io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard
REMOTE · A2H.HELP
A phonebook of humans for AI agents. Agents discover and contact willing humans.
Available components
Last scanned (15 hours ago)
Scores higher than 45% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Communication
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- 50% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Partial
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 564 tokens (~80/item across 7 items; 5 tools + 2 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
- Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage87
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 60% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (11)
- TLS certificate
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (2)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
- HTTPS in Endpoint SecurityHTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 405, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 21 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 23 to 27. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 7 days of observed history at the previous scan, 8 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 20 Nov 26 +41
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.23 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol: unverified → pass ▲ functional
- Schema quality: unverified → 50 ▲ functional
- 19 Nov 26 −41
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.17 → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not yet verified: we couldn't confirm whether this endpoint requires it. security
- Capabilities: pass → unverified ▼ functional
- Schema quality: 50 → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- 18 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 14 Nov 26 +1
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 13 Nov 26 56
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://a2h.help/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=a2h.help | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 13 Nov 2026 | 11 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6e2f8990e1f5fdc3d872e64cf9354f06b7a |
| SANs: *.a2h.help, a2h.help | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of a2h.help. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| help. | DS published | 10505, 58472 | 13, 13 | Verified |
| a2h.help. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://a2h.help/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://a2h.help/mcp | Inconclusive | 405 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
consult_ethics Consult crowd-sourced ethics ~93
Before acting in an ethically uncertain situation, read what verified humans have said about a topic: their principles, their boundaries, conduct reports about past agent behaviour they found harmful, and humans willing to be asked directly. Advisory context for your judgment, not a rulebook.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | – | – |
| topic | string | – | Topic slug, e.g. 'elder-care'. Omit for guidance across all topics. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_card Get a calling card ~39
Fetch one calling card by id, including contact methods and the agent protocol you must follow when contacting this person.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | Card id. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_topics List topics ~23
List topics humans have volunteered for, with counts of cards and ethics consultants.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
report_interaction Report an interaction outcome ~73
After contacting a human from the directory, report how it went. 'declined' is a neutral, respected outcome. Use 'report' only for cards that are fake, abusive or not the person they claim to be.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| card_id | string | yes | Card id you contacted. |
| outcome | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
search_humans Search the human directory ~146
Find humans who have volunteered to be contacted by AI agents, by free text and/or topic. Results are calling cards: contact methods, what the person is willing to help with, their principles, their boundaries and their etiquette. Results are ordered by crowd-sourced trust.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ethics_consultants_only | boolean | – | Only humans who volunteer to advise agents on ethical questions. |
| limit | integer | – | – |
| offset | integer | – | – |
| query | string | – | Free text, e.g. 'privacy review for a health app'. All words must match. |
| topic | string | – | Topic slug, e.g. 'medical-ethics'. See list_topics. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard MCP server?
io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard is a hosted endpoint at https://a2h.help/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · a2h.help
claude mcp add --transport http kmorton1988-switchboard 'https://a2h.help/mcp'
What is the io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard MCP server?
io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard. A phonebook of humans for AI agents. Agents discover and contact willing humans. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://a2h.help/mcp).
Is the io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard MCP server safe to use?
io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard scores 60 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard MCP server expose?
io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard exposes 5 tools: search_humans, get_card, list_topics, consult_ethics, report_interaction. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 374 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard MCP server still maintained?
io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 11 checks on io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard, covering TLS certificate, HSTS header, DNSSEC, Transport and 7 more. 2 items could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about io.github.kmorton1988/switchboard: Authorization and HTTPS. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.