Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs, offline
NPM · @FORESTRIE/MCP-VERIFY
Verify a SCITT receipt under a trust root you hold — offline, no backend, no key, no network
Available components
Last scanned (2 hours ago)
Scores higher than 94% of npm servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security81
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- CVE check failed: a known high-severity CVE affects @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.0, a direct dependency. A fixed version is available. View diagnostics → Fail
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- 30 of 99 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency97
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to forestrie/mcp-verify). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 4 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability85
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 2669 tokens (~88/item across 30 items; 4 tools + 26 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (16)
- Malware scan
- Known CVEs
- Install scripts
- Dependency health
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 2 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 1 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- Package version: 0.7.0 → 0.8.1 functional
- 28 Oct 26 0
- GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq affects this package: high ▼ security
- 21 Oct 26 +15
- CVE-2026-111771 affects this package: high ▼ security
- CVE-2026-111768 affects this package: high ▼ security
- CVE-2026-111769 affects this package: high ▼ security
- CVE-2026-111767 affects this package: high ▼ security
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 20 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Schema quality: 76 → 88 ▼ functional
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- Package version: 0.6.1 → 0.7.0 functional
- 19 Oct 26 0
- Stability: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Schema quality: 57 → 76 ▼ functional
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: excellent → good functional
- Package version: 0.5.2 → 0.6.1 functional
- 17 Oct 26 +2
- Stability: 0.83 → pass security
- 15 Oct 26 −2
- Stability: pass → 0.80 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 6 Nov 2026 · Analysed npm/@forestrie/mcp-verify@0.8.1
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | forestrie/mcp-verify |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/forestrie/mcp-verify/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/v0.8.1 |
| Rekor log index | 3636329267 |
| Predicate type | SLSA build provenance https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha512:5fb5c135464850d9904ac4ac592a8988df50ce294a606c4a162131ed6874c3274a89872f2d4070319534f3a5a44b77c89b61441f76e1e391cd6c44b18 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Vulnerabilities 6 findings
| ID | CVE | Severity | Vector | Fix available |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw | CVE-2026-111767 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L | yes |
| GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 | CVE-2026-111768 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes |
| GHSA-6prh-2h8m-c8cw | CVE-2026-111769 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h | CVE-2026-104850 | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N | yes |
| GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq | high | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | yes | |
| GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq | CVE-2026-111771 | medium | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N | yes |
Background: What a vulnerability scan can and cannot prove →
Dependencies 99 packages
| Packages resolved | 99 |
|---|---|
| Stale | 30 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
decode_receipt Decode a receipt to JSON ~103
Render a COSE receipt's CBOR as JSON — headers, named labels, payload, signature and inclusion proof. NO VERIFICATION is performed: a receipt that decodes cleanly may still be invalid. Mirrors `forestrie decode-receipt --json`.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | – | yes | the COSE receipt to render — {b64: <standard base64>} (base64 is accepted as an alias), or {path: <a file the local server reads>} |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| byteLength | number | yes | – |
| inclusion | object | yes | – |
| payload | object | yes | – |
| protected | object | yes | – |
| signature | object | yes | – |
| tag | number|null | yes | – |
| unprotected | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_grant_receipt Verify a grant receipt ~594
Verify a Forestrie grant receipt against the committed grant (Forestrie-Grant COSE Sign1, or raw grant payload CBOR plus an entry id), at a trust root you choose. Mirrors `forestrie verify-grant`. This is the tool that answers the append-authority question: the leaf IS the grant. KS256 contract roots take an optional ks256Attestation (fetched elsewhere; this tool never calls the chain; several go in ks256Attestations).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| committedGrant | – | yes | Forestrie-Grant COSE Sign1, or raw grant payload CBOR — {b64: <standard base64>} (base64 is accepted as an alias), or {path: <a file the local server reads>} |
| entryId | string | – | required when committedGrant is a raw payload |
| ks256Attestation | – | – | ERC-1271 attestation artifact (encodeKs256Attestation CBOR) for a KS256 CONTRACT root. Fetched elsewhere — this server never touches the network: use mcp-resolve's `fetch_ks256_attestation` tool or f… |
| ks256Attestations | array | – | Several ERC-1271 attestations (each encodeKs256Attestation CBOR, {b64: <standard base64>} (base64 is accepted as an alias), or {path: <a file the local server reads>}) for a KS256 CONTRACT root that… |
| receipt | – | yes | the COSE receipt — {b64: <standard base64>} (base64 is accepted as an alias), or {path: <a file the local server reads>} |
| trust | – | yes | Which anchor you are willing to trust |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| anchor | object | – | – |
| detail | string | – | checkpoint-chain: which link failed and why, in words |
| diagnostics | array | yes | named notes about what the arithmetic could not separate |
| failedLink | number | – | checkpoint-chain: index of the link a failure names |
| ks256Attestation | object | – | present only when a supplied ERC-1271 attestation was needed for the run to pass (the first one, when several were): a contract root is valid under its signers at THIS block only |
| ks256Attestations | object | – | every supplied attestation, accounted for: used ones carried the run (valid under the contract's signers at each named block only); unused ones say why (not_needed, no_matching_certificate, duplicate… |
