# Secret Sentinel (pypi · mcp-secret-sentinel)

Local secret guardrails: scan code, git changes and MCP configs for API keys; redact text

- Trust score: 79/100 (medium)
- Change this week: +15
- Registry status: active
- Liveness: live
- Owner verified: no
- Last scored: 2026-11-05

## Components

- pypi · `mcp-secret-sentinel`: 79/100 (this document), [markdown](https://verifymcp.io/servers/alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel/mcp-secret-sentinel.md), [page](https://verifymcp.io/servers/alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel/mcp-secret-sentinel)

## Channel facts

- Registry: `pypi`
- Package: `mcp-secret-sentinel`
- Version: `0.3.0`
- Transport: `stdio`

## Trust breakdown

How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically from public evidence about the published package, including repeated runs of it in an isolated sandbox, and we only credit what we can confirm. Scores are 0–100 per category. Scoring method: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring (what has changed: https://verifymcp.io/docs/scoring/changelog)

Scored 2026-11-05.

- **Supply Chain Security**: 100/100
  - No malware found by supply-chain analysis.
  - No known CVEs affecting this package version or its production dependencies.
  - Runs hatchling.build at install time, a recognised build step with no custom scripting around it.
  - 1 of 29 dependencies flagged as unhealthy.
- **Provenance & Transparency**: 97/100
  - Source repository is publicly reachable at the declared URL.
  - Cryptographically verified build provenance (signed, bound to AleBrito124356/mcp-secret-sentinel).
  - Clear OSI-approved license (MIT).
  - Actively maintained (last published 16 days ago).
  - Disclosure check failed: no security disclosure policy was found in the source repository.
- **Schema Quality & AI Usability**: 75/100
  - 100% of prompts and resources have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the item's name).
  - AI-judged instruction clarity (good).
  - Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 2095 tokens (~209/item across 10 items; 9 tools + 1 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params.
  - Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples.
- **Stability & Change Management**: 0/100
  - Stability not yet verified: not enough scan history yet (needs a 30-day window).
- **Tool Coverage**: 71/100
  - 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).
  - 0% of tool parameters carry a description.
  - Structured output schemas are declared (89% of tools); any adoption earns full credit.
- **Tool Safety**: 100/100
  - No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.
  - We read all 9 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.
  - An AI judge read all 11 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.
- **Capabilities**: 100/100
  - Implements a current MCP spec version (2026-07-28).

**Unverified: 1 category.** A category scored 0 because we could not verify it: a data source with nothing on this package, evidence we could not reach, or a check we could not run. We only credit what we can confirm.

## Install

### How do I install the Secret Sentinel MCP server?

Secret Sentinel runs locally as a PyPI package, launched with uvx mcp-secret-sentinel. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.

### Claude

```bash
claude mcp add alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel -- uvx mcp-secret-sentinel
```

### Cursor

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "mcp-secret-sentinel"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### VS Code

```json
{
  "servers": {
    "alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "mcp-secret-sentinel"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### Codex

```bash
codex mcp add alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel -- uvx mcp-secret-sentinel
```

### opencode

```json
{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel": {
      "type": "local",
      "command": [
        "uvx",
        "mcp-secret-sentinel"
      ],
      "enabled": true
    }
  }
}
```

### OpenClaw

```bash
openclaw mcp add alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel --command uvx --arg mcp-secret-sentinel
```

### Hermes

```yaml
mcp_servers:
  alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel:
    command: "uvx"
    args: ["mcp-secret-sentinel"]
```

### Netclaw

```json
{
  "McpServers": {
    "alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel": {
      "Transport": "stdio",
      "Command": "uvx",
      "Arguments": [
        "mcp-secret-sentinel"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

### Vellum

```bash
assistant mcp add alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel -t stdio -c uvx -a mcp-secret-sentinel
```

