Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL
REMOTE · SDN-SCREEN-X402.SDNSCREEN.WORKERS.DEV
$0.01/call via x402: OFAC wallet screen, DNS, email auth, domain age, email verify, URL unshorten.
Available components
Last scanned (14 hours ago)
Scores higher than 58% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 18 Oct 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1293 tokens (~215/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management20
- Stability observed for 6 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 18 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Oct 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 12 Oct 26 65
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 18 Oct 2026 · Probed https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=sdnscreen.workers.dev | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 10 Oct 2026 | 8 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 664de26b59caba600582b7985070ac76d6b |
| SANs: *.sdnscreen.workers.dev, sdnscreen.workers.dev | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| dev. | present | 60074 | 8 | Verified |
| workers.dev. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
dns_lookup DNS Records Lookup ~229
Resolves live DNS records for any domain or hostname via 1.1.1.1: A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, SOA and CAA in one call (type=ALL), or a single type incl. SRV, PTR, DS, DNSKEY, HTTPS. Clean JSON with TTLs, NXDOMAIN flag and DNSSEC-authenticated bit. A URL or email address is reduced to its host. Use when an agent needs to verify a domain, find mail servers or nameservers, or read TXT/SPF records. $0.01 USDC on Base. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | Domain or hostname, e.g. example.com. A full URL or email address is accepted and reduced to its host. Alias: domain. |
| type | string | – | ALL (default: A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, SOA, CAA) or one record type. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
email_auth_check Email Auth Check (SPF/DMARC/DKIM) ~239
Checks a domain's email authentication: parses SPF (+all, ?all, multiple records, over 10 DNS lookups), DMARC (p, sp, pct, rua), DKIM keys (your selector or 15 common ones) and MX, then returns an A-F grade, 0-100 score and coded issues (spf_missing, dmarc_p_none, ...). Use when an agent must judge if a domain can be spoofed, debug deliverability, or vet a sender/vendor domain. $0.01 USDC on Base. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Email domain, e.g. example.com. A URL or email address is reduced to its domain. |
| selector | string | – | Optional DKIM selector to check authoritatively (in addition to the common list: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, k2, s1, s2, dkim, mail, mandrill, pm, zoho, protonmail, fm1). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
email_mx_verify Email Address Verify (MX, no SMTP) ~162
Checks an email address without sending mail or opening SMTP: syntax, domain exists, MX records (or RFC 5321 A/AAAA fallback), RFC 7505 null MX, MX host resolves, disposable-domain list (~9.9k domains), role account (info@, support@) and free provider. Verdict deliverable_domain, risky, undeliverable or unknown. Cannot prove the mailbox itself exists. Use when an agent validates a signup, lead or contact email before using it. $0.01 USDC. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | Email address to check, e.g. someone@example.com |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
ofac_wallet_screen OFAC SDN Wallet Screen ~177
Screens a crypto wallet address (EVM, BTC, TRON, SOL, XMR and every other chain OFAC lists) against all Digital Currency Addresses on the US Treasury OFAC SDN list. Returns sanctioned true/false, verdict block/no_match, SDN entity name, sdnType, programs and the list publish date. Use when an agent is about to send funds to, pay, or accept funds from an unfamiliar wallet. $0.01 USDC on Base. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Wallet address. EVM 0x... (case-insensitive), BTC 1.../3.../bc1..., TRON T..., Solana base58, etc. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
url_unshorten URL Unshorten & Redirect Check ~179
Follows a URL's HTTP redirects hop by hop (max 10, page bodies never read) and returns the final URL, status, the full chain and heuristic safety flags: shortener_used, cross_domain_redirect, https_downgrade, ip_address_host, punycode_host, userinfo_in_url, high_abuse_tld, credential_keyword_after_redirect, loops. Risk low/medium/high. Use before an agent clicks, fetches or forwards an unfamiliar or shortened link. Not a malware-reputation lookup. $0.01 USDC. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | http(s) URL to expand. A bare host gets https:// added. Private/loopback hosts are refused. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
whois_domain_age Domain Age & Registrar (RDAP) ~180
Looks up a domain in its registry's RDAP server (the ICANN successor to WHOIS, found via the IANA bootstrap): registration date, age in days/years, newlyRegistered (<30 days), expiry, last change, registrar name + IANA ID, EPP status, nameservers and DNSSEC. No personal contact data. Use when an agent must judge if a domain, sender or vendor is brand-new (a phishing/fraud signal). Unsupported TLDs return 400, uncharged. $0.01 USDC. Paid tool: call it once to get the x402 PaymentRequired object, then retry with params._meta["x402/payment"].
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain, e.g. example.com. A URL, hostname or email address is reduced to its registrable domain. Alias: name. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server?
Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL is a hosted endpoint at https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev
claude mcp add --transport http dev-workers-sdnscreen-sdn-screen-x402-agent-pref 'https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp'
What is the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server?
Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.workers.sdnscreen.sdn-screen-x402/agent-preflight. $0.01/call via x402: OFAC wallet screen, DNS, email auth, domain age, email verify, URL unshorten. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://sdn-screen-x402.sdnscreen.workers.dev/mcp).
Is the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server safe to use?
Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL scores 68 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server expose?
Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL exposes 6 tools: ofac_wallet_screen, dns_lookup, email_auth_check, whois_domain_age, email_mx_verify, url_unshorten. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,166 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL MCP server still maintained?
Agent Preflight: OFAC, DNS, Email Auth, Domain, Email & URL is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 18 October 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.