Skip to content
verify mcp Beta VerifyMCP is currently in beta. If you notice any issues, get in touch and we’ll put it right.

io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda

NPM · @WARDA_PROTOCOL/MCP · 2 COMPONENTS

Economic authority for autonomous agents on Kaspa L1. Never holds a key.

0 this week 76 Trust /100

Last scanned (23 hours ago)

Scores higher than 53% of npm servers

Category Crypto and Web3

Trust breakdown (7 categories)

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →

Supply Chain Security81
  • No malware found by supply-chain analysis.Pass
  • CVE check failed: a known high-severity CVE affects zod 3.25.76, a direct dependency. A fixed version is available. View diagnostics → Fail
  • No install/post-install scripts declared.Pass
  • 31 of 97 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency45
Schema Quality & AI Usability64
  • AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
  • Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 1819 tokens (~202/item across 9 items; 9 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
  • Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
  • No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage89
  • 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
  • 67% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
  • No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
  • We read all 9 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
  • An AI judge read all 9 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
  • Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
What we tested

Checks we ran (16)

  • Malware scan
  • Known CVEs
  • Install scripts
  • Dependency health
  • Source repository
  • Provenance
  • License
  • Maintenance
  • Security disclosure
  • Schema quality
  • Stability
  • Tool coverage
  • Injection markers
  • Destructive annotations
  • Judged manipulation
  • MCP protocol

Does not apply to this package (2)

  • Endpoint SecurityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.
  • Transport & ReachabilityScored on hosted endpoints only. A package has no live endpoint of its own for us to probe.

The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →

Changelog

Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.

  • 20 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 19 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
  • 13 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 12 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
  • 10 Nov 26 0
    • Security disclosure: unverified → fail ▼ functional
  • 8 Nov 26 0
    • Security disclosure: fail → unverified ▼ functional
  • 6 Nov 26 0
    • Stability: 0.97 → pass security
  • 5 Nov 26 +1

    No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 93 to 97. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 28 days of observed history at the previous scan, 29 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.

Diagnostics

Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.

Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Analysed npm/@warda_protocol/mcp@0.4.2

Provenance No attestation

The registry publishes no build provenance for this version, so there is nothing to verify.

Result No attestation
Ecosystem npm

Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →

Vulnerabilities 1 finding
ID CVE Severity Vector Fix available
GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 CVE-2023-54404 high CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H yes

Background: What a vulnerability scan can and cannot prove →

Dependencies 97 packages
Packages resolved 97
Stale 31
Tree resolution Complete

Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →

MCP tools · 9 exposed · ~1,819 tokens

The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →

Tool Tokens
warda_build_delegation ~369

Assemble an unsigned transaction that subdivides this grant into a child for a sub-agent, and return the digest to sign with the PARENT's agent key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY. A child can only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent reserves exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Narrowing the child's allowlist needs the parent's full member list, because the witness is a path through the parent's tree and a root alone cannot produce one.

NameTypeReqDescription
childAgentKeystringyesThe sub-agent's x-only public key, 32 bytes of hex.
childBudgetKasstringyes–
childDelegationDepthnumberyesStrictly less than the parent's, or the tree could not terminate.
childEpochLimitKasstringyes–
childExpiresAtstring–A short window is the only attenuation that ends BY ITSELF, with nobody online to revoke.
childMaxPerSpendKasstringyes–
childNotBeforestring–Inherited from the parent when omitted.
childRecipientsarray–A subset of the parent's allowlist. Omit to inherit all of it.
computeBudgetnumber––
feeSompistring––
parentobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.
parentRecipientsarray–The parent's FULL member list. Required only when childRecipients narrows it.
prefixstring–Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest.
utxoobjectyesThe grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_build_exit ~235

Assemble an unsigned transaction that ENDS this grant and sweeps its balance to the principal. 'revoke' is the emergency stop, signed by the revocation key, effective the moment it confirms — the agent cannot stop it and cannot outrun it beyond the limits it already had. 'reclaim' is the same sweep after the window has closed, signed by the principal key; the covenant enforces the timing with a CLTV, so a reclaim built early simply will not run. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES A KEY. This is the tool a monitor calls when a grant is behaving badly and something has to act.

NameTypeReqDescription
computeBudgetnumber––
feeSompistring––
grantobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.
kindstringyes–
lockTimestring–Reclaim needs at least expiresAt, and still below the current DAA score. Revoke takes 0.
utxoobjectyesThe grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_build_settlement ~297

Assemble an unsigned transaction that ends a child grant and returns its UNSPENT remainder to the parent's budget, charging the parent only what the child actually spent. This is the other half of delegation: letting a child expire instead returns the money to the PRINCIPAL — to the human — which is no use to an agent mid-task. Returns TWO digests: the parent's half is signed by the parent's agent key, the child's by the revocation key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES EITHER. prevRoot is the parent's reserve root from before this child was pushed; warda_build_delegation returns it as parentReserveRootBefore. It cannot be derived from anything on chain — a hash chain pops by preimage.

