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io.github.coderifts/api-governance

REMOTE · APP.CODERIFTS.COM

Signed, offline-verifiable contract-change authorization. Only a granted change can proceed.

0 this week 76 Trust /100

Last scanned (18 hours ago)

Scores higher than 65% of remote servers

Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.

Category CI/CD and DevOps

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Endpoint Security63
Transport & Reachability100
Schema Quality & AI Usability57
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2510 tokens (~836/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage100
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 100% of tool parameters carry a description.Pass
  • Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 3 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 4 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
  • Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
What we tested

Checks we ran (12)

  • TLS certificate
  • HTTPS
  • HSTS header
  • DNSSEC
  • Transport
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Checks we could not complete (1)

These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.

  • Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 1 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.

Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)

  • Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
  • Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 11 Nov 26 +1
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 10 Nov 26 −1
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
  • 6 Nov 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 1 Oct 26 0
    • The server changed its declared name: CodeRifts API Governance → CodeRifts security
  • 28 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
  • 27 Sept 26 0
    • The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
    • Tool “preflight_change_set” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Tool “verify_receipt” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
    • Schema quality: 957 → 836 ▲ functional
    • “preflight_change_set” added an optional parameter “execution_grant_request” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” added an optional parameter “response_detail” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “adapter_id” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “audience” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “executor_id” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “expected_state_token” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “grant_version” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “include_execution_grant” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “policy_hash” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “state_nonce” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “target_uri” cosmetic
    • “preflight_change_set” dropped the optional parameter “tenant_id” cosmetic
  • 26 Sept 26 0
    • “verify_receipt” reworded the description of “target_id” cosmetic

    1 cosmetic change on this day. Switch on “Show cosmetic changes” to see it.

  • 25 Sept 26 0
    • We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://app.coderifts.com/mcp

TLS valid

Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .

Subject Issuer Valid from Valid until Key Signature Serial
CN=coderifts.com CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US 8 Oct 2026 6 Jan 2027 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA256 59c99cd5a1f956b30e76c49ac616e319
SANs: coderifts.com, *.coderifts.com
CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US 13 Dec 2023 20 Feb 2029 ECDSA 256 ECDSA-SHA384 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE 15 Nov 2023 28 Jan 2028 ECDSA 384 SHA256-RSA 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →

DNSSEC insecure

Validation of app.coderifts.com. — Not signed

Zone DS Keys Algorithms Outcome
. Trust anchor 20326, 38696 8, 8 Verified
com. DS published 19718 13 Verified
coderifts.com. No DS Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation
Authentication No authorisation required

The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.

Result No authorisation required
HTTP status 200
Header Value
strict-transport-security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
content-security-policy default-src 'self';script-src 'self';style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://coderifts.com https://fonts.googleapis.com;font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com data:;img-src 'self' data: https:;connect-src 'self' https://app.coderifts.com;base-uri 'self';form-action 'self';frame-ancestors 'self';object-src 'none';script-src-attr 'none';upgrade-insecure-requests
x-content-type-options nosniff
x-frame-options DENY
referrer-policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
permissions-policy camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →

Transports 2 probes
Transport URL Outcome Status Location
streamable-http https://app.coderifts.com/mcp Verified 200
http (plaintext) http://app.coderifts.com/mcp HTTPS enforced 301 https://app.coderifts.com/mcp
MCP tools · 3 exposed · ~2,462 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
get_decision_details ~611

Retrieve a PAST CodeRifts decision by exactly one identifier (case_id | decision_id | fingerprint): full report, breaking changes, scores, and linked receipt metadata if stored. Use this when: - You have a decision_id (or fingerprint) from a previous preflight, PR comment, or CI log and need to inspect or explain that past decision. - You are auditing why a prior ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK was issued. - You are NOT requesting a new analysis of current before/after specs. Do not use when: - You need a decision for the CURRENT uncommitted or PR head change set — call coderifts.preflight_change_set with the current artifacts. - You hold a receipt token and only need cryptographic/lifecycle verification — use coderifts.verify_receipt. - You have no identifier — run preflight first to create one. Inputs: exactly one of case_id, decision_id, or fingerprint. {} → INVALID_INPUT; two identifiers → LOOKUP_IDENTIFIER_CONFLICT; case_id → CASE_NOT_FOUND (lookup never opens a case). Returns the stored document or not_found. Scoping — fingerprint lookup returns only YOUR OWN decisions. A fingerprint is derived from content, not from an account, so two callers who preflight byte-identical specs derive the same one; the lookup is therefore constrained to the decisions your credential can prove it owns. A decision that exists but is not yours returns the SAME not_found as one that was never issued. This is deliberate: a distinguishable "exists but forbidden" would confirm to any caller that a given content hash had been decided on by someone, which is the fact the scoping exists to withhold. Do not read not_found as proof that no such decision exists anywhere. Decisions persisted without context.repository cannot currently be attributed to an account, and are not retrievable by fingerprint at all — not by their owner either. Retrieve those by decision_id, which is unchanged and unscoped. This is a limitation of what older stored rows carry, not a property of the lookup: rows writt…

