# io.github.coderifts/api-governance (remote · app.coderifts.com)

API governance for AI agents. Detects breaking changes, scores blast radius, blocks unsafe calls.

- Trust score: 59/100 (low)
- Change this week: −2
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-08-03

## Components

- remote · `app.coderifts.com`: 59/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/coderifts-api-governance/app.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/coderifts-api-governance/app)

## Channel facts

- Endpoint: `https://app.coderifts.com/mcp`
- Transports: `streamable-http`
- Auth: `required`
- Version: `1.0.1`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-08-03.

- **Endpoint Security**: 63/100
  - The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key.
  - Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 3 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
  - HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path.
  - The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present.
  - DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC.
- **Transport & Reachability**: 100/100
  - Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 52/100
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1224 tokens (~408/item across 3 items; 3 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 0/100
  - Stability check failed: schema churn in the 8 days we've observed: 7 tool removals, 0 breaking changes, 0 auth/transport breaks, 0 additions.
- **Tool Coverage**: 100/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 100% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (100% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Capabilities**: 60/100
  - Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28.

## Install

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add --transport http coderifts-api-governance https://app.coderifts.com/mcp
```

### Codex

```toml
[mcp_servers.coderifts-api-governance]
url = "https://app.coderifts.com/mcp"
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "coderifts-api-governance": {
      "type": "remote",
      "url": "https://app.coderifts.com/mcp",
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add coderifts-api-governance --url https://app.coderifts.com/mcp --transport streamable-http
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  coderifts-api-governance:
    url: "https://app.coderifts.com/mcp"
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "coderifts-api-governance": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://app.coderifts.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}
```

The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-07-31 (score 59, +2)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-30 (score 57, −2)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-29 (score 59, +43)

- [security regression] Stability: unverified → fail
- [security improvement] Transport: fail → pass
- [security] Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 3 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
- [functional regression] Schema quality: 147 → 408
- [functional improvement] Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable
- [functional improvement] Tool coverage: unverified → 100
- [functional improvement] MCP protocol: unverified → pass
- [cosmetic] “verify_receipt” added an optional parameter “audience”
- [cosmetic] “verify_receipt” added an optional parameter “decision_result”
- [cosmetic] “verify_receipt” added an optional parameter “environment”
- [cosmetic] “verify_receipt” added an optional parameter “fingerprint”
- [cosmetic] “verify_receipt” added an optional parameter “operation”
- [cosmetic] “verify_receipt” added an optional parameter “target_id”

### 2026-07-28 (score 16, −45)

- [security regression] Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP
- [security regression] Stability: 0.03 → unverified
- [security regression] Transport: pass → fail
- [security] Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes.
- [functional regression] Capabilities: pass → unverified
- [functional regression] Tool coverage: 100 → unverified
- [functional] First check of Schema quality: unverified

### 2026-07-27 (score 61, +1)

- [functional] We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server

### 2026-07-26 (score 60)

First indexed and scored.

## MCP tools (3)

### `preflight_change_set` (~524 tokens)

Preflight a COMPLETE base→head change set of contract artifacts and return a
governance decision (ALLOW / WARN / REQUIRE_APPROVAL / BLOCK), risk score,
breaking-change analysis, and a signed chain-receipt when applicable.

Use this when:
\- You are about to merge, push to a protected branch, deploy, publish a package,
  or register/expose agent tools, AND the change includes at least one contract
  artifact: OpenAPI/Swagger, GraphQL SDL, gRPC/protobuf, AsyncAPI, MCP manifest,
  or agent tool schemas (inputSchema/JSON Schema tools list).
\- You have (or can assemble) the FULL base and head (or before/after) content for
  every changed contract artifact in this change set — not a single-file subset
  when other contract files also change.
\- You need a NEW decision for the CURRENT change; you do not already hold a
  currently-valid receipt for this exact target/operation.

Do not use when:
\- The change is documentation-only (README, guides, comments) with no contract
  artifact content change — do not call any CodeRifts tool.
\- You already hold a signed receipt and only need to check it is authentic and
  currently valid — use coderifts.verify_receipt instead.
\- You need details of a PREVIOUS decision by decision_id — use
  coderifts.get_decision_details instead.
\- You only want a static "agent readiness" score of a single unspec-diffed file
  with no pending mutate — that is a specialized non-default alias, not this tool.
\- You cannot supply both before and after (or base and head) for the artifacts
  that change — fix the change set first; do not invent empty before specs.

Inputs: list of artifacts, each with type, before, after (or equivalent), plus
optional operation (merge|deploy|tool_call|publish), environment/stakes, and
context. Returns decision, execution_action, risk fields, and chain_receipt when issued.

Input parameters:

- `artifacts` (array, required): Contract artifacts to analyze together (max 20). Each is { id, type, before, after }.
- `context` (object): Optional { operation, environment, repository, branch, pull_request, policy_profile }
- `idempotency_key` (string): Optional client key; a repeat with the same key + body replays the original decision (24h)
- `previous_receipt` (string): Optional prior chain receipt token to link