### Other

```json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": [
        "mcp-secret-sentinel"
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## Changelog

Every change recorded for this component, newest first. Days that predate change tracking, or that we cannot explain, say so: "we were watching and nothing happened" and "we were not watching" are different claims.

### 2026-11-05 (score 79, +15)

- [security improvement] Malware scan: unverified → pass

### 2026-11-03 (score 64, −15)

- [security regression] Malware scan: pass → unverified

### 2026-10-31 (score 79, +15)

- [security improvement] Malware scan: unverified → pass

### 2026-10-29 (score 64, −15)

- [security regression] Malware scan: pass → unverified

### 2026-10-27 (score 79, +15)

- [security improvement] Malware scan: unverified → pass

### 2026-10-26 (score 64, −15)

- [security regression] Malware scan: pass → unverified

### 2026-10-25 (score 79, +15)

- [security improvement] Malware scan: unverified → pass

### 2026-10-23 (score 64, −15)

- [security regression] Malware scan: pass → unverified

## MCP tools (9)

### `scan_text` (~462 tokens)

Scan a snippet of text or code for exposed secrets.

64 detectors: GitHub/GitLab/npm/PyPI tokens; OpenAI, Anthropic, xAI,
DeepSeek, Perplexity, OpenRouter, Groq, NVIDIA, Hugging Face, Replicate,
Together, Cerebras, LangSmith, Langfuse, Pinecone, Firecrawl and Tavily
keys; AWS (incl. Bedrock), Azure, Google, DigitalOcean, Cloudflare,
Vercel, Supabase, Neon, PlanetScale, Fly.io, Databricks, Vault and
Doppler credentials; Stripe, Square, Shopify, SendGrid, Resend,
Mailchimp, Twilio, Slack, Discord, Telegram, Linear, Notion, Atlassian,
Postman, Sentry, Grafana and PostHog tokens; JWTs, private and age keys,
credentialed connection strings and URLs, generic password/secret/token
assignments, plus high-entropy strings. Placeholders ($VAR, ${VAR},
{{ templates }}, changeme, masked values...) are skipped, and a line
carrying "secret-sentinel: ignore", "pragma: allowlist secret" or
"gitleaks:allow" is counted in "suppressed" instead of reported.

Args:
    text: The raw text to scan (code, config, diff output, logs...).
    source_name: Label used in each finding's "file" field.
    max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first
        (default 200, 0 = no limit). When capped, the result adds
        truncated, total_findings, counts_by_severity, counts_by_pattern
        and top_files.

Returns:
    {"clean", "findings": [{"file", "line", "pattern", "severity",
    "redacted", "advice"}], "files_scanned", "summary"}. Secret values
    are ALWAYS redacted (at most 4 chars, never more than a quarter of
    the value, + length); the full value is never included.

Input parameters:

- `max_findings` (integer)
- `source_name` (string)
- `text` (string, required)

Output parameters:

- `baselined`
- `clean` (boolean)
- `counts_by_pattern`
- `counts_by_severity`
- `files_scanned` (integer)
- `findings` (array)
- `summary` (string)
- `suppressed`
- `top_files`
- `total_findings`
- `truncated`

### `redact_text` (~130 tokens)

Return the text with every detected secret replaced by [REDACTED:<detector>].

Use it before quoting logs, stack traces, configs, command output or
diffs that may contain credentials, in the conversation, an issue, a
commit message or a document. Everything that is not a secret is kept
exactly as it was.

Args:
    text: The text to clean.

Returns:
    {"text": the redacted text, "redactions": how many secrets were
    replaced, "by_pattern": {detector name: count}}

Input parameters:

- `text` (string, required)

Output parameters:

- `by_pattern` (object)
- `redactions` (integer)
- `text` (string)

### `scan_file` (~157 tokens)

Scan a single file for exposed secrets.

UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32 text is decoded by byte-order mark. Binary files
(null-byte heuristic) and files larger than 5 MB are skipped and reported
as such in the summary. The project's .secret-sentinel.toml and baseline
apply.

Args:
    path: Absolute path to the file to scan.
    max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first
        (default 200, 0 = no limit).

Returns:
    The standard redacted findings report (see scan_text). Returns an
    error result if the file does not exist.

Input parameters:

- `max_findings` (integer)
- `path` (string, required)

Output parameters:

- `baselined`
- `clean` (boolean)
- `counts_by_pattern`
- `counts_by_severity`
- `files_scanned` (integer)
- `findings` (array)
- `summary` (string)
- `suppressed`
- `top_files`
- `total_findings`
- `truncated`

### `scan_directory` (~203 tokens)

Recursively scan a directory tree for exposed secrets.

