEIF has no domain index).
- `name` (string): Legal company name, e.g. "Apple Inc.". Reliable path.
- `request_id` (string): Client idempotency key; safe retries.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen/api#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-09-29: 67
- 2026-09-28: 67
- 2026-09-27: 66
- 2026-09-26: 66

## Common questions

### What is the SanctionScreen MCP server?

SanctionScreen is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.sanctionsscreen/sanctionscreen. Screen counterparties and enrich companies for AI agents, sanctions checks, cited sources. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp).

### Is the SanctionScreen MCP server safe to use?

SanctionScreen scores 67 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the SanctionScreen MCP server expose?

SanctionScreen exposes 2 tools: screen_counterparty, enrich_company. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,592 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the SanctionScreen MCP server require authentication?

Yes. SanctionScreen asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.

### Is the SanctionScreen MCP server still maintained?

SanctionScreen is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 29 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/mcp
- Authorisation metadata: https://api.sanctionsscreen.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Website: https://sanctionsscreen.io/
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen/api.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen/api.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/io-sanctionsscreen-sanctionscreen/api