Moltline Agent Governance
REMOTE · MCP.MOLTLINESTUDIO.COM · SCANNED SEP 20
Audit MCP configs and skill files for over-broad scope and injection risk. 6 of 8 free.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security83
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC is configured correctly; the domain's records validate against the full chain to the root. View diagnostics → Pass
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2027 tokens (~253/item across 8 items; 8 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
- Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 8 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server?
Moltline Agent Governance is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.moltlinestudio.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-moltlinestudio-govern 'https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-moltlinestudio-govern": {
"url": "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"com-moltlinestudio-govern": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.com-moltlinestudio-govern] url = "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-moltlinestudio-govern": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-moltlinestudio-govern --url 'https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-moltlinestudio-govern:
url: "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern" {
"McpServers": {
"com-moltlinestudio-govern": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern"
}
}
} assistant mcp add com-moltlinestudio-govern -t streamable-http -u 'https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-moltlinestudio-govern": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 16 Sept 26 +1
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 87 to 90. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 26 days of observed history at the previous scan, 27 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 80 to 83. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 24 days of observed history at the previous scan, 25 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 9 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 73 to 77. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 22 days of observed history at the previous scan, 23 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 7 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 67 to 70. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 20 days of observed history at the previous scan, 21 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 5 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 60 to 63. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 18 days of observed history at the previous scan, 19 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 53 to 57. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 16 days of observed history at the previous scan, 17 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 47 to 50. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 14 days of observed history at the previous scan, 15 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=moltlinestudio.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 15 Aug 2026 | 13 Nov 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 72e09c6114448e7a0ed370fb03c277cb |
| SANs: moltlinestudio.com, *.moltlinestudio.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC secure
Validation of mcp.moltlinestudio.com. — Secure
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| moltlinestudio.com. | present | 2371 | 13 | Verified |
| mcp.moltlinestudio.com. | Verified address RRset verified with the apex keys |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=15576000; includeSubDomains |
| content-security-policy | default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https://api.moltlinestudio.com https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| x-frame-options | DENY |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
| permissions-policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
agent_readiness_scan Agent Readiness Scan ~292
Score a public domain against 21 agent-readiness checks. FREE. Use when you need to know whether an autonomous agent can discover, read, use or pay a website - your own, or a vendor you are evaluating before recommending it. Typical input {"domain": "example.com"} returns {"score": 8, "total": 21, "grade": "F", "passed": [...], "failed": [{"title": "...", "detail": "...", "fix": "..."}], "report_url": "..."} where report_url is a permanent shareable page for the same result. Not for auditing an MCP client configuration (audit_mcp_config) and not for scanning text for injection (injection_scan) - this one reaches out over the network and fetches public URLs on a live domain. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"} (for example {"error": "The readiness scanner is not reachable right now."}). Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | A public hostname such as example.com. A full URL is accepted and reduced to its host. Hostnames that resolve to private or internal addresses are refused. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
audit_mcp_config Audit Mcp Config ~274
Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| config | string | yes | The MCP config to audit, pasted as text or JSON — mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
audit_skill_file Audit Skill File ~238
Audit an agent skill or instruction file before you trust it. FREE. Checks for governance smells: prompt-injection and guardrail-bypass phrasing, concealment instructions ('don't tell the user'), exfiltration language, and exposed credential material. Typical input {"content": "<SKILL.md, system prompt, or tool description text>"} returns {"verdict": "reject — do not install" | "no governance red flags on a pattern pass", "findings": [{"severity": 1-5, "issue": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use before trusting a skill or instruction file that came from outside your own repository. Not for arbitrary untrusted input at run time (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | Full text of the skill file, system prompt, or tool description to audit. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
get_auditor_persona Get Auditor Persona ~161
Load the Governance Auditor persona for consistent fleet audits. PREMIUM (license). The persona is methodical, evidence-driven, and allergic to 'it's probably fine'. Takes no arguments. Returns {"persona": ..., "identity": ..., "rules": ["...", ...], "opening_move": "..."} ready to adopt as a system prompt. Use to keep repeated audits consistent in voice and rigor. Not for running an audit - the audit tools do that. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
governance_policy Governance Policy ~222
Generate an audit-ready agent-governance policy for a fleet. PREMIUM (license). Covers inventory cadence, ownership rules, least-privilege approval gates, injection defense, logging/retention, and decommissioning triggers. Typical input {"fleet_context": "20 agents, 3 with shell access, one finance bot"} returns {"policy": ..., "sections": {...}, "context_note": ..., "audit_checklist": ["...", ...]}. Use when a fleet needs a written policy document. Not for assessing what the fleet currently does (inventory_report, audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fleet_context | string | – | Optional plain-language description of the fleet (size, capabilities, sensitive systems) used to tailor the policy; empty returns the generic baseline. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
injection_scan Injection Scan ~220
Scan untrusted text for prompt-injection patterns before ingestion. FREE. Use on any web page, email, or document an agent is about to ingest to catch prompt-injection and data-exfiltration patterns before they reach the agent's context. Typical input {"text": "<untrusted content>"} returns {"injection_suspected": bool, "count": N, "hits": [{"line": N, "pattern": "...", "text": "<flagged line>"}], "note": "..."}. Not for reviewing a skill file you control (audit_skill_file), and a clean result is not a guarantee of safety - it reports pattern matches only. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | The untrusted content to scan, pasted as a single string. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
inventory_report Inventory Report ~256
Build a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list. FREE. Turns a list of agents / MCP servers / skills into an audit-ready summary with critical/elevated/standard tiers and unowned-agent flags. Typical input {"items": "[{\"name\": \"deploy-bot\", \"owner\": \"ana\"}]"} returns {"total": N, "tiers": {"critical": N, ...}, "unowned_agents": [...], "inventory": [{"name": ..., "owner": ..., "tier": ..., "orphaned": bool}], "reading": "...", "note": "..."}. Use to turn a raw agent list into risk tiers. Not for auditing any single agent in depth (audit_mcp_config, scope_check). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| items | string | yes | The fleet as a string — a JSON array of {name, owner?, capabilities?, last_seen?} objects, or plain newline-separated agent names. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
scope_check Scope Check ~248
Score the blast radius of every tool in a permission manifest. FREE. Ranks each tool by capability risk (command exec > money/delete > file-write/messaging > read > network) and flags the over-privileged ones that need approval gates. Typical input {"tools": "[\"run_shell\", \"read_docs\"]"} returns {"tools_scored": N, "high_risk_tools": N, "ranking": [{"tool": ..., "blast_radius": 0-5, "capabilities": [...]}], "recommendation": ["..."], "note": "..."}. Use on a permission manifest to rank tools by blast radius. Not for the configuration that mounts them (audit_mcp_config). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| tools | string | yes | The manifest as a string — a JSON array of tool names or {name, description} objects, a JSON object of name->description, or plain newline-separated names. |
Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.
No examples provided.
What is the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server?
Moltline Agent Governance is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.moltlinestudio/govern. Audit MCP configs and skill files for over-broad scope and injection risk. 6 of 8 free. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/govern).
Is the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server safe to use?
Moltline Agent Governance scores 87 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server expose?
Moltline Agent Governance exposes 8 tools: audit_mcp_config, scope_check, audit_skill_file, injection_scan, inventory_report, and 3 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,911 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Moltline Agent Governance without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Moltline Agent Governance MCP server still maintained?
Moltline Agent Governance is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.