Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents
REMOTE · VIGILNOTARY.COM
Agent leases, signed receipts, watchdogs, and optional paid source-verification evidence.
Available components
Last scanned (2 hours ago)
Scores higher than 87% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Security
Recent critical change
Authorization (14 Sept 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (vigil_set_watchdog). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability90
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2982 tokens (~114/item across 26 items; 26 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Tools include usage examples.Pass
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage98
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 94% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
- Structured output schemas are declared (4% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 4 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 27 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 14 Oct 26 0
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 6 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 92 to 96.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 14 Sept 26 0
- Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ critical
- Stability: 0.27 → fail ▼ security
- A breaking change shipped without a version bump: still 0.1-mvp ▼ security
- Tool “vigil_anchor” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_delete_watchdog” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_grant_lease” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_heartbeat” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_journal_delete” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_journal_put” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_notarize” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_register” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_renew_lease” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_revoke_key” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_revoke_lease” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_set_watchdog” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_verify_lease” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_verify_receipt” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_verify_source” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vigil_delete_watchdog” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_grant_lease” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_heartbeat” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_journal_delete” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_journal_put” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_renew_lease” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_revoke_key” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_revoke_lease” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_set_watchdog” is now declared destructive security
- Tool “vigil_verify_source” is now declared destructive security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- “vigil_verify_lease” made “pubkey_hex” required, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- “vigil_verify_receipt” made “pubkey_hex” required, so existing callers break ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 73% → 94% ▲ functional
- Schema quality: fail → pass ▲ functional
- Destructive annotations: All 4 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation. functional
- “vigil_anchor” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_delete_watchdog” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- “vigil_delete_watchdog” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_grant_lease” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_heartbeat” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- “vigil_heartbeat” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_journal_delete” reworded the description of “slug” cosmetic
- “vigil_journal_delete” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_journal_get” reworded the description of “slug” cosmetic
- “vigil_journal_get” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_journal_list” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_journal_put” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_lease_status” reworded the description of “lease_id” cosmetic
- “vigil_leases” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_notarize” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_renew_lease” reworded the description of “lease_id” cosmetic
- “vigil_renew_lease” reworded the description of “ttl_s” cosmetic
- “vigil_renew_lease” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_revoke_key” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_revoke_lease” reworded the description of “lease_id” cosmetic
- “vigil_revoke_lease” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_set_watchdog” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_usage” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- “vigil_verify_lease” reworded the description of “pubkey_hex” cosmetic
- “vigil_verify_receipt” reworded the description of “pubkey_hex” cosmetic
- “vigil_watchdog_status” reworded the description of “name” cosmetic
- “vigil_watchdog_status” reworded the description of “vigil_key” cosmetic
- 7 Sept 26 0
- Tool “vigil_revoke_lease” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 6 Sept 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 5 Sept 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://vigilnotary.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=vigilnotary.com | CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 25 Oct 2026 | 23 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5621172ecabb366b6330873ca9ccf1b617e |
| SANs: vigilnotary.com | ||||||
| CN=YE1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 5ddd70dd31f801c85c186a7a04b80afe |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of vigilnotary.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| vigilnotary.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; base-uri 'none'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; connect-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | no-referrer |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://vigilnotary.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://vigilnotary.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://vigilnotary.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
vigil_anchor ~105
PRO: anchor the current chain head to OpenTimestamps on demand (the chain is auto-anchored every few hours regardless). Sends the public chain-head digest to external OpenTimestamps calendars; submission is not verified Bitcoin confirmation.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_anchors ~34
Public timestamp submissions to OpenTimestamps calendars. A submission is pending, not an independently verified Bitcoin confirmation. No key required.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_chain ~54
Read a range of receipts to audit chain continuity. Max 1000 per call.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| from_serial | integer | – | First serial (default 1). |
| to_serial | integer | – | Last serial (default = from_serial). |
No output schema declared.
{"from_serial":1,"to_serial":10}vigil_delete_watchdog ~103
Remove a watchdog. Destructive: deletes its configuration and stops future alerts. No undo or restoration of the previous timer is provided.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | Watchdog name, 1..64 characters. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"name":"agent-health"}vigil_get_receipt ~36
Fetch a receipt by serial number. Public — anyone can read any receipt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| serial | integer | yes | The receipt serial number. |
No output schema declared.
