Assay: settlement verification
REMOTE · FOMOX.IO
Verify crypto payments really settled and how much arrived. 20 chains. Read only, no API key.
Available components
Last scanned (17 hours ago)
Scores higher than 65% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Crypto and Web3
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 6 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability69
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1169 tokens (~194/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 6 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 9 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 8 Nov 26 −1
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 26 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 24 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 90 to 93. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 27 days of observed history at the previous scan, 28 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=fomox.io | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 4 Oct 2026 | 2 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6f30c548dd49063798b80fb73e0270261f9 |
| SANs: *.fomox.io, fomox.io | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of fomox.io. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| io. | DS published | 38690 | 8 | Verified |
| fomox.io. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_sandbox_answer ~118
Score your decision on a sandbox case. Tell it whether you would have credited the payment and for how much, and it replies with whether that was correct and, if not, exactly what the error would have cost you in real units. This is the fastest way to find out whether your payment handling is actually safe.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | string | – | If crediting, how much, in the asset's smallest units. |
| caseId | string | yes | The case you ran. |
| credit | boolean | yes | Would you have credited this payment? |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
evaluate_spend_policy ~229
Check a proposed payment against spending limits that live OUTSIDE your context, where no instruction in a prompt, a message or a web page can change them. Returns a signed allow or deny with reasons. Use this before executing any transfer on behalf of a user. It enforces velocity caps, per-action ceilings, recipient allowlists and asset allowlists. Because the rules are held server side and signed, an attacker who takes over your reasoning still cannot raise your limits. IMPORTANT: this is ADVISORY. Assay holds no keys and cannot stop a transaction. Verify the signature and enforce the decision wherever you sign. Create a policy first with the /v1/policy endpoint.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | object | yes | The payment you are about to make. |
| commit | boolean | – | Default true: an allowed action counts against velocity limits. Pass false to ask 'would this be allowed' without consuming budget. |
| policyId | string | yes | From creating a policy. |
| policySecret | string | yes | The secret returned when the policy was created. Shown once, stored only as a hash. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_chains ~58
List every chain this service can verify, with the confirmation depth each needs before a payment is treated as final, and how deeply it can be verified. Call this if you are unsure whether a chain is supported or what to pass as `chain`.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_failure_modes ~138
List every known way a blockchain payment can appear successful while being worth less than it claims, or nothing at all. Each entry explains what the chain does, what it costs you when you get it wrong, and the one-line fix. Useful when writing or reviewing code that credits users for incoming crypto payments. Every chain has its own dialect but they are all the same few lies, and the mitigation is always the same: never trust the stated amount, reconstruct what actually moved.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| family | string | – | Optionally filter to one family: xrpl, evm, utxo, svm, hedera, algorand, or all. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_sandbox_case ~114
Practise on a payment designed to deceive you, with no money at risk. Returns a verification result shaped exactly like a real one for one of 19 adversarial cases. Decide whether you would credit it, then call check_sandbox_answer to find out whether you were right and what the mistake would have cost. Use this to test any agent or integration that handles incoming crypto payments BEFORE it handles real money.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| caseId | string | – | Which case to run. Omit to get the list of available cases. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
verify_payment ~445
Check whether a crypto payment really settled and how much was ACTUALLY delivered, which is often not the amount the transaction claims. Use this before crediting anyone for an incoming payment. Returns `delivered` (what truly moved), `claimed` (what the transaction says), `mismatch` (true when they disagree), and `warnings` naming the specific trap with a remedy. `ok` is true ONLY when the payment is final and meets everything you asserted in `expect`; anything uncertain returns ok:false, so it is safe to gate a credit on `ok`. Chains: xrp, hedera, algorand, solana, ethereum, base, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bnb, avalanche, linea, scroll, zksync, blast, mantle, celo, gnosis, bitcoin, litecoin. Pass `expect` whenever you can. Without it this reports what happened; with it, it tells you whether to pay. Read only: this never moves funds and never holds keys.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | – | Chain id. One of: xrp, hedera, algorand, solana, ethereum, base, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bnb, avalanche, linea, scroll, zksync, blast, mantle, celo, gnosis, bitcoin, litecoin. Common aliases wor… |
| expect | object | – | What you believe should be true. Supplying this is what lets `ok` mean anything. |
| ref | string | yes | The transaction hash or id. EVM: 0x + 64 hex. XRP: 64 hex. Solana: base58 signature. Bitcoin: 64 hex. Hedera: 0.0.1234-1700000000-123456789. Algorand: 52 base32 chars. Or a sandbox case like sandbox:… |
| rpcUrl | string | – | Optional. Your own HTTPS RPC endpoint for this chain. Bypasses our rate limits entirely and usually returns faster. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Assay: settlement verification MCP server?
Assay: settlement verification is a hosted endpoint at https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · fomox.io
claude mcp add --transport http io-fomox-assay 'https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp'
What is the Assay: settlement verification MCP server?
Assay: settlement verification is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.fomox/assay. Verify crypto payments really settled and how much arrived. 20 chains. Read only, no API key. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://fomox.io/api/assay/mcp).
Is the Assay: settlement verification MCP server safe to use?
Assay: settlement verification scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Assay: settlement verification MCP server expose?
Assay: settlement verification exposes 6 tools: verify_payment, list_chains, list_failure_modes, evaluate_spend_policy, run_sandbox_case, check_sandbox_answer. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,102 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Assay: settlement verification MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Assay: settlement verification without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Assay: settlement verification MCP server still maintained?
Assay: settlement verification is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Assay: settlement verification MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Assay: settlement verification, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Assay: settlement verification: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.