Output parameters:

- `artifacts` (array)
- `breaking_changes` (integer)
- `bundle_fingerprint` (string)
- `chain_receipt` (string): Signed chain receipt token when issued (fresh path with signer configured).
- `control_envelope` (object): Control envelope (control/1.0): decision, safe_for_agent, execution_action, required_action, receipt.
- `decision` (string)
- `decision_result` (object): decision-result.v1 envelope (present when a chain receipt is available). Full schema: https://coderifts.com/schemas/decision-result.v1.consumer.json
- `evidence` (array)
- `execution_action` (string)
- `meta` (object)
- `patterns` (array)
- `required_action_core` (object): Branchable required-action core { type, reason_code, recheck_required } when the stored/fresh envelope carries it.
- `risk_score` (integer)
- `safe_for_agent` (boolean)
- `verdict_fingerprint` (string): Verdict fingerprint (sha256:…); mirrors envelope.fingerprint on replay.

### `verify_receipt` (~453 tokens)

Verify a CodeRifts signed chain-receipt you ALREADY HOLD: cryptographic
authenticity (signature + key id), body binding, and — when lifecycle indices
are available — whether it is currently valid authorization (not expired,
superseded, or revoked) for a stated operation/target.

Use this when:
\- You already obtained a chain_receipt / receipt token from a prior preflight
  (or CI artifact) and are about to act (merge/deploy) under that receipt.
\- A contract-gate or policy requires offline/online proof that the receipt is
  authentic for this change before proceeding.
\- You must distinguish "signature ok" from "currently authorized" (stale or
  superseded receipts must not be treated as live approval).

Do not use when:
\- You do not have a receipt yet — call coderifts.preflight_change_set first.
\- You need a NEW decision for a changed base→head set — preflight again;
  verify_receipt does not re-diff specs.
\- You only need human-readable history of an old decision_id without a receipt
  token — use coderifts.get_decision_details.
\- The change set itself is unknown or incomplete — fix the change set and
  preflight; do not "verify" a placeholder.

Inputs: receipt token (required); optional expected target_id, operation, and
now-skew policy hooks. Returns { valid, status, decision, execution_action,
lifecycle_state, reasons[] }.

Input parameters:

- `audience` (string): Intended audience — must match the receipt
- `decision_result` (object): The body_hash-bound decision envelope (carries operation/target/decision); required to evaluate authorization scope
- `environment` (string): Intended environment (e.g. production) — must match the receipt
- `fingerprint` (string): Intended change fingerprint — must equal the receipt fp
- `operation` (string): Intended operation the receipt must authorize (merge|deploy|tool_call|publish)
- `target_id` (string): Intended apply-site target the receipt must bind
- `token` (string, required): The chain receipt token (base64url(body).base64url(signature))

Output parameters:

- `authz_note` (string): Present when no intended context supplied: status reflects signature+expiry only
- `authz_reason` (string): When currently_authorized=false: the deny reason (operation_mismatch, decision_not_allow, superseded, expired, target_mismatch, environment_mismatch, …)
- `authz_state` (string): Lifecycle state from isCurrentlyAuthorized when authorization is evaluated (optional; omitted when currently_authorized is null)
- `authz_status` (string): Authorization-level status (VERIFIED_WRONG_ENVIRONMENT / VERIFIED_SUPERSEDED / VERIFIED_SCOPE_MISMATCH / …)
- `currently_authorized` (boolean|null): Whether the receipt currently authorizes the intended operation/target/fp (§106). null means authorization could not be evaluated (e.g. no intended context) — not unauthorized and not authorized.
- `payload` (object)
- `reason` (string|null)
- `status` (string)
- `valid` (boolean): true iff status is VERIFIED_CURRENT or RETIRED_KEY_VALID_AT_ISSUE

### `get_decision_details` (~247 tokens)

Retrieve a PAST CodeRifts decision by decision_id (or fingerprint): full
report payload, breaking changes list, scores, and linked receipt metadata
if stored.

Use this when:
\- You have a decision_id (or fingerprint) from a previous preflight, PR
  comment, or CI log and need to inspect or explain that past decision.
\- You are auditing why a prior ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK was issued.
\- You are NOT requesting a new analysis of current before/after specs.

Do not use when:
\- You need a decision for the CURRENT uncommitted or PR head change set —
  call coderifts.preflight_change_set with the current artifacts.
\- You hold a receipt token and only need cryptographic/lifecycle verification —
  use coderifts.verify_receipt.
\- You have no decision_id/fingerprint — run preflight first to create one.

Inputs: decision_id (preferred) and/or fingerprint. Returns the stored
decision document or not_found.

Input parameters:

- `decision_id` (string): The decision_id from a prior decision_result envelope
- `fingerprint` (string): A verdict fingerprint (sha256:...); returns the latest matching decision

Output parameters:

- `breaking_changes` (integer)
- `control_envelope` (object): Control envelope (control/1.0) derived from the stored decision_result.
- `decision` (string)
- `decision_result` (object): decision-result.v1 envelope (present when a chain receipt is available). Full schema: https://coderifts.com/schemas/decision-result.v1.consumer.json
- `execution_action` (string)
- `meta` (object)
- `patterns` (array)
- `required_action_core` (object): Branchable required-action core { type, reason_code, recheck_required } when present on the envelope.
- `risk_score` (integer)
- `safe_for_agent` (boolean)
- `verdict_fingerprint` (string)

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: TLS, DNSSEC, Authorisation, Transports. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/coderifts-api-governance/app#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-08-03: 59
- 2026-08-02: 59
- 2026-08-01: 59
- 2026-07-31: 59
- 2026-07-30: 57
- 2026-07-29: 59
- 2026-07-28: 16
- 2026-07-27: 61
- 2026-07-26: 60

## Links

- Remote endpoint: https://app.coderifts.com/mcp
- Authorisation metadata: https://app.coderifts.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Repository: https://github.com/coderifts/self-hosted
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/coderifts-api-governance/app/changelog.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/coderifts-api-governance/app/changelog.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/coderifts-api-governance/app