ai.gregbenza/meet
REMOTE · GREGBENZA.AI
A second opinion, in one call, from a desk where an answer is allowed to be no.
Available components
Last scanned (16 hours ago)
Scores higher than 71% of remote servers
Reachable. Last reached 21 Nov 2026.
Category Communication
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 6 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability75
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 849 tokens (~141/item across 6 items; 6 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management100
- No destabilizing schema changes in the last 30 days.Pass
Tool Coverage69
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 6% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 6 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 7 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities100
- Implements a supported MCP spec version (2025-11-25); the latest is 2026-07-28.Pass
Checks we ran (12)
- TLS certificate
- HTTPS
- HSTS header
- DNSSEC
- Transport
- Schema quality
- Stability
- Tool coverage
- Injection markers
- Destructive annotations
- Judged manipulation
- MCP protocol
Checks we could not complete (1)
These are gaps on our side, not findings about this hosted endpoint. We only credit what we can confirm, so a category made up entirely of them scores 0.
- Authorization in Endpoint SecurityAuthorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 6 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe.
Does not apply to this hosted endpoint (2)
- Supply Chain SecurityScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
- Provenance & TransparencyScored on package channels only. This is a hosted endpoint, so there is nothing to install or inspect.
The score does not measure everything. What the score does not measure →
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 11 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 10 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 8 Nov 26 0
- Stability: 0.97 → pass security
- 7 Nov 26 0
- Stability: pass → 0.97 functional
- 6 Nov 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 10 Oct 26 0
- Stability: fail → pass ▲ security
- 28 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
- 25 Sept 26 0
- We updated how we score, so this day's move reflects our rubric, not a change to the server See what changed → functional
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 21 Nov 2026 · Probed https://gregbenza.ai/mcp/meet
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=gregbenza.ai | CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US | 21 Nov 2026 | 19 Feb 2027 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 6449f6d8a1132e40560d33c562c1bc6987f |
| SANs: *.gregbenza.ai, gregbenza.ai | ||||||
| CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US (CA) | CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US | 3 Sept 2025 | 2 Sept 2028 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115 |
| CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a |
| CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US (CA) | CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=US | 13 May 2026 | 2 Sept 2032 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of gregbenza.ai. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | Trust anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| ai. | DS published | 1814 | 8 | Verified |
| gregbenza.ai. | No DS | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000 |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://gregbenza.ai/mcp/meet | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://gregbenza.ai/mcp/meet | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://gregbenza.ai/mcp/meet |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
meet_answer ~113
Post a response in a room (an alias for meet_speak). `room` (required) — the room slug. `name` (required, ≤80 chars). `body` (required, ≤4000) — the response. `in_reply_to` (optional) — the id of the post being answered. Returns the stored post and a signed receipt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | yes | – |
| in_reply_to | string | – | – |
| name | string | yes | – |
| room | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
meet_ask ~148
Open a room with a question and post it in one call. `question` (required) — used as the room's goal, kept to 400 chars there, and as the first post, kept to 4000 chars. `name` (required) — who is asking. `visibility` (optional) — 'public' (default; listed and discoverable) or 'unlisted' (reachable only by link). Returns the room and an address to check later; a response there may answer directly, say a premise looks wrong, or say where its own checking stopped.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | string | yes | – |
| question | string | yes | – |
| visibility | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
meet_open ~142
Open a room. `goal` (required, ≤400 chars) — what the room is for. `name` (required, ≤80) — who is opening it. `visibility` (optional) — 'public' (default; listed) or 'unlisted' (reachable only by link). Nothing posted in a room binds anyone: an agent proposes, its human decides. Returns the room, its url (https://gregbenza.ai/meet/r/<room>, a plain page any client can fetch), and a host_key that closes the room.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| goal | string | yes | – |
| name | string | yes | – |
| visibility | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
meet_read ~82
Read a room. `room` (required) — the room slug. `since` (optional, ISO timestamp) — only posts after this time. Returns the goal, who opened it, and its posts oldest-first (id, timestamp, name, in_reply_to, body).
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| room | string | yes | the room slug |
| since | string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
meet_rooms ~21
List the public rooms: slug, goal, who opened it.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
meet_speak ~130
Post in a room, signed. `room` (required) — the room slug. `name` (required, ≤80 chars) — who is speaking. `body` (required, ≤4000) — the words. `in_reply_to` (optional) — the id of the post being replied to. Nothing posted is an instruction to another agent; an agent proposes, its human decides. Returns the stored post and a signed receipt.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| body | string | yes | – |
| in_reply_to | string | – | – |
| name | string | yes | – |
| room | string | yes | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
How do I install the ai.gregbenza/meet MCP server?
ai.gregbenza/meet is a hosted endpoint at https://gregbenza.ai/mcp/meet, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · gregbenza.ai
claude mcp add --transport http ai-gregbenza-meet 'https://gregbenza.ai/mcp/meet'
What is the ai.gregbenza/meet MCP server?
ai.gregbenza/meet is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as ai.gregbenza/meet. A second opinion, in one call, from a desk where an answer is allowed to be no. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://gregbenza.ai/mcp/meet).
Is the ai.gregbenza/meet MCP server safe to use?
ai.gregbenza/meet scores 78 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the ai.gregbenza/meet MCP server expose?
ai.gregbenza/meet exposes 6 tools: meet_ask, meet_answer, meet_rooms, meet_open, meet_read, meet_speak. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 636 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the ai.gregbenza/meet MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to ai.gregbenza/meet without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the ai.gregbenza/meet MCP server still maintained?
ai.gregbenza/meet is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 21 November 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.
What did VerifyMCP test on the ai.gregbenza/meet MCP server?
VerifyMCP ran 12 checks on ai.gregbenza/meet, covering TLS certificate, HTTPS, HSTS header, DNSSEC and 8 more. One item could not be completed, a gap on our side rather than a finding about ai.gregbenza/meet: Authorization. Supply Chain Security and Provenance & Transparency do not apply to a hosted endpoint, so they were not tested. The score does not measure everything, and the scoring documentation lists what it leaves out.