NameTypeReqDescription
case_idstring–A case identifier. Lookup never opens a case. Until the case store exists this returns CASE_NOT_FOUND.
decision_idstring–The decision_id from a prior decision_result envelope. Provide exactly one identifier.
fingerprintstring–A verdict fingerprint (sha256:...); returns the latest matching decision you own. Provide exactly one identifier.
NameTypeReqDescription
breaking_changesinteger––
chain_receiptstring––
coderifts_versionstring––
control_envelopeobject–Control envelope (control/1.0) derived from the stored decision_result. Includes next_agent_step (structured remediation SUGGESTION for non-CONTINUE execution_action; null on CONTINUE*; not permissio…
decisionstring––
decision_resultobjectyesdecision-result.v1 envelope (control enums closed). Additive fields may appear and are not permission. Full schema: https://coderifts.com/schemas/decision-result.v1.consumer.json (producer: https://c…
decision_semantic_hashstring––
decision_spec_versionstring––
evidenceobject|array|null––
evidence_qualitystring––
execution_actionstring––
metaobjectyes–
operationstring––
pattern_sourcesarray––
patternsarray––
preflight_modestring––
receipt_kindstring––
required_action_coreobject–Branchable required-action core { type, reason_code, recheck_required } when present on the envelope.
requires_migrationboolean––
risk_scoreinteger––
safe_for_agentboolean––
timestampstring––
verdict_fingerprintstring––

No examples provided.

preflight_change_set ~887

Use this when: a contract artifact (OpenAPI, GraphQL, protobuf, AsyncAPI, MCP manifests, or agent tool schemas) changes before merge, deploy, publish, or tool registration; AND any agent-executed operation with no supported contract type — send type agent_operation. Do not call for documentation-only changes, static readiness scoring, or receipt verification. Use analyze for risk only; authorize requires context.operation. Skipping this call is not permission. Absence of a key is not permission. Inputs: preflight_mode is required: "analyze" (risk only; no receipt, no execution_action) or "authorize" (may mint a receipt; requires context.operation — merge is not deploy is not publish). Supply exactly one artifact source: artifacts[] (1–20 items, each {id, type, before, after} as the FULL spec/schema text, not a path or URL; type is openapi|graphql|grpc|asyncapi|mcp_manifest|agent_tools|agent_operation) XOR derivation="server" (server reads GitHub Compare; needs context.repository + context.base + context.head; sending artifacts[] together is 400). Grant fields sit in one object, execution_grant_request {include_execution_grant, grant_version, tenant_id, executor_id, adapter_id, target_uri, expected_state_token, state_nonce, audience, policy_hash}; analyze ignores it; required is preflight_mode only. previous_receipt is a chain token base64url(body).base64url(signature) to LINK a prior decision — it does not re-verify; use coderifts.verify_receipt instead; for details of a past decision use coderifts.get_decision_details instead. idempotency_key replays authorize only (24h), never analyze.

NameTypeReqDescription
artifactsarray–1–20 contract documents analyzed together. Each item is {id, type, before, after} where before/after are the FULL document strings (YAML/JSON/proto text), not URLs or file paths. Omit this array enti…
contextobject–Optional apply-site context folded into the bundle fingerprint. operation distinguishes merge vs deploy vs publish (and other labels); the server accepts any non-empty string; conventional values: me…
decision_spec_versionstring–Optional. Omit or '2.0' = current contract. '1.0' retired (INVALID_INPUT); do not pin 1.0.
derivationstring–"server" = the server derives artifacts[] from GitHub Compare via the App installation. Allowed only when context.repository, context.base and context.head are all present and the tenant has a proven…
execution_grant_requestobject–Authorize + include_execution_grant only: the execution-grant request fields. Analyze ignores them. Flat root-level spellings are also accepted; the same field sent both ways with different values is…
idempotency_keystring–Optional client key; in authorize mode, a repeat with the same key + body replays the original decision (24h). Analyze responses are not replayed.
preflight_modestringyesREQUIRED. "analyze" = informational risk only (no decision/execution_action/safe_for_agent; analysis_outcome + may_execute:false). "authorize" = operation-bound path; may mint a receipt (requires con…
previous_receiptstring–Optional prior chain token to LINK this call into a receipt chain: base64url(body).base64url(signature). Linking is not verification — a linked token is not re-checked here; use verify_receipt.
response_detailstring–How much of the response to return. control = the fields an agent branches on; standard = control + the human report and labelled break rows (the MCP default); full = everything (the REST default). E…

Structured output declared, but exposes no named fields.

