vault-ask
NPM · @ERSENI/VAULT-ASK
Request and send secrets for AI agents, end-to-end encrypted and never shown in the chat.
Available components
Last scanned (5 hours ago)
Scores higher than 87% of npm servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security100
- No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
- No production dependencies, so there is no dependency health to assess. View diagnostics → Pass
Provenance & Transparency100
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to Erseni/secrets-component). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (AGPL-3.0-or-later).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 16 days ago).Pass
- Publishes a security disclosure policy (SECURITY.md).Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability58
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1147 tokens (~382/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management57
- Stability observed for 17 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage97
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 90% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "send_secret" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (16)
- Malware scan
- Known CVEs
- Install scripts
- Dependency health
- Source repository
- Provenance
- License
- Maintenance
- Security disclosure
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Does not apply to this package (2)
- Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
- Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 53 to 57. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 16 days of observed history at the previous scan, 17 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 47 to 50. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 14 days of observed history at the previous scan, 15 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 1 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 40 to 43. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 12 days of observed history at the previous scan, 13 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 30 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 33 to 37. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 10 days of observed history at the previous scan, 11 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 28 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 27 to 30. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 8 days of observed history at the previous scan, 9 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 25 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 23 Oct 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 21 Oct 26 +16
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Analysed npm/@erseni/vault-ask@0.2.1
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | Erseni/secrets-component |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/Erseni/secrets-component/.github/workflows/publish-vault-ask.yml@refs/heads/main |
| Rekor log index | 3331314897 |
| Predicate type | SLSA build provenance https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha512:75a7fd9c489ce1b821091683e9d4ed00244bf08faab62692c306e81f61dd188aa7e5909adb2865bd09c5ea2aa0f170273a0036d7607ef782552cdb968 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Dependencies 0 packages
| Packages resolved | 0 |
|---|---|
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
request_secret ~219
Use this whenever you need a password, token, API key or other secret from the user, for example "I will give you my database password" or "you need my API key for X". Never ask the user to type or paste a secret into the chat. Asks the user for one or more secrets and writes them into a .env file or a file, without the values ever passing through this conversation. First call without request_id: returns a link. Show it to the user, then call again with the returned request_id; that call waits for the answer and writes the file with permissions 600. The result only contains names and lengths, never a value.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| env_file | string | – | Write NAME=value lines into this .env file |
| file | string | – | Write the single requested value into this file |
| names | array | – | Names of the values to ask for, for example ["DB_PASSWORD"] |
| request_id | string | – | The id returned by the first call |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
run_with_secret ~230
Use this whenever a single command needs a password, token, API key or other secret from the user, for example "connect to the database with my password" or "deploy with my API token". Never ask the user to type or paste a secret into the chat. Asks the user for one or more secrets and runs exactly one command with them as environment variables. The user sees the command before entering anything, and only this command can receive the values. First call without request_id: returns a link. Show it to the user, then call again with the returned request_id; that call waits for the answer, runs the command and returns its exit code and its output with every value masked.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | array | – | The command and its arguments, for example ["psql", "-h", "db.example.com"] |
| cwd | string | – | Working directory for the command |
| names | array | – | Names of the values to ask for, for example ["DB_PASSWORD"] |
| request_id | string | – | The id returned by the first call |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_secret ~421
Use this whenever the user asks you to generate, create or send them a password, token, API key or other secret, for example "generate a password for my database", "generier mir ein Passwort" or "send me the key". Do not generate a secret any other way and never write one into the chat. Generates the value locally (32 letters and digits unless length or charset say otherwise) or takes it from from_file or from_env, encrypts it on this machine and returns only a one-time link that shows the value once in the browser. Give the user that link. With env_file, file or command the same value also goes to that destination (needs name except for file), so the system and the link hold the same value. The result contains the link, its expiry and the length, never the value.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| charset | string | – | Characters of the generated value, default alnum |
| command | array | – | Also run this command with the value in the environment variable NAME, for example ["./scripts/set-db-password"]. Its output comes back with the value masked |
| cwd | string | – | Working directory for relative paths and the command |
| env_file | string | – | Also write NAME=value into this .env file (permissions 600) |
| file | string | – | Also write the value into this file (permissions 600) |
| from_env | string | – | Send the value of this environment variable of the server process instead of a generated value |
| from_file | string | – | Send the content of this file instead of a generated value |
| label | string | – | Label shown above the value on the page, for example "Database password for app@db.example.com" |
| length | integer | – | Length of the generated value, default 32 |
| name | string | – | Name of the value, for example "DB_PASSWORD". Default label on the page, and the variable name for env_file and command |
| ttl_seconds | integer | – | How long the link stays valid, default 86400 |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the vault-ask MCP server?
vault-ask runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @erseni/vault-ask mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
npm · @erseni/vault-ask
claude mcp add com-erseni-vault-ask -- npx -y @erseni/vault-ask mcp
What is the vault-ask MCP server?
vault-ask is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.erseni/vault-ask. Request and send secrets for AI agents, end-to-end encrypted and never shown in the chat. This page covers its npm package (@erseni/vault-ask).
Is the vault-ask MCP server safe to use?
vault-ask scores 85 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 5 November 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the vault-ask MCP server expose?
vault-ask exposes 3 tools: request_secret, run_with_secret, send_secret. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 870 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the vault-ask MCP server still maintained?
vault-ask is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the vault-ask MCP server under?
vault-ask declares the AGPL-3.0-or-later licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.
What did VerifyMCP test on the vault-ask MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 16 checks on vault-ask, covering Malware scan, Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health and 12 more. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to an npm package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.