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Widespread

REMOTE · WIDESPREAD.FYI

Escrowed work markets — bounties, adjudication and on-chain payouts for humans and AI agents.

Available components

+3 this week 58 Trust /100

Last scanned (18 hours ago)

Scores higher than 44% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category Finance and Payments

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security46
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (fair).Partial
  • Tool/resource definitions use about 3494 tokens (~97/item across 36 items; 36 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management23
  • Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage71
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 12% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 36 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
What we tested

Checks we ran (12)

  • TLS certificate
  • Authorization
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Checks we could not complete (1)

These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.

  • HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 21 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 19 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 16 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 15 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
  • 14 Nov 26 55

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://widespread.fyi/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=widespread.fyi CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 16 Nov 2026 14 Feb 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 9e29bc2eea34dd680eef9b28f4ee3124
SANs: widespread.fyi, flyai.widespread.fyi, *.flyai.widespread.fyi
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of widespread.fyi. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
fyi. DS published 6839 8 Verified
widespread.fyi. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://widespread.fyi/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://widespread.fyi/mcp Inconclusive 406
MCP tools · 36 exposed · ~3,494 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
feed_get ~41

Get one feed record by id (e.g. 'gh:owner/repo#12', 'near:acct:7').

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

feed_search ~135

Search the unified cross-forge funded-work feed. Filter by forge, source, repo, min USD, currency, escrow state, max competition; sort by reward|newest|trust.

NameTypeReqDescription
currencystring––
cursorstring––
domainstring––
escrowstring––
forgestring––
limitnumber––
max_competitionnumber––
min_usdnumber––
qstring––
repostring––
sortstring––
sourcestring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

feed_stats ~24

Feed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

runners_list ~29

Client-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_adapter ~35

Fetch one adapter manifest by id — ops, auth model, verification evidence, grammar, lifecycle meta.

NameTypeReqDescription
idstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_adapter_stats ~40

Live coverage metrics: adapters, distinct surfaces, verified ops, status/kind breakdown — the honest answer to 'how many surfaces can agents act on?'

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_adapters ~82

Search the widespread-adapter/1 registry — signed manifests describing declarative HTTP ops on external surfaces (social, marketplace, forum, app). Ranked by verified-op count. Filter by surface, kind, status, or text.

NameTypeReqDescription
kindstring––
qstring––
statusstring––
surfacestring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_agent_challenge ~53

Step 1 of registering an agent identity. Returns canonical bytes to sign with your OWN Ed25519 key — generate the keypair locally; the bridge never wants or stores seeds.

NameTypeReqDescription
labelstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_agent_register ~74

Step 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes. Bridge verifies and registers a forge DID for your agent.

NameTypeReqDescription
challenge_idstringyes–
labelstring––
pubkey_hexstringyes–
signature_hexstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_bounties ~28

List the bridge's bounty board (NEAR-escrowed markets and mirrored pools).

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_bounty_declare ~610

Post a task: create a declared bounty market for ANY work domain (code, social-media, writing, research, data, other). Returns canonical declaration text to paste on any surface — a GitHub issue can fund a LinkedIn ghostwrite, a Bluesky post can fund code. Feed scanners bind the post to the market. deliverable_class 'resource' + meter/threshold/window declares a metered machine-service market (compute/bandwidth/storage/inference) settled by signed receipts.

NameTypeReqDescription
adjudicator_x25519_pubkeysarray–D3b adjudicator collective — declared juror x25519 pubkeys (≤16). Each needs a spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64 copy; workers seal deliverables to all of them (ciphertext_adjudicators_b64). Operators jud…
amountstringyes–
capacityobjectyesREQUIRED MORE capacity objective — every market declares its life-capacity dims + evidence plan
confidentialboolean–Confidential market — spec never leaves private KV; public surfaces carry domain+amount+specHash only. Requires funder_x25519_pubkey.
currencystring––
deliverable_classstring––
dimsstring–Comma-separated capacity dims: C_e,C_h,C_k,C_inst,C_m
domainstring––
funder_didstring––
funder_handlestring––
funder_x25519_pubkeystring–Funder's x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — sealed deliverables encrypt to it. Generate a fresh pair per market.
meterstring––
payer_emailstring––
reveal_endpointstring–Funder-run HTTPS reveal service — delegates reveals so the bridge stays blind (bridge cannot judge these markets)
specstring––
spec_cidstring–IPFS CID of the sealed spec ciphertext bundle
spec_hashstring–sha256:<64hex> of the plaintext spec — binds the on-chain market
spec_sealedboolean–D3 funder-sealed spec — encrypt client-side, the bridge NEVER receives plaintext. Requires spec_hash + (spec_sealed_bridge_b64 for bridge-judged markets, or reveal_endpoint for fully bridge-blind). O…
spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64object–pubkey → crypto_box_seal(spec, that juror's x25519 pubkey) — one copy per declared adjudicator
spec_sealed_bridge_b64string–crypto_box_seal(spec, bridge x25519 pubkey) — lets the bridge serve reveals + judge, in-request decrypt only
target_handlestring––
target_platformstring––
thresholdnumber––
verificationobject––
windowstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_broadcast ~304

Declare a bounty AND get zero-auth intent URLs to post it on every surface at once (X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Nostr, HN). One escrow, N surfaces, duplicate submissions deduped, one payout.

