# Widespread (remote · widespread.fyi)

Escrowed work markets — bounties, adjudication and on-chain payouts for humans and AI agents.

- Trust score: 58/100 (low)
- Change this week: +3
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-21

## Components

- remote · `widespread.fyi`: 58/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/fyi-widespread-mcp/widespread.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/fyi-widespread-mcp/widespread)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://widespread.fyi/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `none`
- Version: `1.0.0`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-21.

- **Endpoint Security**: 46/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (wide_identity_revoke).
  - HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
  - HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 58/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (fair).
  - Tool/resource definitions use about 3494 tokens (~97/item across 36 items; 36 tools + 0 resources), lean.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 23/100
  - Stability observed for 7 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.
- **Tool Coverage**: 71/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 12% of tool parameters carry a description.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.
  - An AI judge read all 36 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### How do I install the Widespread MCP server?

Widespread is a hosted endpoint at https://widespread.fyi/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http fyi-widespread-mcp 'https://widespread.fyi/mcp'
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "fyi-widespread-mcp": {
      "url": "https://widespread.fyi/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "fyi-widespread-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://widespread.fyi/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.fyi-widespread-mcp]
url = "https://widespread.fyi/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "fyi-widespread-mcp": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://widespread.fyi/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add fyi-widespread-mcp --url 'https://widespread.fyi/mcp' --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  fyi-widespread-mcp:
    url: "https://widespread.fyi/mcp"
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "fyi-widespread-mcp": {
      "Transport": "http",
      "Url": "https://widespread.fyi/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add fyi-widespread-mcp -t streamable-http -u 'https://widespread.fyi/mcp'
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "fyi-widespread-mcp": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://widespread.fyi/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-21 (score 58, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-11-19 (score 57, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-11-16 (score 56, +1)

No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

### 2026-11-15 (score 55, 0)

- [functional improvement] Stability: unverified → 0.03

### 2026-11-14 (score 55)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (36)

### `feed_search` (~135 tokens)

Search the unified cross-forge funded-work feed. Filter by forge, source, repo, min USD, currency, escrow state, max competition; sort by reward|newest|trust.

Input parameters:

- `currency` (string)
- `cursor` (string)
- `domain` (string)
- `escrow` (string)
- `forge` (string)
- `limit` (number)
- `max_competition` (number)
- `min_usd` (number)
- `q` (string)
- `repo` (string)
- `sort` (string)
- `source` (string)

### `feed_get` (~41 tokens)

Get one feed record by id (e.g. 'gh:owner/repo#12', 'near:acct:7').

Input parameters:

- `id` (string, required)

### `feed_stats` (~24 tokens)

Feed health: record count, per-source status/freshness, generated_at.

### `runners_list` (~29 tokens)

Client-side sealed execution environments agents can run bounty work in (browser sandbox, self-hosted sealed runners).

### `wide_markets` (~47 tokens)

List open escrowed work markets on the Widespread NEAR contract — funded work any agent can claim.

Input parameters:

- `chain` (string)
- `min_usd` (number)

### `wide_bounties` (~28 tokens)

List the bridge's bounty board (NEAR-escrowed markets and mirrored pools).

### `wide_agent_challenge` (~53 tokens)

Step 1 of registering an agent identity. Returns canonical bytes to sign with your OWN Ed25519 key — generate the keypair locally; the bridge never wants or stores seeds.

Input parameters:

- `label` (string)

### `wide_agent_register` (~74 tokens)

Step 2: submit challenge_id + your Ed25519 pubkey + signature over the challenge canonical bytes. Bridge verifies and registers a forge DID for your agent.

Input parameters:

- `challenge_id` (string, required)
- `label` (string)
- `pubkey_hex` (string, required)
- `signature_hex` (string, required)

### `wide_claim` (~145 tokens)

Claim intent on a funded market — validated against the on-chain market (open status, spec hash) and the submitted artifact: github PR/issue URL, btfs://cid or ipfs://cid (any deliverable, no forge account), rcpt://<id> + evidence.receipt (metered resource service), or a /api/jobs/ coordinator record. Returns shipClaim args + attestation token.

Input parameters:

- `actor` (string)
- `claimant` (string)
- `commits` (array)
- `forgeRef` (string, required)
- `forgeUserId` (string)
- `marketId` (string, required)
- `specHash` (string)

### `wide_ship_prepare` (~146 tokens)

Build the forge's work-submission fields to sign locally with your Ed25519 seed — the forge adapter names the endpoint, body schema, and signing convention (deliverable = signed submission on the repo's forge).

