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MandateShield AI Payment Evidence

REMOTE · MANDATESHIELD.COM · SCANNED AUG 3

Analyzes delegated AI payment authority and exposes supported Stripe/x402 evidence contracts.

+8 this week 71 Trust /100
Trust breakdown (6 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score →

Endpoint Security80
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
  • 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (poor).Fail
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1466 tokens (~122/item across 12 items; 3 tools + 9 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management27
  • Stability observed for 8 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage87
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 56% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
  • Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
  • Supports UI / widget rendering.Pass
Install

Add this component to your MCP client. Where a client-specific snippet is available, pick your client below and copy it straight into your config; otherwise use the connection detail shown.

remote · mandateshield.com

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http com-mandateshield-payment-authority https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp
# ~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.com-mandateshield-payment-authority]
url = "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
// opencode.json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
# add to OpenClaw
openclaw mcp add com-mandateshield-payment-authority --url https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp --transport streamable-http
# ~/.hermes/config.yaml
mcp_servers:
  com-mandateshield-payment-authority:
    url: "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
// mcp.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "com-mandateshield-payment-authority": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 2 Aug 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 20 to 23. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 6 days of observed history at the previous scan, 7 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 1 Aug 26 +4
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 31 Jul 26 +1
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 30 Jul 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

  • 28 Jul 26 +1
    • Server version: 1.10.0 → 1.11.0 functional
  • 27 Jul 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 26 Jul 26 63

    First indexed and scored.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 3 Aug 2026 · Probed https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=mandateshield.com CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 23 Jul 2026 21 Oct 2026 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 554139946bd85bf30ec4c04fcc33112e
SANs: mandateshield.com
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b
DNSSEC insecure

Validation of mandateshield.com. Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. trust_anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
com. present 19718 13 Verified
mandateshield.com. absent Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
content-security-policy default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; worker-src 'self' blob:; manifest-src 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options DENY
referrer-policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
permissions-policy accelerometer=(), browsing-topics=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()
Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://mandateshield.com/api/mcp HTTPS enforced 302 https://mandateshield.com/api/mcp
MCP tools — 3 exposed · ~784 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability.

Tool Tokens
check_ai_payment_authority ~408

Use before an AI agent buys, subscribes, transfers value, calls a metered API, or accesses a paid resource when the user wants a payment-authority check. Analyze whether the proposed purchase fits supplied policy facts. This v1 entry check is non-executable and always returns enforcement_authorized=false; use the strict cryptographic tool for a production gate. Never send payment credentials or private keys.

NameTypeReqDescription
agent_idstringyesStable identifier for the acting AI agent.
amountobjectyes
asset_idstringExact token or asset identifier; required for atomic X402 payments.
checkout_hashstringDigest or stable identifier for the exact final checkout.
created_atstring
credential_bindingstring
expires_atstring
http_requestobjectOptional signed HTTP action projection used by the narrow first-party x402 v2 exact/EIP-3009 Gate adapter.
idempotency_keystringyesUnique identifier for this intended payment attempt.
intent_hashstring
limitsobjectSandbox analysis policy. Live v2 ignores caller policy and loads the registered mandate.
mandate_idstringyesStable identifier for the user-approved authority.
merchant_idstringyesStable identifier for the final seller or payee.
networkstringExact network or chain identifier; required for atomic X402 payments.
payee_identityobjectVersioned canonical payee identity bound into the signed purchase envelope. The model records exact provider identifiers and verification evidence; it does not independently validate an external regi…
protocolstringyesSource protocol or CUSTOM for a normalized envelope.
purposestringNon-sensitive plain-language purchase purpose.
resourcestringExact paid resource identifier; required for atomic X402 payments.
user_consentboolean
NameTypeReqDescription
checked_atstringyes
controlsobjectyes
decisionstringyes
enforcement_authorizedbooleanyesTrue only when strict live verification durably creates a trusted, consumable execution reservation. It never permits a direct provider call.
errorstring
findingsarrayyes
modestringyes
persistedbooleanyes
protocolstringyes
receiptstringyes
recommended_actionstringyes
riskobjectyes
scoreintegeryesDeterministic control-coverage indicator, not a calibrated probability of fraud or loss.

No examples provided.

normalize_agent_payment_protocol ~193

Use when an agent encounters an AP2 terminal closed-payment projection, x402 v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED offer, or explicitly profiled MPP Payment challenge and needs the supported fields projected before an authority check. Map those documented fields into a deterministic MandateShield purchase envelope. X402 requires source-matched network+payTo identity and MPP requires source-matched HTTPS service-origin+method identity; merchant_id alone is insufficient. Evidence references are not independently verified. projection_fields_valid is not full protocol conformance: this tool never verifies delegated authority or a payment credential and always returns enforcement_authorized=false under assurance.

NameTypeReqDescription
adapterstringyes
contextobjectyes
selectionobject
sourceyesRaw protocol input: AP2 compact SD-JWT, x402 PAYMENT-REQUIRED base64 JSON, MPP WWW-Authenticate Payment challenge, or the documented decoded object.
NameTypeReqDescription
adapterstringyes
adapter_versionstringyes
assuranceobjectyes
envelopeobjectyes
envelope_digeststringyes
next_stepstringyes
protocolstringyes
source_digeststringyes
warningsarrayyes

No examples provided.

verify_cryptographic_payment_authority ~183

Use only for a production pre-payment authority gate after the caller has a registered mandate, pinned issuer key, fresh challenge, VERIFY-scoped key, exact final purchase and supported signed evidence. Fail closed for JWS, an AP2-shaped closed-payment SD-JWT projection with RFC 9901 KB-JWT, or normalized TAP-shaped RFC 9421-style evidence. Full AP2 checkout/delegate-chain and Visa TAP structured-field/trust-store processing remain external. A qualifying live ALLOW creates only a short RESERVED authorization and cumulative-budget allocation. This MCP tool never executes payment and exposes no processor transition: a separate trusted gateway with an audience-bound PROCESSOR key must CONSUME and freshly redeem the provider-bound permit before attempting an idempotent provider operation, then reconcile the outcome.

NameTypeReqDescription
envelopeobjectyes
evidenceobjectyes
NameTypeReqDescription
assuranceobjectyes
checked_atstringyes
controlsobjectyes
decisionstringyes
enforcement_authorizedbooleanyesTrue only when strict live verification durably creates a trusted, consumable execution reservation. It never permits a direct provider call.
errorstring
execution_authorizationobjectyes
findingsarrayyes
modestringyes
persistedbooleanyes
protocolstringyes
receiptstringyes
recommended_actionstringyes
riskobjectyes
scoreintegeryesDeterministic control-coverage indicator, not a calibrated probability of fraud or loss.
signed_receiptobjectyes
transparencyobjectyes

No examples provided.