Secret Sentinel
PYPI · MCP-SECRET-SENTINEL
Local secret guardrails: scan code, git changes and MCP configs for API keys; redact text
Available components
Last scanned (16 hours ago)
Scores higher than 59% of PyPI servers
Category Security
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Supply Chain Security50
- Malware scan not yet available for this package.Unverified
- No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.Pass
- Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it. View diagnostics → Pass
- 1 of 29 dependencies flagged as unhealthy. View diagnostics → Partial
Provenance & Transparency97
- Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL. View diagnostics → Pass
- Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to AleBrito124356/mcp-secret-sentinel). View diagnostics → Pass
- Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).Pass
- Actively maintained (last published 15 days ago).Pass
- Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository. See how to fix → Fail
Schema Quality & AI Usability75
- 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).Pass
- AI-judged instruction clarity (good).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2095 tokens (~209/item across 10 items; 9 tools + 1 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management0
- Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).Unverified
Tool Coverage71
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 0% of tool parameters carry a description.Fail
- Structured output schemas are declared (89% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.Pass
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 9 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).Pass
Unverified: 1 category
A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 3 Nov 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 31 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 29 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 27 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 26 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 25 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
- 23 Oct 26 −15
- Malware scan: pass → unverified ▼ security
- 22 Oct 26 +15
- Malware scan: unverified → pass ▲ security
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 4 Nov 2026 · Analysed pypi/mcp-secret-sentinel@0.3.0
Provenance Verified
A signed build attestation was found and verified, binding this exact artifact to the source repository it claims to come from.
| Result | Verified |
|---|---|
| Ecosystem | pypi |
| Reason | Verified |
| Discovered via | Registry attestation endpoint |
| Source repo | AleBrito124356/mcp-secret-sentinel |
| Certificate issuer | https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com |
| Certificate SAN | https://github.com/AleBrito124356/mcp-secret-sentinel/.github/workflows/publish.yml@refs/tags/v0.3.0 |
| Rekor log index | 3323568085 |
| Predicate type | PyPI publish attestation https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1 |
| Subject digest | sha256:c46b2236422597a006d0c178e80ac320a9869ea12b9340bd4b84194f3ba916a4 |
Background: How many MCP packages publish verified provenance →
Install scripts 1 script
| Hook | Tier | Command |
|---|---|---|
| build_backend | allowlisted | hatchling.build |
Background: Why install scripts are a supply-chain risk →
Dependencies 29 packages
| Packages resolved | 29 |
|---|---|
| No linked repository | 1 |
| Tree resolution | Complete |
Background: SBOMs and build attestations, explained →
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
list_patterns ~74
List the active secret detectors and allowlist rules. Returns: {"count": int, "patterns": [{"name", "severity", "advice"}], "entropy_detector": {...threshold and advice...}, "allowlist_rules": [{"name", "description"}]} Raw regexes are intentionally not exposed.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
redact_text ~130
Return the text with every detected secret replaced by [REDACTED:<detector>]. Use it before quoting logs, stack traces, configs, command output or diffs that may contain credentials, in the conversation, an issue, a commit message or a document. Everything that is not a secret is kept exactly as it was. Args: text: The text to clean. Returns: {"text": the redacted text, "redactions": how many secrets were replaced, "by_pattern": {detector name: count}}
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| by_pattern | object | yes | – |
| redactions | integer | yes | – |
| text | string | yes | – |
No examples provided.
