Sanctionlistcheck.com
REMOTE · SANCTIONLISTCHECK.COM
Checks names against OFAC, UK, EU, UN and more sanctions lists; returns scored possible matches.
Available components
Last scanned (14 hours ago)
Scores higher than 87% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security89
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation is enforced on tool calls, but the challenge carries no valid RFC 9728 metadata, so a client cannot discover where to get a token. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability74
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 337 tokens (~84/item across 4 items; 4 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management53
- Stability observed for 16 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 4 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 5 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Checks we ran (13)
- TLS certificate
- Authorization
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 31 Oct 26 +6
- HTTPS: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 30 Oct 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “screen_names” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- 29 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 27 to 30. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 8 days of observed history at the previous scan, 9 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 27 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 25 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 13 to 17. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 4 days of observed history at the previous scan, 5 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 22 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 3 to 7. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 1 days of observed history at the previous scan, 2 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=sanctionlistcheck.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 23 Oct 2026 | 21 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 23c7deb973ce34591345488f154e958e |
| SANs: sanctionlistcheck.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of sanctionlistcheck.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | DS published | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| sanctionlistcheck.com. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication Challenged, unverified
The endpoint asked for a token, but we could not retrieve and validate the RFC 9728 metadata that tells a client how to obtain one.
| Result | Challenged, unverified |
|---|---|
| Enforced | On tool calls |
| HTTP status | 200 |
WWW-Authenticate challenge Bearer resource_metadata="https://sanctionlistcheck.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
Bearer resource_metadata="https://sanctionlistcheck.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp" | Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none' |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(self) |
Protected resource metadata
| Document | https://sanctionlistcheck.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
|---|---|
| Retrieved | Yes |
| Problem | Metadata incomplete |
| Resource | https://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
get_balance Get Credit Balance ~29
Retrieve the credit balance for your API key and its latest credit movements. This tool is free to use.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
get_record Get Screening Record ~46
Fetch a previously stored screening record by its record id. This tool is free to use.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| record_id | string | yes | The unique identifier of a screening record, returned by screen_names. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
list_sources List Source Lists ~45
The list_sources tool provides the 10 official sanctions lists and their data-as-of dates from the current daily snapshot. This tool is free to use and does not require an API key.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
screen_names Screen Names ~153
Sanctions screening of 1 to 100 names against 10 official lists. The response includes a record id, the snapshot version, the data-as-of date for each source list, and the matching engine version. Each screened name costs one credit. Hits are candidates for human review and require further assessment.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| idempotency_key | string | – | An optional key to prevent duplicate screenings. A retry with the same key within 24 hours returns the stored record and charges no credits. |
| names | array | yes | A list of 1 to 100 names to be screened. |
| threshold | number | – | An optional minimum score from 0.6 to 1; only hits at or above this score are returned. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Sanctionlistcheck.com MCP server?
Sanctionlistcheck.com is a hosted endpoint at https://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · sanctionlistcheck.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-sanctionlistcheck-sanctionlistcheck 'https://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp'
What is the Sanctionlistcheck.com MCP server?
Sanctionlistcheck.com is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.sanctionlistcheck/sanctionlistcheck. Checks names against OFAC, UK, EU, UN and more sanctions lists; returns scored possible matches. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://sanctionlistcheck.com/mcp).
Is the Sanctionlistcheck.com MCP server safe to use?
Sanctionlistcheck.com scores 83 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Sanctionlistcheck.com MCP server expose?
Sanctionlistcheck.com exposes 4 tools: screen_names, get_record, list_sources, get_balance. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 273 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Sanctionlistcheck.com MCP server require authentication?
Yes. Sanctionlistcheck.com asked us for credentials when we connected, so you will need to authorise it in your MCP client before it can do anything.
Is the Sanctionlistcheck.com MCP server still maintained?
Sanctionlistcheck.com is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the Sanctionlistcheck.com MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 13 checks on Sanctionlistcheck.com, covering TLS certificate, Authorization, HTTPS, HSTS header and 9 more. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.