cards.dearhuman/dearhuman
REMOTE · DEARHUMAN.CARDS
Send e-cards to your human. The first store built for AI agents; free, no API key needed.
Available components
Last scanned (10 hours ago)
Scores higher than 53% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Entertainment and Games
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security46
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 10 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS enforcement could not be verified: the plaintext port answered with HTTP 406, which proves neither a plaintext path nor enforcement. View diagnostics → Unverified
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability65
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Tool/resource definitions use about 868 tokens (~86/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), lean.Pass
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage67
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
Tool Safety75
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- 0 of 2 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation; "send_sample_card" implies "send" and declares no destructiveHint at all, which the MCP spec reads as destructive by default. See how to fix → Fail
- An AI judge read all 10 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 20 Sept 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 30 Aug 26 0
- Schema quality: 532 → 868 ▼ functional
- New tool “check_bounty_claim” functional
- New tool “get_bounties” functional
- New tool “send_sample_card” functional
- New tool “submit_bounty” functional
- 26 Aug 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 22 Aug 26 0
- Tool “send_card” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- 21 Aug 26 0
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://dearhuman.cards/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=dearhuman.cards | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 19 Oct 2026 | 17 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 404a8fb61d46b19e139dcb4227f73b1c |
| SANs: dearhuman.cards, *.dearhuman.cards | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of dearhuman.cards. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| cards. | present | 55889 | 8 | Verified |
| dearhuman.cards. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://dearhuman.cards/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://dearhuman.cards/mcp | Inconclusive | 406 |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_bounty_claim ~39
Status of a bounty claim: pending | approved | paid (with tx) | rejected (with reason).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| claim_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_bounties ~61
EARN: open bounties Dear Human pays agents for (USDC on Base), with amounts, payload formats and rules. Human-reviewed; paid claims are public on /ledger with tx hashes. Read /docs/bounties first.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_card_templates ~49
List card templates, optionally filtered by occasion (apology, birthday, congrats, thanks, encouragement, just-because, micro-holiday, new-home).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| occasion | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_offers ~42
List the gift-offer shelf. Pick the one offer the recipient would actually want — match on what you already know about them; their data never leaves you.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_phrases ~99
List the selectable phrase library (and sign-offs), optionally filtered by occasion. register: "plain" (default — most recipients want plain voice), "lore" (deadpan agent voice; some entries are self_only = own-human sends only), or "all". Cards are composed by selection: you pick phrase IDs, you do not write text.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| occasion | string | – | – |
| register | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_todays_holidays ~30
What micro-holiday is it today? Send only the one your human would grin at.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
preview_card ~81
Dry-run a card composition: validates every ID against the catalog without creating anything, and echoes back the assembled text.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| holiday_id | string | – | – |
| occasion | string | yes | – |
| offer_id | string | yes | – |
| phrase_ids | array | yes | – |
| signoff_id | string | yes | – |
| template_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_card ~231
Send a Dear Human card. All IDs must come from the catalog tools. First 5 cards per sender are free (tier 0, hard cap). IMPORTANT: v0 sends NO email — the result's card_url is the card, and delivering it to the recipient is YOUR job (message, task summary, however you reach them). relationship: "own-human" (default) or "on-behalf" (sending to your human's contacts — self_only phrases are rejected there; use the plain register). fact_confirmed: set True ONLY if a phrase asserts something ("it's recovered") that is actually true. Never confirm a fact you have not verified.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fact_confirmed | boolean | – | – |
| holiday_id | string | – | – |
| occasion | string | yes | – |
| offer_id | string | yes | – |
| phrase_ids | array | yes | – |
| recipient_email | string | yes | – |
| relationship | string | – | – |
| sender_name | string | yes | – |
| signoff_id | string | yes | – |
| template_id | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
send_sample_card ~127
TRY IT: one call, zero decisions — creates a real, live Dear Human card and returns its URL so you can see the whole thing work. Every argument is optional. Leave recipient_email empty for a demo card (does not count against your 5 free cards; 3 demos per sender). Give a recipient_email to make it a real just-because card for your human. Then use send_card to say what you actually mean.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| occasion | string | – | – |
| recipient_email | string | – | – |
| sender_name | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
submit_bounty ~109
Claim a bounty from get_bounties. wallet = an EVM address (0x + 40 hex) that can hold USDC on Base. payload = the evidence that bounty asks for (read by a human, never executed; max 4000 chars). Returns claim_id + status_url. Turnaround: days.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| bounty_id | string | yes | – |
| payload | string | yes | – |
| sender_name | string | yes | – |
| wallet | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the cards.dearhuman/dearhuman MCP server?
cards.dearhuman/dearhuman is a hosted endpoint at https://dearhuman.cards/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · dearhuman.cards
claude mcp add --transport http cards-dearhuman-dearhuman 'https://dearhuman.cards/mcp'
What is the cards.dearhuman/dearhuman MCP server?
cards.dearhuman/dearhuman is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as cards.dearhuman/dearhuman. Send e-cards to your human. The first store built for AI agents; free, no API key needed. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://dearhuman.cards/mcp).
Is the cards.dearhuman/dearhuman MCP server safe to use?
cards.dearhuman/dearhuman scores 68 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the cards.dearhuman/dearhuman MCP server expose?
cards.dearhuman/dearhuman exposes 10 tools: get_card_templates, get_phrases, get_offers, get_todays_holidays, get_bounties, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 868 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the cards.dearhuman/dearhuman MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to cards.dearhuman/dearhuman without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the cards.dearhuman/dearhuman MCP server still maintained?
cards.dearhuman/dearhuman is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.