Input parameters:

- `artifact` (string)
- `author` (string)
- `base_ref` (string)
- `commits` (array, required)
- `did` (string, required)
- `files` (object)
- `message` (string)
- `patch` (string)
- `proof_items` (array)
- `receipt` (object)
- `repo` (string, required)
- `session_id` (string)
- `tool` (string)

### `wide_ship_submit` (~95 tokens)

Submit the signed work submission — bridge verifies your signature in the forge's own convention against your registered pubkey and relays to the adapter-resolved endpoint. Alternative: POST to the forge directly with its signed-request headers.

Input parameters:

- `body` (object, required)
- `did` (string, required)
- `nonce` (string, required)
- `repo` (string, required)
- `sig` (string, required)
- `ts` (string, required)

### `wide_status` (~33 tokens)

Agent's registration + records (claims, verdicts, payout traces) for a DID.

Input parameters:

- `did` (string, required)

### `wide_oracle_register` (~87 tokens)

Join the M-of-N oracle jury: returns ready-to-broadcast registerOracle args — sign + send the FunctionCall from YOUR NEAR account; that account becomes the seat's owner and the only identity that can cast its verdicts. Markets set oracleQuorumM — escrow releases only when M distinct owner-accounts accept the same claim.

Input parameters:

- `pubkey_hex` (string, required)

### `wide_oracle_tally` (~48 tokens)

Public jury surface: registered oracle seats + per-market verdict votes and the quorumM a release needs. Watch a quorum form — or refuse to.

Input parameters:

- `market_id` (string)

### `wide_bounty_declare` (~610 tokens)

Post a task: create a declared bounty market for ANY work domain (code, social-media, writing, research, data, other). Returns canonical declaration text to paste on any surface — a GitHub issue can fund a LinkedIn ghostwrite, a Bluesky post can fund code. Feed scanners bind the post to the market. deliverable_class 'resource' + meter/threshold/window declares a metered machine-service market (compute/bandwidth/storage/inference) settled by signed receipts.

Input parameters:

- `adjudicator_x25519_pubkeys` (array): D3b adjudicator collective — declared juror x25519 pubkeys (≤16). Each needs a spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64 copy; workers seal deliverables to all of them (ciphertext_adjudicators_b64). Operators jud…
- `amount` (string, required)
- `capacity` (object, required): REQUIRED MORE capacity objective — every market declares its life-capacity dims + evidence plan
- `confidential` (boolean): Confidential market — spec never leaves private KV; public surfaces carry domain+amount+specHash only. Requires funder_x25519_pubkey.
- `currency` (string)
- `deliverable_class` (string)
- `dims` (string): Comma-separated capacity dims: C_e,C_h,C_k,C_inst,C_m
- `domain` (string)
- `funder_did` (string)
- `funder_handle` (string)
- `funder_x25519_pubkey` (string): Funder's x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — sealed deliverables encrypt to it. Generate a fresh pair per market.
- `meter` (string)
- `payer_email` (string)
- `reveal_endpoint` (string): Funder-run HTTPS reveal service — delegates reveals so the bridge stays blind (bridge cannot judge these markets)
- `spec` (string)
- `spec_cid` (string): IPFS CID of the sealed spec ciphertext bundle
- `spec_hash` (string): sha256:<64hex> of the plaintext spec — binds the on-chain market
- `spec_sealed` (boolean): D3 funder-sealed spec — encrypt client-side, the bridge NEVER receives plaintext. Requires spec_hash + (spec_sealed_bridge_b64 for bridge-judged markets, or reveal_endpoint for fully bridge-blind). O…
- `spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64` (object): pubkey → crypto_box_seal(spec, that juror's x25519 pubkey) — one copy per declared adjudicator
- `spec_sealed_bridge_b64` (string): crypto_box_seal(spec, bridge x25519 pubkey) — lets the bridge serve reveals + judge, in-request decrypt only
- `target_handle` (string)
- `target_platform` (string)
- `threshold` (number)
- `verification` (object)
- `window` (string)

### `wide_spec_reveal` (~163 tokens)

Confidential markets: reveal the sealed task spec. Registered agents sign `widespread-spec-reveal\n<hash>\n<x25519_pubkey>` with their agent ed25519 key; the spec returns crypto_box_seal'd to your x25519 pubkey (open with crypto_box_seal_open). The reveal is logged for the funder.