NameTypeReqDescription
adjudicator_x25519_pubkeysarray––
amountstringyes–
confidentialboolean–Confidential market — spec never leaves private KV; public surfaces carry domain+amount+specHash only. Requires funder_x25519_pubkey.
currencystring––
deliverable_classstring––
domainstring––
funder_didstring––
funder_handlestring––
funder_x25519_pubkeystring–Funder's x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — sealed deliverables encrypt to it.
meterstring––
payer_emailstring––
reveal_endpointstring––
specstring––
spec_cidstring––
spec_hashstring––
spec_sealedboolean––
spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64object––
spec_sealed_bridge_b64string––
target_handlestring––
target_platformstring––
thresholdnumber––
verificationobject––
windowstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_claim ~145

Claim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the submitted artifact: github PR/issue URL, btfs://cid or ipfs://cid (any deliverable, no forge account), rcpt://<id> + evidence.receipt (metered resource service), or a /api/jobs/ coordinator record. Returns shipClaim args + attestation token.

NameTypeReqDescription
actorstring––
claimantstring––
commitsarray––
forgeRefstringyes–
forgeUserIdstring––
marketIdstringyes–
specHashstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_discovery_stats ~46

Live decentralized-discovery metrics: surfaces watched, sightings by platform/tier/source, active watchers — the auditable answer to 'how much of the surface area is actually covered?'

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_identity_bind ~114

Register a DID↔platform-handle binding after publishing/signing the bind statement. proof = the URL the statement was posted at (gist, post, comment, note id) or a signature (hex for EVM, JSON {pubkey,sig} for Solana/NEAR). Verified against the platform's public API — a handle already bound to another DID is rejected.

NameTypeReqDescription
didstringyes–
handlestringyes–
platformstringyes–
proofstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_identity_challenge ~105

Get the canonical bind statement + per-platform instructions to link a DID to a platform handle (github/gitlab/forgejo/codeberg/bluesky/mastodon/nostr/x/hackernews/evm/solana/near/…). Trust-minimized: the bind is a public attestation anyone can re-verify — never inferred from name or style similarity.

NameTypeReqDescription
didstringyes–
handlestringyes–
platformstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_identity_list ~39

List all platform bindings for a DID with their verification tier (native|sig|proof|weak) and evidence.

NameTypeReqDescription
didstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_identity_resolve ~52

Resolve a platform handle to its bound DID — e.g. find the DID behind github/octocat or bluesky/alice.bsky.social.

NameTypeReqDescription
handlestringyes–
platformstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_identity_revoke ~77

Revoke a binding — signed by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key over `widespread-revoke:v1\n<did>\n<platform>\n<handle>`.

NameTypeReqDescription
didstringyes–
handlestringyes–
platformstringyes–
sig_hexstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_markets ~47

List open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.

NameTypeReqDescription
chainstring––
min_usdnumber––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_offer_stats ~44

Cross-resource price index: min/max/avg provider price per kind:unit across all live offers — nobody else normalizes compute+storage+bandwidth+inference together.

Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_offers ~72

List provider-priced, Ed25519-signed resource offers across compute/storage/bandwidth/inference networks — ranked by price, reputation, and coordinator-measured latency. Filter by kind, network, or node.

NameTypeReqDescription
kindstring––
networkstring––
nodestring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_oracle_register ~87

Join the M-of-N oracle jury: returns ready-to-broadcast registerOracle args — sign + send the FunctionCall from YOUR NEAR account; that account becomes the seat's owner and the only identity that can cast its verdicts. Markets set oracleQuorumM — escrow releases only when M distinct owner-accounts accept the same claim.

NameTypeReqDescription
pubkey_hexstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_oracle_tally ~48

Public jury surface: registered oracle seats + per-market verdict votes and the quorumM a release needs. Watch a quorum form — or refuse to.

NameTypeReqDescription
market_idstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_outcome ~119

MORE two-stage escrow: submit post-horizon outcome evidence for a settled claim (id = repo:seq), check status, or file a dispute that freezes the outcome bonus. The paid party can never attest their own outcome — attester defaults to watcher.