| ok | boolean | yes | – |
| questions | object | yes | the four trust questions. 'not_answered_by_this_root' is a real answer and must be shown to the user, never collapsed into a pass. |
| reason | string | – | – |
| root | string | yes | – |
| stage | string | yes | – |
| stages | array | yes | the mechanical stages, exactly the reference CLI's contract |
| verifier | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_receipt Verify a payload receipt ~582
Verify a Forestrie receipt against the EXACT registered payload bytes and an entry id, at a trust root you choose. Mirrors `forestrie verify`. Offline: no network, no key, no account. Returns both the mechanical stages and the four trust questions. KS256 contract roots take an optional ks256Attestation (fetched elsewhere; this tool never calls the chain; several go in ks256Attestations).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| entryId | string | yes | 32 lowercase hex: idtimestamp_be8 || mmrIndex_be8 |
| ks256Attestation | – | – | ERC-1271 attestation artifact (encodeKs256Attestation CBOR) for a KS256 CONTRACT root. Fetched elsewhere — this server never touches the network: use mcp-resolve's `fetch_ks256_attestation` tool or f… |
| ks256Attestations | array | – | Several ERC-1271 attestations (each encodeKs256Attestation CBOR, {b64: <standard base64>} (base64 is accepted as an alias), or {path: <a file the local server reads>}) for a KS256 CONTRACT root that… |
| payload | – | yes | the EXACT registered payload bytes whose SHA-256 is the leaf ContentHash — {b64: <standard base64>} (base64 is accepted as an alias), or {path: <a file the local server reads>} |
| receipt | – | yes | the COSE receipt — {b64: <standard base64>} (base64 is accepted as an alias), or {path: <a file the local server reads>} |
| trust | – | yes | Which anchor you are willing to trust |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| anchor | object | – | – |
| detail | string | – | checkpoint-chain: which link failed and why, in words |
| diagnostics | array | yes | named notes about what the arithmetic could not separate |
| failedLink | number | – | checkpoint-chain: index of the link a failure names |
| ks256Attestation | object | – | present only when a supplied ERC-1271 attestation was needed for the run to pass (the first one, when several were): a contract root is valid under its signers at THIS block only |
| ks256Attestations | object | – | every supplied attestation, accounted for: used ones carried the run (valid under the contract's signers at each named block only); unused ones say why (not_needed, no_matching_certificate, duplicate… |
| ok | boolean | yes | – |
| questions | object | yes | the four trust questions. 'not_answered_by_this_root' is a real answer and must be shown to the user, never collapsed into a pass. |
| reason | string | – | – |
| root | string | yes | – |
| stage | string | yes | – |
| stages | array | yes | the mechanical stages, exactly the reference CLI's contract |
| verifier | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
verify_self Verify this package's own release registration ~158
Verify this package's own release-time self-registration receipt: does the receipt commit the signed statement, does that statement's payload match the bundled provenance.json byte-for-byte, and does its ES256 signature verify under the bundled log owner key? No inputs required. Defaults to the known-log-key root with the bundled key, not genesis — the publications log is a grandchild of the forest root and nothing walks that grant chain yet (docs/self-registration.md). Errors clearly, rather than throwing, when this checkout has no fixtures/self/ bundle (any checkout that is not itself the published tarball).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| root | – | – | Which trust root to run verify_self under. Defaults to known-log-key with the bundled key, not genesis — see docs/self-registration.md. |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| anchor | object | – | – |
| detail | string | – | checkpoint-chain: which link failed and why, in words |
| diagnostics | array | yes | named notes about what the arithmetic could not separate |
| failedLink | number | – | checkpoint-chain: index of the link a failure names |
| ks256Attestation | object | – | present only when a supplied ERC-1271 attestation was needed for the run to pass (the first one, when several were): a contract root is valid under its signers at THIS block only |
| ks256Attestations | object | – | every supplied attestation, accounted for: used ones carried the run (valid under the contract's signers at each named block only); unused ones say why (not_needed, no_matching_certificate, duplicate… |
| ok | boolean | yes | – |
| questions | object | yes | the four trust questions. 'not_answered_by_this_root' is a real answer and must be shown to the user, never collapsed into a pass. |
| reason | string | – | – |
| root | string | yes | – |
| self | object | yes | – |
| stage | string | yes | – |
| stages | array | yes | the mechanical stages, exactly the reference CLI's contract |
| verifier | object | yes | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… MCP server?
Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @forestrie/mcp-verify. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · @forestrie/mcp-verify
claude mcp add dev-forestrie-verify -- npx -y @forestrie/mcp-verify
What is the Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… MCP server?
Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as dev.forestrie/verify. Verify a SCITT receipt under a trust root you hold, offline, no backend, no key, no network. This page covers its npm package (@forestrie/mcp-verify).
Is the Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… MCP server safe to use?
Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… scores 91 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We recorded 6 known advisories against it as of 6 November 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… MCP server expose?
Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… exposes 4 tools: verify_receipt, verify_grant_receipt, decode_receipt, verify_self. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,437 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… MCP server still maintained?
Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 6 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… MCP server under?
Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs… MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 16 checks on Verify SCITT receipts from Forestrie transparency logs…, covering Malware scan, Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health and 12 more. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to an npm package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.