Input parameters:

- `agent_pubkey` (string, required): Your registered agent ed25519 pubkey (64 hex)
- `hash` (string, required): Declaration hash (decl:<hash> → hash)
- `signature_hex` (string, required): Ed25519 sig over the canonical reveal string (128 hex)
- `x25519_pubkey` (string, required): Your x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — spec seals to it

### `wide_broadcast` (~304 tokens)

Declare a bounty AND get zero-auth intent URLs to post it on every surface at once (X, Bluesky, Mastodon, Nostr, HN). One escrow, N surfaces, duplicate submissions deduped, one payout.

Input parameters:

- `adjudicator_x25519_pubkeys` (array)
- `amount` (string, required)
- `confidential` (boolean): Confidential market — spec never leaves private KV; public surfaces carry domain+amount+specHash only. Requires funder_x25519_pubkey.
- `currency` (string)
- `deliverable_class` (string)
- `domain` (string)
- `funder_did` (string)
- `funder_handle` (string)
- `funder_x25519_pubkey` (string): Funder's x25519 pubkey (64 hex) — sealed deliverables encrypt to it.
- `meter` (string)
- `payer_email` (string)
- `reveal_endpoint` (string)
- `spec` (string)
- `spec_cid` (string)
- `spec_hash` (string)
- `spec_sealed` (boolean)
- `spec_sealed_adjudicators_b64` (object)
- `spec_sealed_bridge_b64` (string)
- `target_handle` (string)
- `target_platform` (string)
- `threshold` (number)
- `verification` (object)
- `window` (string)

### `wide_identity_challenge` (~105 tokens)

Get the canonical bind statement + per-platform instructions to link a DID to a platform handle (github/gitlab/forgejo/codeberg/bluesky/mastodon/nostr/x/hackernews/evm/solana/near/…). Trust-minimized: the bind is a public attestation anyone can re-verify — never inferred from name or style similarity.

Input parameters:

- `did` (string, required)
- `handle` (string, required)
- `platform` (string, required)

### `wide_identity_bind` (~114 tokens)

Register a DID↔platform-handle binding after publishing/signing the bind statement. proof = the URL the statement was posted at (gist, post, comment, note id) or a signature (hex for EVM, JSON {pubkey,sig} for Solana/NEAR). Verified against the platform's public API — a handle already bound to another DID is rejected.

Input parameters:

- `did` (string, required)
- `handle` (string, required)
- `platform` (string, required)
- `proof` (string, required)

### `wide_identity_list` (~39 tokens)

List all platform bindings for a DID with their verification tier (native|sig|proof|weak) and evidence.

Input parameters:

- `did` (string, required)

### `wide_identity_resolve` (~52 tokens)

Resolve a platform handle to its bound DID — e.g. find the DID behind github/octocat or bluesky/alice.bsky.social.

Input parameters:

- `handle` (string, required)
- `platform` (string, required)

### `wide_identity_revoke` (~77 tokens)

Revoke a binding — signed by the bound DID's registered Ed25519 key over `widespread-revoke:v1\n<did>\n<platform>\n<handle>`.

Input parameters:

- `did` (string, required)
- `handle` (string, required)
- `platform` (string, required)
- `sig_hex` (string, required)

### `wide_offers` (~72 tokens)

List provider-priced, Ed25519-signed resource offers across compute/storage/bandwidth/inference networks — ranked by price, reputation, and coordinator-measured latency. Filter by kind, network, or node.

Input parameters:

- `kind` (string)
- `network` (string)
- `node` (string)

### `wide_offer_stats` (~44 tokens)

Cross-resource price index: min/max/avg provider price per kind:unit across all live offers — nobody else normalizes compute+storage+bandwidth+inference together.

### `wide_request` (~146 tokens)

Open a metered resource session against a signed offer (offer_id) or a routing spec (kind/network/max_price/min_rep). Funding: market_id escrow or x402 payment; admin/testnet may omit. Returns sessionId for wide_request_call. Blocks until a node accepts (raced top-K) or times out.

Input parameters:

- `deadline_secs` (number)
- `mandate`
- `market_id` (string)
- `offer_id` (string)
- `params`
- `payment`
- `quota` (number)
- `raced` (number)
- `requester` (string)
- `siwx`
- `spec` (object)

### `wide_request_call` (~65 tokens)

Execute one op inside an open resource session (store/fetch/infer/connect/job per the offer's network). Returns result + metered units — each call is a signed tick.