Inside a git repository the file list comes from git (tracked files plus
untracked files no .gitignore excludes), so every ignore rule is
honoured. Always skips .git, node_modules, virtualenvs, caches, dist,
build, minified bundles, lockfiles, binaries, files over 5 MB and the
paths the project's .secret-sentinel.toml excludes.

Args:
    path: Absolute path to the directory to scan.
    max_files: Stop after scanning this many files (default 500).
    max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first
        (default 200, 0 = no limit).

Returns:
    The standard redacted findings report; finding paths are relative to
    the scanned root, using forward slashes.

Input parameters:

- `max_files` (integer)
- `max_findings` (integer)
- `path` (string, required)

Output parameters:

- `baselined`
- `clean` (boolean)
- `counts_by_pattern`
- `counts_by_severity`
- `files_scanned` (integer)
- `findings` (array)
- `summary` (string)
- `suppressed`
- `top_files`
- `total_findings`
- `truncated`

### `scan_git_staged` (~178 tokens)

Scan ONLY the lines currently staged for commit (git diff --cached).

This is the pre-commit checkpoint: it inspects exactly the content the
next commit would publish, and reports the file and post-commit line
number of every added secret. Local diff settings (external diff tools,
textconv filters, prefixes, path quoting) are overridden, and git runs
no configured programs.

Args:
    repo_path: Absolute path to a git repository (or any path inside one).
    max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first
        (default 200, 0 = no limit).

Returns:
    The standard redacted findings report. If nothing is staged the result
    is clean with an explanatory summary.

Input parameters:

- `max_findings` (integer)
- `repo_path` (string, required)

Output parameters:

- `baselined`
- `clean` (boolean)
- `counts_by_pattern`
- `counts_by_severity`
- `files_scanned` (integer)
- `findings` (array)
- `summary` (string)
- `suppressed`
- `top_files`
- `total_findings`
- `truncated`

### `scan_git_history` (~209 tokens)

Scan the lines added by the most recent commits (git log -p).

Each finding is tagged with the short hash of the commit that introduced
it. A secret that was later deleted is still reported — history retains
it, so the credential must be rotated regardless.

Args:
    repo_path: Absolute path to a git repository (or any path inside one).
    max_commits: How many commits back to inspect (default 50).
    all_branches: Walk every branch, tag and the stash instead of only
        the history of HEAD (default false).
    max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first
        (default 200, 0 = no limit).

Returns:
    The standard redacted findings report, with a "commit" field on each
    finding.

Input parameters:

- `all_branches` (boolean)
- `max_commits` (integer)
- `max_findings` (integer)
- `repo_path` (string, required)

Output parameters:

- `baselined`
- `clean` (boolean)
- `counts_by_pattern`
- `counts_by_severity`
- `files_scanned` (integer)
- `findings` (array)
- `summary` (string)
- `suppressed`
- `top_files`
- `total_findings`
- `truncated`

### `scan_git_range` (~250 tokens)

Scan the commits in base..head: by default, what `git push` would send.

Run this before pushing. With the defaults it scans every commit on the
current branch that its upstream does not have yet. If the branch has no
upstream, the error says so: pass the branch you will push to as base
(for example "origin/main").

Args:
    repo_path: Absolute path to a git repository (or any path inside one).
    base: Commits reachable from here are excluded (default "@{upstream}").
    head: Last commit to include (default "HEAD").
    max_commits: Scan at most this many of the newest commits in the range.
    max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first
        (default 200, 0 = no limit).

Returns:
    The standard redacted findings report with a "commit" field on each
    finding, plus "commits_scanned" and "range".

Input parameters:

- `base` (string)
- `head` (string)
- `max_commits` (integer)
- `max_findings` (integer)
- `repo_path` (string, required)

Output parameters:

- `baselined`
- `clean` (boolean)
- `commits_scanned` (integer)
- `counts_by_pattern`
- `counts_by_severity`
- `files_scanned` (integer)
- `findings` (array)
- `range` (string)
- `summary` (string)
- `suppressed`
- `top_files`
- `total_findings`
- `truncated`

### `scan_agent_configs` (~296 tokens)

Audit AI agent and MCP client configuration files for hardcoded secrets.

Checks the project's .mcp.json, .claude/settings*.json, .cursor/mcp.json,