{"serial":1}vigil_grant_lease ~250
Grant a short-lived, Ed25519-signed LEASE authorizing an agent to perform an action until it expires. A customer-run gateway verifies the lease offline (fail-closed) before letting the action through. This is the guard on a money/data-moving action. Free tier: 1 active lease (guarded agent). Security-sensitive: grants authority. Keep this account key outside the controlled agent. A signed lim string is enforced only by the customer's gateway.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | The action class this lease authorizes, e.g. 'stripe.refund' (1-128 chars). |
| agent | string | yes | Identifier for the agent being authorized (1-128 chars). |
| lim | string | – | Optional limit string the gateway enforces, e.g. 'amount<=50usd'. |
| ttl_s | integer | yes | Lease lifetime in seconds, 5..604800. Keep it short; renew to extend. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"action":"stripe.refund","agent":"refund-agent","lim":"amount\u003c=100usd","ttl_s":60}vigil_heartbeat ~113
'Still alive.' Reset a watchdog's timer. Call this at least once per interval. Resets the deadline and delivery state, potentially suppressing an overdue alert or rearming delivery.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | Watchdog name, 1..64 characters. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"name":"agent-health"}vigil_info ~36
Service description, the Ed25519 signing pubkey to verify receipts against, current chain head, and free-tier limits. No key required.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_journal_delete ~105
Delete a journal slot. Destructive: removes stored bytes with no undo through the API.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| slug | string | yes | Journal slot name, 1..64 ASCII letters, numbers, hyphens, or underscores. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"slug":"encrypted-state"}vigil_journal_get ~102
Fetch a journal blob by slug. Returns base64 (decrypt client-side).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| slug | string | yes | Journal slot name, 1..64 ASCII letters, numbers, hyphens, or underscores. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"slug":"encrypted-state"}vigil_journal_list ~74
List your journal slots (slug, size, last-updated).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_journal_put ~162
Store an opaque blob under a slug (overwrites). Encrypt client-side: the server stores exactly the bytes supplied and cannot enforce client encryption. Send bytes as base64. Free tier: 4 slots, 64KB each. Destructive when the slug exists: previous bytes are replaced with no version history or undo.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| data_base64 | string | yes | The (already-encrypted) bytes, base64-encoded. |
| slug | string | yes | 1-64 alnum/-/_ chars. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"data_base64":"ZW5jcnlwdGVkLWJ5dGVz","slug":"encrypted-state"}vigil_lease_status ~53
Public status of a lease (active / expired / revoked). What a gateway polls for revocation. No key required.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| lease_id | string | yes | Opaque lease identifier returned by vigil_grant_lease. |
No output schema declared.
{"lease_id":"lease_example"}vigil_leases ~67
List your leases and their states.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_notarize ~209
Notarize work: POST the sha256 (64 hex chars) of anything and get back an Ed25519-signed, timestamped, hash-chained, serial-numbered receipt. Chain position orders submitted records; the timestamp is a signed assertion of Vigil's clock. Free tier: 10/day. Irreversibly publishes the digest, label and account handle in the public chain; no deletion tool exists. It proves signed-data integrity, not that an action happened or a claim is true.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| label | string | – | Optional human label, <=200 chars. Public — do not put secrets here. |
| subject_sha256 | string | yes | 64 lowercase hex chars: the sha256 of the thing you are notarizing. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"label":"public example digest","subject_sha256":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"}vigil_pricing ~26
The plans and per-tier limits (free, dev, pro). No key required.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_register ~86
Create a key. Returns a bearer key shown ONCE — store it; it is your only identity. No email, no account. Starts on the free tier. Creates a persistent identity. The returned key grants full account control; provision it in a trusted client, not a model transcript.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| handle | string | yes | 1-64 chars, lowercase alnum plus - and _. |
No output schema declared.
{"handle":"example-agent"}vigil_renew_lease ~169
Extend a lease with a fresh signed token and new expiry. Renewing is how a healthy agent keeps acting; stop renewing (or revoke) and it lapses. Security-sensitive: extends authority and refreshes the offline recheck window. Keep renewal credentials outside the controlled agent.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| lease_id | string | yes | Opaque lease identifier returned by vigil_grant_lease. |
| ttl_s | integer | yes | Requested lease lifetime in seconds, 5..604800; offline trust still ends at recheck_by_ms within 30 seconds. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"lease_id":"lease_example","ttl_s":60}vigil_revoke_key ~112
Revoke your own key. It stops authenticating immediately. Irreversible. Irreversible: also revokes the account's leases and deletes its watchdogs. Private journal access is lost; public receipts remain. It does not cancel a Stripe subscription.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_revoke_lease ~148
Revoke a lease. A compliant v2 gateway refuses the old offline token at recheck_by_ms (at most 30 seconds after issue/renewal), or earlier if it polls revocation. Revocation is not instantaneous. Irreversible for this lease ID; it cannot be renewed again. Already admitted actions are not undone.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| lease_id | string | yes | Opaque lease identifier returned by vigil_grant_lease. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"lease_id":"lease_example"}vigil_set_watchdog ~229
Arm a dead-man switch. Register an interval and an https webhook; then call vigil_heartbeat before each interval elapses. Miss one and Vigil attempts a signed 'absence' payload to your webhook, retrying failed delivery. Free tier: 1 watchdog. Overwrites an existing watchdog and resets its timer and delivery state. A missed heartbeat sends the supplied message to an external HTTPS recipient; failed delivery is capped at five attempts per armed interval.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| interval_s | integer | yes | Seconds allowed between heartbeats, 60..604800. |
| message | string | – | Optional note included in the absence payload, <=2000 chars. |
| name | string | yes | A name for this watchdog, 1-64 chars. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
| webhook_url | string | yes | An https URL resolving to a public address; fired once on a missed heartbeat. |
No output schema declared.