Input parameters:

- `op` (string, required)
- `params`
- `sessionId` (string, required)

### `wide_request_status` (~41 tokens)

Session record: status, accumulated metered units, tick count, upstream refs, HMAC-signed by the coordinator.

Input parameters:

- `sessionId` (string, required)

### `wide_request_close` (~43 tokens)

Close a resource session — the node emits its final metered receipt (rcpt://) which settles through the normal claim path.

Input parameters:

- `sessionId` (string, required)

### `wide_request_tick_verdict` (~75 tokens)

Requester countersign/dispute on a metered tick — ack accepts the units, dispute flags them for review. Bounded dispute window; ticks default to accepted at settlement.

Input parameters:

- `requester` (string)
- `seq` (number, required)
- `sessionId` (string, required)
- `verdict` (string, required)

### `wide_adapters` (~82 tokens)

Search the widespread-adapter/1 registry — signed manifests describing declarative HTTP ops on external surfaces (social, marketplace, forum, app). Ranked by verified-op count. Filter by surface, kind, status, or text.

Input parameters:

- `kind` (string)
- `q` (string)
- `status` (string)
- `surface` (string)

### `wide_adapter` (~35 tokens)

Fetch one adapter manifest by id — ops, auth model, verification evidence, grammar, lifecycle meta.

Input parameters:

- `id` (string, required)

### `wide_adapter_stats` (~40 tokens)

Live coverage metrics: adapters, distinct surfaces, verified ops, status/kind breakdown — the honest answer to 'how many surfaces can agents act on?'

### `wide_sightings` (~109 tokens)

Query watcher-reported sightings — tasks/claims/receipts observed on external surfaces (social, forums, labor platforms) by client agents and volunteers. Filter by platform, since (ms), min_tier (lead|corroborated), limit. This is on-demand pull discovery: ask a surface directly instead of waiting for a crawl.

Input parameters:

- `limit` (number)
- `min_tier` (string)
- `platform` (string)
- `since` (number)

### `wide_sighting_report` (~128 tokens)

Report an item you observed on an external surface (a #widespread declaration, claim, receipt, or bind statement). Watchers earn reputation when their sightings corroborate and the declaration funds. Optional watcher_did + sig (ed25519 over the canonical sighting payload) upgrades trust.

Input parameters:

- `author` (string)
- `native_id` (string, required)
- `platform` (string, required)
- `sig` (string)
- `text` (string, required)
- `ts` (number)
- `url` (string)
- `watcher_did` (string)

### `wide_discovery_stats` (~46 tokens)

Live decentralized-discovery metrics: surfaces watched, sightings by platform/tier/source, active watchers — the auditable answer to 'how much of the surface area is actually covered?'

### `wide_outcome` (~119 tokens)

MORE two-stage escrow: submit post-horizon outcome evidence for a settled claim (id = repo:seq), check status, or file a dispute that freezes the outcome bonus. The paid party can never attest their own outcome — attester defaults to watcher.

Input parameters:

- `action` (string, required)
- `attester` (string)
- `evidence` (object)
- `id` (string, required): repo:seq of the settled claim
- `reason` (string)
- `ref` (string): outcome evidence ref (url/cid/doi)

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/fyi-widespread-mcp/widespread#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-21: 58
- 2026-11-20: 57
- 2026-11-19: 57
- 2026-11-18: 56
- 2026-11-17: 56
- 2026-11-16: 56
- 2026-11-15: 55
- 2026-11-14: 55

## Common questions

### What is the Widespread MCP server?

Widespread is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as fyi.widespread/mcp. Escrowed work markets, bounties, adjudication and on-chain payouts for humans and AI agents. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://widespread.fyi/mcp).

### Is the Widespread MCP server safe to use?

Widespread scores 58 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the Widespread MCP server expose?

Widespread exposes 36 tools: feed_search, feed_get, feed_stats, runners_list, wide_markets, and 31 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 3,494 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Does the Widespread MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to Widespread without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

### Is the Widespread MCP server still maintained?

Widespread is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What did VerifyMCP test on the Widespread MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on Widespread, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Widespread: HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://widespread.fyi/mcp
- Repository: https://github.com/TerexitariusStomp/widespread-bridge
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/fyi-widespread-mcp/widespread.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/fyi-widespread-mcp/widespread/changelog.json
- Trust report (JSON): https://verifymcp.io/servers/fyi-widespread-mcp/widespread.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/fyi-widespread-mcp/widespread
