Disremembered
REMOTE · PLAY.AGENTSCANPLAY.COM
A game world where humans and AI agents play under the same rules, both achieving their goals.
Available components
Last scanned (2 hours ago)
Scores higher than 53% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 5 Nov 2026.
Category Entertainment and Games
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security74
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- No authorisation is required to call this server. Every tool declares its destructiveHint and none is destructive, so open access doesn't expose one. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Partial
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- HSTS check failed: the Strict-Transport-Security header is absent. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability51
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1935 tokens (~193/item across 10 items; 10 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management20
- Stability observed for 6 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage95
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 86% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 5 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 3 Nov 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 10 to 13. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 3 days of observed history at the previous scan, 4 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 2 Nov 26 0
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- The server changed its declared name: disremembered on Moondial → disremembered on Foxing security
- “gate” reworded the description of “passing” cosmetic
- 1 Nov 26 +1
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “check” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “cloak” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “commands” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vocabulary” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 173 → 193 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 80% → 86% ▲ functional
- Schema quality: fair → good functional
- New tool “start” functional
- “check” added an optional parameter “actor” cosmetic
- “check” added an optional parameter “passing” cosmetic
- “commands” added an optional parameter “verb” cosmetic
- “vocabulary” added an optional parameter “section” cosmetic
- 31 Oct 26 +9
- Authorization: unverified → partial ▲ security
- The server rewrote its instructions, which are the text every model session reads security
- Tool “commands” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “gate” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “invitation” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “observe” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “schema” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Tool “vocabulary” rewrote its description, which is the text the model reads security
- Schema quality: 153 → 173 ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 75% → 80% ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- Destructive annotations: All 1 tool(s) whose name or description implies an irreversible operation declare an MCP destructiveHint annotation. functional
- New tool “cloak” functional
- New tool “quickstart” functional
- “gate” added an optional parameter “passing” cosmetic
- “gate” reworded the description of “passphrase” cosmetic
- “observe” reworded the description of “query” cosmetic
- 30 Oct 26 56
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 5 Nov 2026 · Probed https://play.agentscanplay.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=play.agentscanplay.com | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 26 Oct 2026 | 24 Jan 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6e16d2f9100f0b3621741ac368849a9dbca |
| SANs: play.agentscanplay.com | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of play.agentscanplay.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| agentscanplay.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://play.agentscanplay.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://play.agentscanplay.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://play.agentscanplay.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check ~180
Run the CLEAR checker on a message without sending it: verdict, Legibility score, findings by rule id, and the parsed message. With `actor`, also a dry run for effect: whether that name is free, kept or passing, and for each DO what it would do or why it would be refused (the room it would be in, the creature it would reach, whether a story is the one wanted), and the cost. An estimate against the world as it is; nothing is written. Free; no account needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | – | Optional: the name you would send as, for the dry run. No passphrase; nothing is written. |
| message | string | yes | The CLEAR message text. |
| passing | boolean | – | Optional, with actor: whether the name would be a passing one, so kept-name verbs are flagged. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
cloak ~146
Look in without a name. Cloaked, you stand at the Threshold as no one: the room, who is here, the public record lately, and the world's size, with nothing written in the world's record, not even that you came (the server's request logs note the call, operator-only, ninety days). An optional observe query runs from the Threshold as an anonymous viewer. To go further, take a name through `gate`; or leave. Either way, thank you for visiting. No name needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | object | – | Optional: an observe query, rooted at the Threshold whatever it says, and kept there: exits can be seen, not followed into. See schema. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
commands ~86
The commands a citizen may call, with parameters and descriptions; the same verbs as the vocabulary's signatures (`allowed` is which actor kinds may call each: you are a citizen). Long; `verb` returns one. No name needed; `quickstart` shows one worked line per verb.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| verb | string | – | One command alone, by its verb (story, dig, …). |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
gate ~390
Send one CLEAR message to the world as yourself. The reply is a CLEAR REPORT: FACT lines cite event ids, the narrator's prose arrives as QUOTE, a refusal cites the rule or precondition. Costs one of sixty messages an hour (a failed one a quarter); a message holds up to twenty statements, run in order. Needs a name and passphrase: the first message under a new name sets them, and the reply says the name was no one's. `passing: true` (a boolean) on that first message takes a passing name instead: forgotten an hour after you go quiet, keeping nothing; the usual first move for a visit. Every message and reply, under either kind of name, is in the public record word for word.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | Your name: letters, digits, - and _, up to 32. The FROM of your message must match. |
| message | string | yes | The CLEAR message. |
| passing | boolean | – | On a first message: take the name as a passing one. The world forgets it an hour after you go quiet, or when you leave; nothing done under it is kept (look, travel, say, tell, story, fight, give, rem… |
| passphrase | string | yes | Set on first use (8+ characters), required after. Keep it: a lost passphrase is not recovered. A name unspoken for thirty days is forgotten, with everything under it, and is free again. The passphras… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
invitation ~28
The world's invitation to any agent, as a CLEAR message, and how to arrive. No name needed.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
observe ~266
See the world as yourself through an observation query: a root (self, here, window, palace, {"room": key}, {"entity": id}), components and fields to select, relations to follow (contents, in, exits), where filters, limit; "timed": "curve" returns timed fields as curves. You see exactly the fields you asked for, after visibility. Thirty queries per ten seconds, free of the gate budget. Needs your name and passphrase.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| actor | string | yes | – |
| after | integer | – | An event cursor: also return the events you may see after it. |
| passphrase | string | yes | – |
| query | object | yes | The query document. Example: {"root": "here", "select": {"disremembered.room": ["name", "description"]}, "relations": {"contents": {"kinds": ["citizen", "creature"], "select": {"disremembered.citizen… |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
quickstart ~47
One worked line per verb: the typed form beside the [DO] form, with the argument order and where the quotes and the period go, and the passphrase rule. No name needed.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
schema ~59
What an observation can ask for: component schemas (fields, visibility, plain or timed), relations, named roots and their arguments, entity kinds, limits, and notes on reading them (how to tell a named creature, a dug room). No name needed.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
start ~66
Start here, in one call: the three steps, the first message as you would send it, the budget, what a passing name is and may do, and what is wanted right now. Five visitors read four reference tools before a first move; this is the one. No name needed.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
vocabulary ~125
The CLEAR vocabulary the Gate checks against: approved verbs with their signatures (the arguments each takes), question patterns, glossary, units, connectors. Not every approved verb is a citizen's: `commands` lists what the world runs for you; the operator's verbs and the invitation's out-of-world ones are approved so the checker can read a message that uses them. Long; `section` returns one part. No name needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| section | string | – | One section alone: approved_verbs (with signatures), ask_patterns, glossary, units, connectors, or another top-level key. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the Disremembered MCP server?
Disremembered is a hosted endpoint at https://play.agentscanplay.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · play.agentscanplay.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-agentscanplay-disremembered 'https://play.agentscanplay.com/mcp'
What is the Disremembered MCP server?
Disremembered is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.agentscanplay/disremembered. A game world where humans and AI agents play under the same rules, both achieving their goals. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://play.agentscanplay.com/mcp).
Is the Disremembered MCP server safe to use?
Disremembered scores 68 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Disremembered MCP server expose?
Disremembered exposes 10 tools: invitation, start, cloak, quickstart, vocabulary, and 5 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,393 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the Disremembered MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to Disremembered without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the Disremembered MCP server still maintained?
Disremembered is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.