NameTypeReqDescription
child–yes–
childUtxo–yes–
computeBudgetnumber––
feeSompistring–Defaults to 2000000 — two covenant inputs, so roughly twice a spend's mass.
parentobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.
parentUtxoobjectyesThe grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found.
prefixstring–Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest.
prevRootstringyesThe parent's reserve root before this child was pushed.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_build_spend ~271

Assemble an unsigned Kaspa transaction that spends from this grant, and return the digest to sign. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY and never signs: it hands back bytes, and you sign the digest wherever your key lives. It also returns the advisory verdict, but it builds the transaction either way — a local rule that is too strict must not be able to block a payment the chain would accept. If the verdict says refused, broadcasting will cost a fee and fail.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountKasstringyesAmount to pay, in KAS.
computeBudgetnumber–Defaults to 16. Charged as mass, so over-provisioning costs money and under-provisioning is rejected outright.
daaScorestringyesCurrent DAA score of the chain.
feeSompistring–Defaults to 1000000. A spend carries a ~3KB redeem script, so its mass is dominated by size.
grantobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.
recipientstringyesPayee public key, 32 bytes of hex. Must be on the allowlist.
utxoobjectyesThe grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_check_delegation ~121

Check whether a proposed child grant is a legal narrowing of this one. A child may only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent must reserve exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Advisory.

NameTypeReqDescription
childAgentKeystringyes–
childBudgetKasstringyes–
childEpochLimitKasstringyes–
childMaxPerSpendKasstringyes–
daaScorestringyes–
parentobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_check_spend ~138

Check a proposed payment against every rule the covenant enforces, and return the same verdict the chain would. Builds the recipient proof for you. ADVISORY: a 'permitted' answer is not permission — it means the covenant would accept this transaction. A 'refused' answer means no valid transaction exists, so broadcasting one would only waste a fee.

NameTypeReqDescription
amountKasstringyesAmount to pay, in KAS.
daaScorestringyes–
grantobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.
recipientstringyesPayee public key, 32 bytes of hex.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_grant_address ~118

Derive the on-chain address of a grant from its terms and current state. A grant's address is a HASH of its state, so it MOVES after every spend and every delegation — an address that worked yesterday holds nothing today. Use this to know which address to fund, watch, or look up.

NameTypeReqDescription
grantobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.
prefixstring–Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_grant_authority ~91

Report a grant's remaining authority: budget left, epoch headroom, per-transaction cap, and the largest single payment permitted right now. Use this before planning a purchase. Advisory — the covenant enforces these limits whether or not you ask.

NameTypeReqDescription
daaScorestringyesCurrent DAA score of the chain.
grantobjectyesThe grant, as issued by the principal.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

warda_recover_grant ~179

Read a grant's full state back out of any transaction that spent it, and work out where it went. Use this when a grant's recorded state is stale, wrong, or lost and its address turns up empty. Kaspa's P2SH requires the covenant script to travel in the clear inside every spending transaction, and the grant's state is spliced into that script — so every spend publishes the grant it spent. Pass the transaction as wire JSON, or just the redeem script hex if that is all you have.

NameTypeReqDescription
prefixstring–Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest.
redeemScriptHexstring–The covenant script alone, if you have only that.
transaction––A wire-format transaction that spent the grant.

No output schema declared.

No examples provided.

Install

How do I install the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server?

io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda runs locally as an npm package, launched with npx -y @warda_protocol/mcp. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

npm · @warda_protocol/mcp

# add to Claude Code
claude mcp add artykomarkets-warda -- npx -y @warda_protocol/mcp
Common questions

What is the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server?

io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda. Economic authority for autonomous agents on Kaspa L1. Never holds a key. This page covers its npm package (@warda_protocol/mcp).

Is the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server safe to use?

io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda scores 76 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We recorded 1 known advisory against it as of 21 November 2026. It declares no install or post-install scripts. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

What tools does the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server expose?

io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda exposes 9 tools: warda_grant_authority, warda_check_spend, warda_check_delegation, warda_build_spend, warda_grant_address, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,819 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

Is the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server still maintained?

io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

What licence is the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server under?

io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.

What did VerifyMCP test on the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 16 checks on io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda, covering Malware scan, Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health and 12 more. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to an npm package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.