.vscode/mcp.json, .gemini/, .codex/ and other client configs, plus agent
instruction files (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules...),
and the user-level configs of Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor,
VS Code, Cline, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Codex, Kiro, Continue, Zed and
others. Project files report whether git tracks them: a key in a
tracked .mcp.json ships with the repository.

Args:
    project_path: Absolute path to the project to audit (optional).
    include_user: Also scan configs in the user's home folder (default true).
    include_transcripts: Also scan the newest Claude Code / Codex session
        transcripts (default false; slower).
    max_findings: List at most this many findings, most severe first.

Returns:
    The standard redacted report plus "agent_files": [{"client", "scope",
    "path", "findings", "tracked_by_git", "hint"}] for every file found.

Input parameters:

- `include_transcripts` (boolean)
- `include_user` (boolean)
- `max_findings` (integer)
- `project_path`

Output parameters:

- `agent_files` (array)
- `baselined`
- `clean` (boolean)
- `counts_by_pattern`
- `counts_by_severity`
- `files_scanned` (integer)
- `findings` (array)
- `summary` (string)
- `suppressed`
- `top_files`
- `total_findings`
- `truncated`

### `list_patterns` (~74 tokens)

List the active secret detectors and allowlist rules.

Returns:
    {"count": int,
     "patterns": [{"name", "severity", "advice"}],
     "entropy_detector": {...threshold and advice...},
     "allowlist_rules": [{"name", "description"}]}
    Raw regexes are intentionally not exposed.

## Diagnostics

Captured diagnostic sections: Provenance, Install scripts, Dependencies. The full working is on the page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel/mcp-secret-sentinel#diagnostics

## Score history

- 2026-11-05: 79
- 2026-11-04: 64
- 2026-11-03: 64
- 2026-11-02: 79
- 2026-11-01: 79
- 2026-10-31: 79
- 2026-10-30: 64
- 2026-10-29: 64
- 2026-10-28: 79
- 2026-10-27: 79
- 2026-10-26: 64
- 2026-10-25: 79
- 2026-10-24: 64
- 2026-10-23: 64
- 2026-10-22: 79
- 2026-10-21: 64
- 2026-10-20: 64
- 2026-10-19: 64

## Common questions

### What is the Secret Sentinel MCP server?

Secret Sentinel is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as io.github.AleBrito124356/mcp-secret-sentinel. Local secret guardrails: scan code, git changes and MCP configs for API keys; redact text. This page covers its PyPI package (mcp-secret-sentinel).

### Is the Secret Sentinel MCP server safe to use?

Secret Sentinel scores 79 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. We found no known CVEs affecting it as of 5 November 2026. Its build provenance is signed and verified. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.

### What tools does the Secret Sentinel MCP server expose?

Secret Sentinel exposes 9 tools: scan_text, redact_text, scan_file, scan_directory, scan_git_staged, and 4 more. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 1,959 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.

### Is the Secret Sentinel MCP server still maintained?

Secret Sentinel is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 5 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.

### What licence is the Secret Sentinel MCP server under?

Secret Sentinel declares the MIT licence, which is OSI-approved. That covers the source only, and says nothing about the cost of any service it calls.

### What did VerifyMCP test on the Secret Sentinel MCP server?

VerifyMCP ran 15 checks on Secret Sentinel, covering Malware scan, Known CVEs, Install scripts, Dependency health and 11 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about Secret Sentinel: Stability. One category scores 0 for that reason, because we only credit what we can confirm. Endpoint Security and Transport & Reachability do not apply to a PyPI package, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.

## Links

- PyPI project: https://pypi.org/project/mcp-secret-sentinel/
- Socket report: https://socket.dev/pypi/package/mcp-secret-sentinel
- Repository: https://github.com/AleBrito124356/mcp-secret-sentinel
- Changelog RSS feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel/mcp-secret-sentinel.xml
- Changelog JSON feed: https://verifymcp.io/servers/alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel/mcp-secret-sentinel/changelog.json
- Trust report (JSON): https://verifymcp.io/servers/alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel/mcp-secret-sentinel.json
- HTML version of this page: https://verifymcp.io/servers/alebrito124356-mcp-secret-sentinel/mcp-secret-sentinel