{"interval_s":300,"message":"agent missed heartbeat","name":"agent-health","webhook_url":"https://alerts.example.com/vigil"}vigil_usage ~77
Your current tier, its limits, and how much you've used today. Requires your key.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{}vigil_verify_lease ~165
Offline, FAIL-CLOSED check of a lease token against a mandatory, independently pinned Ed25519 public key. Returns allow=true only for a valid signature before expiry and recheck_by_ms. It does not authenticate the calling agent, enforce action/amount policy, or query live revocation; a customer gateway must do those checks before every provider action. Checks signature, expiry and the signed recheck deadline only. It does not check live revocation, agent identity, action, amount or gateway policy; those checks are mandatory at the gateway.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| lease | object | yes | A full lease token from vigil_grant_lease. |
| pubkey_hex | string | yes | Mandatory Ed25519 public key pinned from a trusted out-of-band source; never copy it from the lease. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vigil_verify_receipt ~121
Verify a receipt's hash and Ed25519 signature against a mandatory, independently pinned Ed25519 public key. The key must not come from the receipt being checked. Returns valid=false for tampering, forgery, a wrong signer, or malformed input. Read-only and local to Vigil.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| pubkey_hex | string | yes | Mandatory Ed25519 public key pinned from a trusted out-of-band source; never copy it from the receipt. |
| receipt | object | yes | A full receipt object as returned by vigil_notarize / vigil_get_receipt. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vigil_verify_source ~100
Paid source-local verification with exact evidence and signed receipt. Does not establish absolute truth. Read price and payment requirements before authorizing; settlement spends USDC irreversibly and there is no automatic refund. Identical tool arguments alone are NOT idempotent: retry with the identical arguments, same vigil/idempotency-key metadata and original payment proof.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim | string | yes | – |
| options | object | – | – |
| source_url | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| assessment_scope | – | yes | – |
| cache | object | yes | – |
| checked_at | string | yes | – |
| claim | string | yes | – |
| claim_support | – | yes | – |
| confidence | null | yes | No numerical confidence is published before calibration. |
| evidence | array | yes | – |
| explanation | string | yes | – |
| limits | object | yes | – |
| methodology_version | string | yes | – |
| payment | object | yes | USDC uses six atomic decimals. Offline mock payments simulate USDC and move no funds. Null fees are unknown, not zero. |
| reachable | – | yes | – |
| receipt | object | yes | Pin Vigil's key independently. Verify the Ed25519 attestation, SHA256 of canonical envelope bytes, and SHA256 of the result with receipt removed. Schema validation alone does not authenticate a recei… |
| request_id | string | yes | – |
| risk_flags | array | yes | – |
| schema_version | – | yes | – |
| served_at | string | yes | – |
| source | object | yes | – |
| source_identity | object | yes | – |
| status | – | yes | – |
| verification_type | – | yes | – |
No examples provided.
vigil_watchdog_status ~98
Read a watchdog's state: interval, last beat, whether it is overdue, fired, or exhausted.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | Watchdog name, 1..64 characters. |
| vigil_key | string | – | DEPRECATED legacy account-wide credential, including deletion and permission issuance. Prefer the client-injected HTTP Authorization: Bearer header; omit this argument when that header authenticates… |
No output schema declared.
{"name":"agent-health"}How do I install the Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents MCP server?
Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents is a hosted endpoint at https://vigilnotary.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · vigilnotary.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-vigilnotary-vigil 'https://vigilnotary.com/mcp'
What is the Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents MCP server?
Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.vigilnotary/vigil. Agent leases, signed receipts, watchdogs, and optional paid source-verification evidence. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://vigilnotary.com/mcp).
Is the Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents MCP server safe to use?
Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents MCP server expose?
Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents exposes 26 tools: vigil_info, vigil_register, vigil_pricing, vigil_usage, vigil_notarize, and 21 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,834 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents MCP server still maintained?
Vigil — an outside witness for AI agents is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.