scan_agent_configs ~296
Audit AI agent and MCP client configuration files for hardcoded secrets. Checks the project's .mcp.json, .claude/settings*.json, .cursor/mcp.json, .vscode/mcp.json, .gemini/, .codex/ and other client configs, plus agent instruction files (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules...), and the user-level configs of Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Cline, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Codex, Kiro, Continue, Zed and others. Project files report whether git tracks them: a key in a tracked .mcp.json ships with the repository. Args: project_path: Absolute path to the project to audit (optional). include_user: Also scan configs in the user's home folder (default true). include_transcripts: Also scan the newest Claude Code / Codex session transcripts (default false; slower). max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first. Returns: The standard redacted report plus "agent_files": [{"client", "scope", "path", "findings", "tracked_by_git", "hint"}] for every file found.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| include_transcripts | boolean | – | – |
| include_user | boolean | – | – |
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| project_path | – | – | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_files | array | yes | – |
| baselined | – | – | – |
| clean | boolean | yes | – |
| counts_by_pattern | – | – | – |
| counts_by_severity | – | – | – |
| files_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| suppressed | – | – | – |
| top_files | – | – | – |
| total_findings | – | – | – |
| truncated | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
scan_directory ~203
Recursively scan a directory tree for exposed secrets. Inside a git repository the file list comes from git (tracked files plus untracked files no .gitignore excludes), so every ignore rule is honoured. Always skips .git, node_modules, virtualenvs, caches, dist, build, minified bundles, lockfiles, binaries, files over 5 MB and the paths the project's .secret-sentinel.toml excludes. Args: path: Absolute path to the directory to scan. max_files: Stop after scanning this many files (default 500). max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first (default 200, 0 = no limit). Returns: The standard redacted findings report; finding paths are relative to the scanned root, using forward slashes.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_files | integer | – | – |
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| path | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| baselined | – | – | – |
| clean | boolean | yes | – |
| counts_by_pattern | – | – | – |
| counts_by_severity | – | – | – |
| files_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| suppressed | – | – | – |
| top_files | – | – | – |
| total_findings | – | – | – |
| truncated | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
scan_file ~157
Scan a single file for exposed secrets. UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32 text is decoded by byte-order mark. Binary files (null-byte heuristic) and files larger than 5 MB are skipped and reported as such in the summary. The project's .secret-sentinel.toml and baseline apply. Args: path: Absolute path to the file to scan. max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first (default 200, 0 = no limit). Returns: The standard redacted findings report (see scan_text). Returns an error result if the file does not exist.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| path | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| baselined | – | – | – |
| clean | boolean | yes | – |
| counts_by_pattern | – | – | – |
| counts_by_severity | – | – | – |
| files_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| suppressed | – | – | – |
| top_files | – | – | – |
| total_findings | – | – | – |
| truncated | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
scan_git_history ~209
Scan the lines added by the most recent commits (git log -p). Each finding is tagged with the short hash of the commit that introduced it. A secret that was later deleted is still reported — history retains it, so the credential must be rotated regardless. Args: repo_path: Absolute path to a git repository (or any path inside one). max_commits: How many commits back to inspect (default 50). all_branches: Walk every branch, tag and the stash instead of only the history of HEAD (default false). max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first (default 200, 0 = no limit). Returns: The standard redacted findings report, with a "commit" field on each finding.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| all_branches | boolean | – | – |
| max_commits | integer | – | – |
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| repo_path | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| baselined | – | – | – |
| clean | boolean | yes | – |
| counts_by_pattern | – | – | – |
| counts_by_severity | – | – | – |
| files_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| suppressed | – | – | – |
| top_files | – | – | – |
| total_findings | – | – | – |
| truncated | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
scan_git_range ~250
Scan the commits in base..head: by default, what `git push` would send. Run this before pushing. With the defaults it scans every commit on the current branch that its upstream does not have yet. If the branch has no upstream, the error says so: pass the branch you will push to as base (for example "origin/main"). Args: repo_path: Absolute path to a git repository (or any path inside one). base: Commits reachable from here are excluded (default "@{upstream}"). head: Last commit to include (default "HEAD"). max_commits: Scan at most this many of the newest commits in the range. max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first (default 200, 0 = no limit). Returns: The standard redacted findings report with a "commit" field on each finding, plus "commits_scanned" and "range".
