io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda
REMOTE · MCP.WARDAPROTOCOL.COM · 2 COMPONENTS · SCANNED SEP 24
Economic authority for autonomous agents on Kaspa L1. Never holds a key.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 11 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability60
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2408 tokens (~218/item across 11 items; 11 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management77
- Stability observed for 23 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage90
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 71% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 11 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
How do I install the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server?
io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda is a hosted endpoint at https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · mcp.wardaprotocol.com
claude mcp add --transport http artykomarkets-warda 'https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"artykomarkets-warda": {
"url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"artykomarkets-warda": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.artykomarkets-warda] url = "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"artykomarkets-warda": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add artykomarkets-warda --url 'https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
artykomarkets-warda:
url: "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"artykomarkets-warda": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add artykomarkets-warda -t streamable-http -u 'https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"artykomarkets-warda": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 24 Sept 26 +1
- Server version: 0.6.0 → 0.6.1 functional
- 21 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 63 to 67. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 19 days of observed history at the previous scan, 20 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 19 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 57 to 60. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 17 days of observed history at the previous scan, 18 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 17 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 50 to 53. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 15 days of observed history at the previous scan, 16 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 16 Sept 26 0
- Schema quality: 2098 → 2408 ▼ functional
- Server version: 0.5.1 → 0.6.0 functional
- New tool “warda_find_service” functional
- 15 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 43 to 47. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 13 days of observed history at the previous scan, 14 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 37 to 40. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 11 days of observed history at the previous scan, 12 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 +1
- Server version: 0.5.0 → 0.5.1 functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 24 Sept 2026 · Probed https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=mcp.wardaprotocol.com | CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 1 Sept 2026 | 30 Nov 2026 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 5295f7b065694678894146c6daa244b4af7 |
| SANs: mcp.wardaprotocol.com | ||||||
| CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | RSA 2048 | SHA256-RSA | 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319 |
| CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | RSA 4096 | SHA256-RSA | f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of mcp.wardaprotocol.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| wardaprotocol.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=63072000 |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 308 | https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
warda_build_delegation Build a delegation for me to sign ~369
Assemble an unsigned transaction that subdivides this grant into a child for a sub-agent, and return the digest to sign with the PARENT's agent key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY. A child can only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent reserves exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Narrowing the child's allowlist needs the parent's full member list, because the witness is a path through the parent's tree and a root alone cannot produce one.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| childAgentKey | string | yes | The sub-agent's x-only public key, 32 bytes of hex. |
| childBudgetKas | string | yes | – |
| childDelegationDepth | number | yes | Strictly less than the parent's, or the tree could not terminate. |
| childEpochLimitKas | string | yes | – |
| childExpiresAt | string | – | A short window is the only attenuation that ends BY ITSELF, with nobody online to revoke. |
| childMaxPerSpendKas | string | yes | – |
| childNotBefore | string | – | Inherited from the parent when omitted. |
| childRecipients | array | – | A subset of the parent's allowlist. Omit to inherit all of it. |
| computeBudget | number | – | – |
| feeSompi | string | – | – |
| parent | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
| parentRecipients | array | – | The parent's FULL member list. Required only when childRecipients narrows it. |
| prefix | string | – | Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest. |
| utxo | object | yes | The grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_build_exit Build a revocation or a reclaim ~235
Assemble an unsigned transaction that ENDS this grant and sweeps its balance to the principal. 'revoke' is the emergency stop, signed by the revocation key, effective the moment it confirms — the agent cannot stop it and cannot outrun it beyond the limits it already had. 'reclaim' is the same sweep after the window has closed, signed by the principal key; the covenant enforces the timing with a CLTV, so a reclaim built early simply will not run. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES A KEY. This is the tool a monitor calls when a grant is behaving badly and something has to act.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| computeBudget | number | – | – |
| feeSompi | string | – | – |
| grant | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
| kind | string | yes | – |
| lockTime | string | – | Reclaim needs at least expiresAt, and still below the current DAA score. Revoke takes 0. |
| utxo | object | yes | The grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_build_settlement Build a settlement, collapsing a child back into its parent ~297
Assemble an unsigned transaction that ends a child grant and returns its UNSPENT remainder to the parent's budget, charging the parent only what the child actually spent. This is the other half of delegation: letting a child expire instead returns the money to the PRINCIPAL — to the human — which is no use to an agent mid-task. Returns TWO digests: the parent's half is signed by the parent's agent key, the child's by the revocation key. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES EITHER. prevRoot is the parent's reserve root from before this child was pushed; warda_build_delegation returns it as parentReserveRootBefore. It cannot be derived from anything on chain — a hash chain pops by preimage.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| child | – | yes | – |
| childUtxo | – | yes | – |
| computeBudget | number | – | – |
| feeSompi | string | – | Defaults to 2000000 — two covenant inputs, so roughly twice a spend's mass. |
| parent | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
| parentUtxo | object | yes | The grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found. |
| prefix | string | – | Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest. |
| prevRoot | string | yes | The parent's reserve root before this child was pushed. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_build_spend Build a payment for me to sign ~290