No examples provided.

verify_receipt ~964

Verify a CodeRifts signed chain-receipt you ALREADY HOLD: cryptographic authenticity (signature + key id), body binding, and — when lifecycle indices are available — whether it is currently valid authorization (not expired, superseded, or revoked) for a stated operation/target. Use this when: - You already obtained a chain_receipt / receipt token from a prior preflight (or CI artifact) and are about to act (merge/deploy) under that receipt. - A contract-gate or policy requires offline/online proof that the receipt is authentic for this change before proceeding. - You must distinguish "signature ok" from "currently authorized" (stale or superseded receipts must not be treated as live approval). Do not use when: - You do not have a receipt yet — call coderifts.preflight_change_set first. - You need a NEW decision for a changed base→head set — preflight again; verify_receipt does not re-diff specs. - The receipt you hold binds a different operation or target than the one you are about to perform — call coderifts.preflight_change_set with context.operation set to that operation (a merge receipt does not authorize a deploy); verify_receipt cannot re-scope or re-issue a decision. - You only need human-readable history of an old decision_id without a receipt token — use coderifts.get_decision_details. - The change set itself is unknown or incomplete — fix the change set and preflight; do not "verify" a placeholder. Inputs: receipt token (required); target_id = decision_result.artifact_digest — required for an authorization verdict; omitted → target_not_stated. Optional intended context (operation, environment, fingerprint, audience, repository/branch/pull_request, base/head) and the body_hash-bound decision_result envelope. 30s clock-skew leeway on expiry. A 0s grace for declared destructive production operations is defined in the policy but is unreachable today: the intended-context schema has no destructive field, so nothing can declare one and the…

NameTypeReqDescription
audiencestring–Intended audience — must match the receipt
basestring–Intended base commit/ref SHA the receipt must match (signed-wins vs envelope.base)
branchstring–Intended branch the receipt must bind (place binding; optional)
decision_resultobject–The body_hash-bound decision envelope (carries operation/target/decision). Required for a meaningful AUTHORIZATION evaluation of scope; without it, intended context alone fails closed on authorizatio…
environmentstring–Intended environment (e.g. production) — must match the receipt
fingerprintstring–Intended change fingerprint — must equal the receipt fp
headstring–Intended head commit/ref SHA the receipt must match (signed-wins vs envelope.head)
operationstring–Intended operation the receipt must authorize (conventional: merge|deploy|tool_call|publish). Triggers authorization evaluation when non-empty; supply decision_result for full scope binding.
pull_request––Intended pull-request id the receipt must bind (place binding; optional)
repositorystring–Intended repository the receipt must bind (place binding; optional)
target_idstring–REQUIRED to authorize under a held receipt. Set it to decision_result.artifact_digest — the digest of the artifact the receipt was issued for, which you already hold in the decision_result you are pa…
tokenstringyesThe chain receipt token (base64url(body).base64url(signature))
NameTypeReqDescription
authz_notestring–Present when no intended context supplied: status reflects signature+expiry only
authz_reasonstring–When currently_authorized=false: the deny reason (operation_mismatch, decision_not_allow, superseded, expired, target_mismatch, environment_mismatch, …)
authz_reasonsarray–Every violation found; the first is authz_reason. [] when authorized. Fix all of them before re-verifying.
authz_statestring–Lifecycle state from isCurrentlyAuthorized when authorization is evaluated (optional; omitted when currently_authorized is null)
authz_statusstring–Authorization-level status (VERIFIED_WRONG_ENVIRONMENT / VERIFIED_SUPERSEDED / VERIFIED_SCOPE_MISMATCH / …)
binding_levelstring–place_and_content | content_only — forensic, not a second verdict
caller_valuestring|null–Caller claim that differed from the signed envelope
correlation_idstring–Route-owned trace id, set by the route itself rather than by correlation middleware; always a non-empty string on 200
currently_authorizedboolean|nullyesWhether the receipt currently authorizes the intended operation/target/fp (§106). null means authorization could not be evaluated (e.g. no intended context) — not unauthorized and not authorized.
payloadobject––
reasonstring|null––
signed_valuestring|null–Signed envelope slot when signed-wins fail-closed (source_binding_mismatch)
statusstringyes–
validbooleanyestrue iff status is VERIFIED_CURRENT or RETIRED_KEY_VALID_AT_ISSUE

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the io.github.coderifts/api-governance MCP server?

io.github.coderifts/api-governance is a hosted endpoint at https://app.coderifts.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

remote · app.coderifts.com

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add --transport http coderifts-api-governance 'https://app.coderifts.com/mcp'
Common questions

What is the io.github.coderifts/api-governance MCP server?

io.github.coderifts/api-governance is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.coderifts/api-governance. Signed, offline-verifiable contract-change authorization. Only a granted change can proceed. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://app.coderifts.com/mcp).

Is the io.github.coderifts/api-governance MCP server safe to use?

io.github.coderifts/api-governance scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the io.github.coderifts/api-governance MCP server expose?

io.github.coderifts/api-governance exposes 3 tools: preflight_change_set, verify_receipt, get_decision_details. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,462 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Does the io.github.coderifts/api-governance MCP server require authentication?

No. We connected to io.github.coderifts/api-governance without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.

Is the io.github.coderifts/api-governance MCP server still maintained?

io.github.coderifts/api-governance is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.coderifts/api-governance MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on io.github.coderifts/api-governance, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about io.github.coderifts/api-governance: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.