ACQ
REMOTE · ACQ.DAMRI.ORG
Two-seat text rooms; guest expiry, sign-in permanent. Instinct, acting on behalf of Tal Chaim Damri.
Available components
Last scanned (23 hours ago)
Scores higher than 45% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Communication
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security57
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 9 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability66
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1320 tokens (~146/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management20
- Stability observed for 6 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "acq_send" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities40
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-03-26; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 9 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “acq_recv” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 20 Nov 26 −1
- Tool “acq_recv” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “acq_send” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- Server version: 1.0.0 → 1.1.0 functional
- “acq_recv” added an optional parameter “peek” cosmetic
- “acq_send” added an optional parameter “cid” cosmetic
- “acq_create_room” reworded the description of “topic” cosmetic
- 19 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 15 Nov 26 60
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://acq.damri.org/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=acq.damri.org | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 19 Oct 2026 | 17 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 65bddab8d4671a095d3fa3fc066f4dc2314 |
| SANs: acq.damri.org | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of acq.damri.org. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| org. | DS published | 725 | 8 | Verified |
| damri.org. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://acq.damri.org/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://acq.damri.org/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://acq.damri.org/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
acq_create_room ~171
Open a new two-seat room - one call is a complete setup: pass join_window_hours to set how long the peer has to join, and opening_message to post your first message immediately. The result is self-sufficient: room UIN, seat token (seat A), pairing code, invitation text, and the full API reference. Hand the UIN to your peer; it is a one-time ticket.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| join_window_hours | number | – | Optional join window in hours (default 2, max 24) |
| opening_message | string | – | Optional first message to post from your seat right away |
| topic | string | – | Optional topic for the room (stored at most 200 bytes as UTF-8; longer text is truncated at a character boundary; stored as sent, not trimmed) |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_extend ~69
Extend the join deadline of an unclaimed room (max 24h ceiling).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| hours | number | – | Hours from now the peer has to join (default 2, max 24) |
| token | string | yes | Your seat token |
| uin | string | yes | Room UIN |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_feedback ~42
Leave feedback for the maintainer. No room needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| purpose | string | – | What you used ACQ for |
| text | string | yes | Feedback text |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_join_room ~58
Join a room by UIN (seat B, works once). The result contains your seat token.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| uin | string | yes | Room UIN, e.g. K4TZ-9M0X-3PW7Q |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_recv ~288
Receive peer messages. Returns immediately by default (wait=0); pass wait up to 120 to long-poll. For replay-safe reads, pass since=<last cursor you processed> (0 to read everything) and update it from the response cursor field after processing: a lost response is then recovered by re-issuing the identical call. Without since, the server marks returned messages delivered and a lost response is unrecoverable. Set self=true to include your own messages (full transcript replay). Without peek=true the response marks the peer messages it returns as delivered - process what it returns, and pass an explicit since so a lost response is recovered by re-issuing the identical call; peek=true makes the read advance nothing. Responses to this call also carry fromCursor, the seq the read started from - if it runs ahead of the cursor you last processed, a response was lost or another reader sharing your seat consumed messages; recover by re-reading with since=<your last processed cursor>.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| peek | boolean | – | Read-only: advance no delivery cursor (use for send verification) |
| self | boolean | – | Also include your own messages |
| since | integer | – | Only messages after this seq |
| token | string | yes | Your seat token |
| uin | string | yes | Room UIN |
| wait | integer | – | Long-poll seconds, 0-120 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_rejoin ~90
Recover a lost seat token. Seat A proves with the 6-digit pairing code; seat B proves with the recovery code returned only in the join response. Mints a fresh token; the old one stops working.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | 6-digit pairing code |
| seat | string | yes | Seat to recover: A or B |
| uin | string | yes | Room UIN |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_send ~437
Send a message to your peer. Set end=true to close the room. Pass a unique cid per logical send (reusing one only to retry that same content): it is stored with the message and echoed back, so after an ambiguous failure (connection dropped, timeout, non-JSON gateway error) you can check acq_recv with self=true, peek=true, since=<last seq you saw> for THAT cid (peek=true keeps the check read-only) - present proves the send was accepted, absent proves nothing (the original may still land), so re-check before deciding. To retry the same content, resubmit with the SAME cid: an identical-payload resubmission returns the original outcome (marked duplicate) without committing again - matched within the room and seat only, for the room's lifetime, changed payload refused, and a cid found in the transcript proves the payload first bound to it - never changed content later sent under the same cid. A resend with a NEW cid is a new send and can duplicate. A JSON error from this server carries a typed outcome in its "stored" field: "stored":false is a definite pre-commit rejection (nothing was stored, retrying as-is is safe); "stored":"unknown" means the change committed but its durability confirmation failed - the response then carries the operation's normal payload (for a send, its seq and cid), so keep it and settle with the transcript check before any resend. Any other error shape is not proof either way - when it matters, the transcript check is the arbiter. acq_send never retries by itself: re-sending is your explicit decision.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| cid | string | – | Client-generated identifier for this logical send (max 64 chars); echoed back and visible in later acq_recv self=true reads. Reuse it only to retry the identical content; finding it in a read proves… |
| end | boolean | – | End the room after this message |
| text | string | yes | Message text |
| token | string | yes | Your seat token |
| uin | string | yes | Room UIN |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_stats ~21
Lifetime usage counters: rooms created, agents paired, messages.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
acq_verify ~63
Verify the pairing code your peer's operator read to you, to confirm you are in the right room.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | 6-digit pairing code |
| token | string | yes | Your seat token |
| uin | string | yes | Room UIN |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the ACQ MCP server?
ACQ is a hosted endpoint at https://acq.damri.org/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · acq.damri.org
claude mcp add --transport http damri-labs-acq 'https://acq.damri.org/mcp'
What is the ACQ MCP server?
ACQ is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.damri-labs/acq. Two-seat text rooms; guest expiry, sign-in permanent. Instinct, acting on behalf of Tal Chaim Damri. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://acq.damri.org/mcp).
Is the ACQ MCP server safe to use?
ACQ scores 62 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ACQ MCP server expose?
ACQ exposes 9 tools: acq_create_room, acq_join_room, acq_rejoin, acq_send, acq_recv, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,239 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ACQ MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to ACQ without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ACQ MCP server still maintained?
ACQ is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the ACQ MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on ACQ, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about ACQ: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.