Assemble an unsigned Kaspa transaction that spends from this grant, and return the digest to sign. THIS SERVER NEVER SEES YOUR KEY and never signs: it hands back bytes, and you sign the digest wherever your key lives. It also returns the advisory verdict, but it builds the transaction either way — a local rule that is too strict must not be able to block a payment the chain would accept. If the verdict says refused, broadcasting will cost a fee and fail.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amountKas | string | yes | Amount to pay, in KAS. |
| computeBudget | number | – | Defaults to 16. Charged as mass, so over-provisioning costs money and under-provisioning is rejected outright. |
| daaScore | string | yes | Current DAA score of the chain. |
| feeSompi | string | – | Defaults to 3000000. A covenant spend carries the whole redeem script in its signature script — about 7KB — so its mass is dominated by size and an ordinary transfer's fee is rejected as non-standard. |
| grant | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
| recipient | string | yes | Payee public key, 32 bytes of hex. Must be on the allowlist. |
| utxo | object | yes | The grant's CURRENT UTXO. Its address moves after every spend, so a stale one will not be found. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_check_delegation Would this delegation be allowed? ~121
Check whether a proposed child grant is a legal narrowing of this one. A child may only ever be more restrictive than its parent, and the parent must reserve exactly what the child receives — authority is subdivided, never created. Advisory.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| childAgentKey | string | yes | – |
| childBudgetKas | string | yes | – |
| childEpochLimitKas | string | yes | – |
| childMaxPerSpendKas | string | yes | – |
| daaScore | string | yes | – |
| parent | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_check_spend Would this payment be allowed? ~138
Check a proposed payment against every rule the covenant enforces, and return the same verdict the chain would. Builds the recipient proof for you. ADVISORY: a 'permitted' answer is not permission — it means the covenant would accept this transaction. A 'refused' answer means no valid transaction exists, so broadcasting one would only waste a fee.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| amountKas | string | yes | Amount to pay, in KAS. |
| daaScore | string | yes | – |
| grant | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
| recipient | string | yes | Payee public key, 32 bytes of hex. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_find_service What can this agent buy, and for how much? ~310
Search the Warda service registry for endpoints an agent holding a grant can pay. Filters are a conjunction: a service must offer EVERY capability asked for and be at or under maxPrice. WHAT IS VERIFIED: that the operator controls the key the service is paid at, and that the listing was served from the same host as the endpoint it names. WHAT IS NOT: that the price is real, that the service works, or that it is worth paying — those are the operator's claims about themselves and arrive labelled as such. There is no ranking; do not read the order as one. NETWORK: unlike every other tool on this server, this one makes one outbound request, to the registry and to nothing else. It will not fetch a URL you give it. NOT REQUIRED: discovery is never in the payment path. A listing is a signed manifest at /.well-known/warda-service.json on the operator's own domain — if you already know an endpoint, read that directly and pay it without asking anyone.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability | array | – | Capabilities the service must offer, ALL of them. e.g. ['weather.current'] |
| maxPrice | string | – | Most you will pay per unit, as a decimal string in the asset's own units, e.g. '0.05'. |
| network | string | – | e.g. 'kaspa:testnet-10'. Omit for any. |
| q | string | – | Plain substring over name and description. Crude on purpose. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_grant_address Where does this grant live right now? ~118
Derive the on-chain address of a grant from its terms and current state. A grant's address is a HASH of its state, so it MOVES after every spend and every delegation — an address that worked yesterday holds nothing today. Use this to know which address to fund, watch, or look up.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| grant | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
| prefix | string | – | Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_grant_authority What may this agent spend? ~140
The agent's spending power right now: budget left, epoch headroom, per-transaction cap, and the largest single payment currently permitted. This is what an agent wallet's spending limit would tell you, except that it is not a setting — the covenant enforces these whether or not you ask. Use it before planning a purchase. NOT a chain balance: this server never reads the chain. It reports what the grant you passed says, so a stale descriptor gives a confident wrong number.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| daaScore | string | yes | Current DAA score of the chain. |
| grant | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_recover_grant Find a grant again from a transaction that spent it ~179
Read a grant's full state back out of any transaction that spent it, and work out where it went. Use this when a grant's recorded state is stale, wrong, or lost and its address turns up empty. Kaspa's P2SH requires the covenant script to travel in the clear inside every spending transaction, and the grant's state is spliced into that script — so every spend publishes the grant it spent. Pass the transaction as wire JSON, or just the redeem script hex if that is all you have.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| prefix | string | – | Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest. |
| redeemScriptHex | string | – | The covenant script alone, if you have only that. |
| transaction | – | – | A wire-format transaction that spent the grant. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
warda_wallet Show me this agent's wallet ~211
The whole wallet view in one call: the grant's current address, its spending limits, the largest payment permitted right now, and every address it is allowed to pay. This is the agent-wallet shape — address, limits, spending power — with one difference worth knowing: the limits are not settings this server or your code applies. They are in the script that unlocks the coin, so a payment outside them is not refused, it is a transaction that does not exist. NO CHAIN READ: this server never connects to a node. Every figure comes from the grant descriptor you passed, so an on-chain balance is deliberately absent — reporting one from a stale record is the failure this whole protocol keeps meeting.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| daaScore | string | yes | Current DAA score of the chain. |
| grant | object | yes | The grant, as issued by the principal. |
| prefix | string | – | Address prefix: kaspa, kaspatest, kaspasim or kaspadev. Defaults to kaspatest. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server?
io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda. Economic authority for autonomous agents on Kaspa L1. Never holds a key. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://mcp.wardaprotocol.com/mcp).
Is the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server safe to use?
io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda scores 74 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server expose?
io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda exposes 11 tools: warda_grant_authority, warda_check_spend, warda_check_delegation, warda_build_spend, warda_wallet, and 6 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 2,408 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda MCP server still maintained?
io.github.ArtyKOMarkets/warda is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 24 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.