aft.page
REMOTE · MCP.AFT.PAGE
Deploy a folder, build output, or public GitHub repo to a live URL. Update, roll back.
Available components
Last scanned (22 hours ago)
Scores higher than 85% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 4 Nov 2026.
Category CI/CD and DevOps
Recent critical change
Authorization (29 Sept 2026). See the changelog before you install this server.
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation check failed: no authorisation is required to call this server, and it exposes a tool marked destructive (aft_rollback). See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability82
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 828 tokens (~118/item across 7 items; 6 tools + 1 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage98
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 94% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 15 Oct 26 0
- Tool “deploy” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- 12 Oct 26 +2
- Schema quality: fail → pass ▲ functional
- The server now declares the “resources” capability functional
- First check of Schema quality: 100 functional
- New resource “deploy-to-aft” functional
- 9 Oct 26 0
- Schema quality: pass → fail ▼ functional
- 29 Sept 26 0
- Authorization: unverified → fail ▼ critical
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- Tool “aft_rollback” is now declared destructive security
- Destructive annotations: All 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation. functional
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 2 Sept 26 0
- Schema quality: 93 → 103 ▼ functional
- Server version: 0.5.0 → 0.6.0 functional
- “deploy” added an optional parameter “expires” cosmetic
- 31 Aug 26 0
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Probed https://mcp.aft.page/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=aft.page | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 5 Oct 2026 | 3 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | f04e58f3ec3f8e14132c666e5033a36e |
| SANs: aft.page, mcp.aft.page, *.mcp.aft.page | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.aft.page. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| page. | present | 64712 | 8 | Verified |
| aft.page. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.aft.page/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.aft.page/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.aft.page/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
aft_deploys List aft.page deploy history ~105
List the versions (v1, v2…) of a slug with their label, door, commit and whether each is live or a held preview. Needs edit_token from .aft/state.json (or the first deploy). Same history the project UI shows after claim.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| edit_token | string | yes | From first deploy / .aft/state.json. Required to update or rollback the same URL. |
| slug | string | yes | Site slug from aft.json or .aft/state.json |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
aft_health Check aft.page API ~15
Ping the aft.page deploy API.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
aft_promote Promote a held aft.page version ~122
Make a held preview version live at the same URL. Pass version (e.g. 4) or deploy_id from aft_deploys. Needs edit_token.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| deploy_id | string | – | deployId from aft_deploys |
| edit_token | string | yes | From first deploy / .aft/state.json. Required to update or rollback the same URL. |
| slug | string | yes | Site slug from aft.json or .aft/state.json |
| version | integer | – | Version number from aft_deploys, e.g. 3 for v3 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
aft_rollback Rollback aft.page site ~126
Point the live slug at a prior version from aft_deploys, by version number or deploy_id. Same URL. Needs edit_token from .aft/state.json. Claim not required.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| deploy_id | string | – | deployId from aft_deploys |
| edit_token | string | yes | From first deploy / .aft/state.json. Required to update or rollback the same URL. |
| slug | string | yes | Site slug from aft.json or .aft/state.json |
| version | integer | – | Version number from aft_deploys, e.g. 3 for v3 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
deploy Deploy to aft.page ~344
Publish to a live URL. Pass html (one page) OR files (a built site, or a small app's source). Plain HTML → html. Vite/React → npm run build, then files from dist/. Next static export → files from out/; a static site needs index.html. Flask/FastAPI/Django/Express → the source files with requirements.txt or package.json; aft builds and runs it. Never upload node_modules, .venv, or .next/. First hit: preferred_slug from aft.json (include aft.json in files). Later: same slug + edit_token from .aft/state.json — every update is a new version (v1, v2…) at the same URL. Pass hold:true to keep an update as a preview until aft_promote. label names the version. Limits: 500 files, 25MB each, 100MB total.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| edit_token | string | – | From first deploy / .aft/state.json. Required to update or rollback the same URL. |
| expires | string | – | Optional quick-view expiry, e.g. "1h", "24h", "90s", "7d". Anonymous (unclaimed) deploys only — the link 404s after this. |
| files | array | – | – |
| hold | boolean | – | Update only: build and verify but do not go live; promote later with aft_promote. |
| html | string | – | One HTML document. Ignored if files is set. |
| label | string | – | Short name for this version, e.g. 'before redesign'. |
| preferred_slug | string | – | aft.json slug. Required with edit_token. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
deploy_repo Deploy a public GitHub repo ~95
Same engine as aft.page/run: public GitHub URL → detect → build → live URL. Static is instant; Vite and Next.js build in the background (polls until live or failed). Private repos are refused. For a local project dir, use hosted CLI aft deploy instead.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | GitHub URL or owner/repo, e.g. https://github.com/mdn/beginner-html-site |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the aft.page MCP server?
aft.page is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.aft.page/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.aft.page
claude mcp add --transport http page-aft-mcp 'https://mcp.aft.page/mcp'
What is the aft.page MCP server?
aft.page is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as page.aft/mcp. Deploy a folder, build output, or public GitHub repo to a live URL. Update, roll back. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.aft.page/mcp).
Is the aft.page MCP server safe to use?
aft.page scores 82 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the aft.page MCP server expose?
aft.page exposes 6 tools: deploy, deploy_repo, aft_deploys, aft_rollback, aft_promote, aft_health. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 807 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the aft.page MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to aft.page without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the aft.page MCP server still maintained?
aft.page is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.