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| base | string | – | – |
| head | string | – | – |
| max_commits | integer | – | – |
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| repo_path | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| baselined | – | – | – |
| clean | boolean | yes | – |
| commits_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| counts_by_pattern | – | – | – |
| counts_by_severity | – | – | – |
| files_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| range | string | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| suppressed | – | – | – |
| top_files | – | – | – |
| total_findings | – | – | – |
| truncated | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
scan_git_staged ~178
Scan ONLY the lines currently staged for commit (git diff --cached). This is the pre-commit checkpoint: it inspects exactly the content the next commit would publish, and reports the file and post-commit line number of every added secret. Local diff settings (external diff tools, textconv filters, prefixes, path quoting) are overridden, and git runs no configured programs. Args: repo_path: Absolute path to a git repository (or any path inside one). max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first (default 200, 0 = no limit). Returns: The standard redacted findings report. If nothing is staged the result is clean with an explanatory summary.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| repo_path | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| baselined | – | – | – |
| clean | boolean | yes | – |
| counts_by_pattern | – | – | – |
| counts_by_severity | – | – | – |
| files_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| suppressed | – | – | – |
| top_files | – | – | – |
| total_findings | – | – | – |
| truncated | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
scan_text ~462
Scan a snippet of text or code for exposed secrets. 64 detectors: GitHub/GitLab/npm/PyPI tokens; OpenAI, Anthropic, xAI, DeepSeek, Perplexity, OpenRouter, Groq, NVIDIA, Hugging Face, Replicate, Together, Cerebras, LangSmith, Langfuse, Pinecone, Firecrawl and Tavily keys; AWS (incl. Bedrock), Azure, Google, DigitalOcean, Cloudflare, Vercel, Supabase, Neon, PlanetScale, Fly.io, Databricks, Vault and Doppler credentials; Stripe, Square, Shopify, SendGrid, Resend, Mailchimp, Twilio, Slack, Discord, Telegram, Linear, Notion, Atlassian, Postman, Sentry, Grafana and PostHog tokens; JWTs, private and age keys, credentialed connection strings and URLs, generic password/secret/token assignments, plus high-entropy strings. Placeholders ($VAR, ${VAR}, {{ templates }}, changeme, masked values...) are skipped, and a line carrying "secret-sentinel: ignore", "pragma: allowlist secret" or "gitleaks:allow" is counted in "suppressed" instead of reported. Args: text: The raw text to scan (code, config, diff output, logs...). source_name: Label used in each finding's "file" field. max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first (default 200, 0 = no limit). When capped, the result adds truncated, total_findings, counts_by_severity, counts_by_pattern and top_files. Returns: {"clean", "findings": [{"file", "line", "pattern", "severity", "redacted", "advice"}], "files_scanned", "summary"}. Secret values are ALWAYS redacted (at most 4 chars, never more than a quarter of the value, + length); the full value is never included.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_findings | integer | – | – |
| source_name | string | – | – |
| text | string | yes | – |
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| baselined | – | – | – |
| clean | boolean | yes | – |
| counts_by_pattern | – | – | – |
| counts_by_severity | – | – | – |
| files_scanned | integer | yes | – |
| findings | array | yes | – |
| summary | string | yes | – |
| suppressed | – | – | – |
| top_files | – | – | – |
| total_findings | – | – | – |
| truncated | – | – | – |
No examples provided.
How do I install the Secret Sentinel MCP server?
Secret Sentinel runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx mcp-secret-sentinel. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
pypi · mcp-secret-sentinel
claude mcp add alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel -- uvx mcp-secret-sentinel
What is the Secret Sentinel MCP server?
Secret Sentinel is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.AleBrito124356/mcp-secret-sentinel. Local secret guardrails: scan code, git changes and MCP configs for API keys; redact text. This page covers its PyPI package (mcp-secret-sentinel).
Is the Secret Sentinel MCP server safe to use?
Secret Sentinel scores 64 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 4 November 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the Secret Sentinel MCP server expose?
Secret Sentinel exposes 9 tools: scan_text, redact_text, scan_file, scan_directory, scan_git_staged, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,959 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Is the Secret Sentinel MCP server still maintained?
Secret Sentinel is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 4 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What licence is the Secret Sentinel MCP server under?
Secret Sentinel declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.