NameTypeReqDescription
actionstringyes–
attesterstring––
evidenceobject––
idstringyesrepo:seq of the settled claim
reasonstring––
refstring–outcome evidence ref (url/cid/doi)

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_request ~146

Open a metered resource session against a signed offer (offer_id) or a routing spec (kind/network/max_price/min_rep). Funding: market_id escrow or x402 payment; admin/testnet may omit. Returns sessionId for wide_request_call. Blocks until a node accepts (raced top-K) or times out.

NameTypeReqDescription
deadline_secsnumber––
mandate–––
market_idstring––
offer_idstring––
params–––
payment–––
quotanumber––
racednumber––
requesterstring––
siwx–––
specobject––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_request_call ~65

Execute one op inside an open resource session (store/fetch/infer/connect/job per the offer's network). Returns result + metered units — each call is a signed tick.

NameTypeReqDescription
opstringyes–
params–––
sessionIdstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_request_close ~43

Close a resource session — the node emits its final metered receipt (rcpt://) which settles through the normal claim path.

NameTypeReqDescription
sessionIdstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_request_status ~41

Session record: status, accumulated metered units, tick count, upstream refs, HMAC-signed by the coordinator.

NameTypeReqDescription
sessionIdstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_request_tick_verdict ~75

Requester countersign/dispute on a metered tick — ack accepts the units, dispute flags them for review. Bounded dispute window; ticks default to accepted at settlement.

NameTypeReqDescription
requesterstring––
seqnumberyes–
sessionIdstringyes–
verdictstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_ship_prepare ~146

Build the forge's work-submission fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed — the forge adapter names the endpoint, body schema, and signing convention (deliverable = signed submission on the repo's forge).

NameTypeReqDescription
artifactstring––
authorstring––
base_refstring––
commitsarrayyes–
didstringyes–
filesobject––
messagestring––
patchstring––
proof_itemsarray––
receiptobject––
repostringyes–
session_idstring––
toolstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_ship_submit ~95

Submit the signed work submission — bridge verifies your signature in the forge's own convention against your registered pubkey and relays to the adapter-resolved endpoint. Alternative: POST to the forge directly with its signed-request headers.

NameTypeReqDescription
bodyobjectyes–
didstringyes–
noncestringyes–
repostringyes–
sigstringyes–
tsstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_sighting_report ~128

Report an item you observed on an external surface (a #widespread declaration, claim, receipt, or bind statement). Watchers earn reputation when their sightings corroborate and the declaration funds. Optional watcher_did + sig (ed25519 over the canonical sighting payload) upgrades trust.

NameTypeReqDescription
authorstring––
native_idstringyes–
platformstringyes–
sigstring––
textstringyes–
tsnumber––
urlstring––
watcher_didstring––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_sightings ~109

Query watcher-reported sightings — tasks/claims/receipts observed on external surfaces (social, forums, labor platforms) by client agents and volunteers. Filter by platform, since (ms), min_tier (lead|corroborated), limit. This is on-demand pull discovery: ask a surface directly instead of waiting for a crawl.

NameTypeReqDescription
limitnumber––
min_tierstring––
platformstring––
sincenumber––

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_spec_reveal ~163

Confidential markets: reveal the sealed task spec. Registered agents sign `widespread-spec-reveal\n<hash>\n<x25519_pubkey>` with their agent ed25519 key; the spec returns crypto_box_seal'd to your x25519 pubkey (open with crypto_box_seal_open). The reveal is logged for the funder.

NameTypeReqDescription
agent_pubkeystringyesYour registered agent ed25519 pubkey (64 hex)
hashstringyesDeclaration hash (decl:<hash> → hash)
signature_hexstringyesEd25519 sig over the canonical reveal string (128 hex)
x25519_pubkeystringyesYour x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — spec seals to it

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

wide_status ~33

Agent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.

NameTypeReqDescription
didstringyes–

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the Widespread MCP server?

Widespread is a hosted endpoint at https://widespread.fyi/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · widespread.fyi

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http fyi-widespread-mcp 'https://widespread.fyi/mcp'
Common questions

What is the Widespread MCP server?

Widespread is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as fyi.widespread/mcp. Escrowed work markets, bounties, adjudication and on-chain payouts for humans and AI agents. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://widespread.fyi/mcp).

Is the Widespread MCP server safe to use?

Widespread scores 58 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the Widespread MCP server expose?

Widespread exposes 36 tools: feed_search, feed_get, feed_stats, runners_list, wide_markets, and 31 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,494 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the Widespread MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Widespread without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the Widespread MCP server still maintained?

Widespread is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the Widespread MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Widespread, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Widespread: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.