SignatureForever
REMOTE · SIGNATUREFOREVER.COM · SCANNED SEP 20
Audit and build email signatures that survive Gmail, Outlook desktop and Apple Mail.
Available components
How this component scores in each security and reliability category. Every signal is checked automatically against the live server, and we only credit what we can confirm. How we score → Why this is hard to score →
Endpoint Security63
- The endpoint's TLS certificate is valid, in date, and uses a strong key. View diagnostics → Pass
- Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 5 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Unverified
- HTTPS is enforced; there's no plaintext access path. View diagnostics → Pass
- The HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security) header is present. View diagnostics → Pass
- DNSSEC check failed: this domain isn't protected by DNSSEC. See how to fix → View diagnostics → Fail
Transport & Reachability100
- Verified streamable-http transport via a live MCP handshake. View diagnostics → Pass
Schema Quality & AI Usability77
- AI-judged instruction clarity (excellent).Pass
- Context-footprint check failed: tool/resource definitions use about 699 tokens (~139/item across 5 items; 5 tools + 0 resources), over budget; trim descriptions and params. See how to fix → Fail
- Usage-examples check failed: none of the tools include examples. See how to fix → Fail
Stability & Change Management33
- Stability observed for 10 of 30 days with no destabilising changes; credit accrues until the full window elapses.Partial
Tool Coverage83
- 100% of tools have a non-trivial description (not blank, and not just the tool's name).Pass
- 50% of tool parameters carry a description.Partial
Tool Safety100
- No prompt-injection markers were found in the server instructions, tool names or descriptions we captured.Pass
- We read all 5 captured tool definition(s), and no name or description among them implies an irreversible operation.Pass
- An AI judge read all 6 captured unit(s) of tool text and found none that tries to manipulate the model reading it.Pass
Capabilities60
- Spec-recency check failed: implements MCP spec 2025-06-18; the latest is 2026-07-28. See how to fix → Fail
How do I install the SignatureForever MCP server?
SignatureForever is a hosted endpoint at https://signatureforever.com/mcp, so there is nothing to install locally. Ready-made configuration for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codex and 5 more is on this page, copied from each client's own documentation.
remote · signatureforever.com
claude mcp add --transport http com-signatureforever-email-signatures 'https://signatureforever.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-signatureforever-email-signatures": {
"url": "https://signatureforever.com/mcp"
}
}
} {
"servers": {
"com-signatureforever-email-signatures": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://signatureforever.com/mcp"
}
}
} [mcp_servers.com-signatureforever-email-signatures] url = "https://signatureforever.com/mcp"
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"mcp": {
"com-signatureforever-email-signatures": {
"type": "remote",
"url": "https://signatureforever.com/mcp",
"enabled": true
}
}
} openclaw mcp add com-signatureforever-email-signatures --url 'https://signatureforever.com/mcp' --transport streamable-http
mcp_servers:
com-signatureforever-email-signatures:
url: "https://signatureforever.com/mcp" {
"McpServers": {
"com-signatureforever-email-signatures": {
"Transport": "http",
"Url": "https://signatureforever.com/mcp"
}
}
} assistant mcp add com-signatureforever-email-signatures -t streamable-http -u 'https://signatureforever.com/mcp'
{
"mcpServers": {
"com-signatureforever-email-signatures": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://signatureforever.com/mcp"
}
}
} The mcpServers block is a cross-client convention. Remote transports vary, so check your client's docs.
Every change we have recorded for this component, newest first. Security-relevant changes are always shown. ▲ marks a change for the better, ▼ a change for the worse; unmarked changes are neutral.
- 20 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 30 to 33. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 9 days of observed history at the previous scan, 10 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 18 Sept 26 +48
- HTTPS: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Injection markers: unverified → pass ▲ security
- Transport: fail → pass ▲ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to call this server, and 5 tool(s) never declared a destructiveHint. The MCP spec treats an absent hint as destructive by default, so we cannot call this surface safe. security
- MCP protocol: unverified → fail ▼ functional
- Endpoint reachability: not serving MCP → reachable ▲ functional
- Tool coverage: unverified → 100 ▲ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.27 ▲ functional
- 17 Sept 26 −47
- Endpoint reachability: reachable → not serving MCP ▼ security
- Tool safety: pass → unverified ▼ security
- HTTPS: pass → unverified ▼ security
- Stability: 0.20 → unverified ▼ security
- Transport: pass → fail ▼ security
- Authorization: Authorisation not fully verified: no authorisation is required to connect, but we couldn't read the tool list to see what that exposes. security
- Capabilities: fail → unverified ▼ functional
- Tool coverage: 100 → unverified ▼ functional
- First check of Schema quality: unverified functional
- 16 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 17 to 20. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 5 days of observed history at the previous scan, 6 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 13 Sept 26 +1
No change was recorded against any check on this day. Stability & Change Management went from 7 to 10. That category is still filling its 30-day observation window: 2 days of observed history at the previous scan, 3 at this one. The score rises as the window fills, whether or not the server changes.
- 11 Sept 26 −1
- MCP protocol: pass → fail ▼ functional
- Stability: unverified → 0.03 ▲ functional
- MCP protocol version: 2026-07-28 → 2025-06-18 functional
- 10 Sept 26 66
First indexed and scored.
Diagnostic detail from the automated scan of this channel: what the scanner observed at each step, so you can see exactly where a check passed or failed. It is informational only and never changes the trust score.
Captured 20 Sept 2026 · Probed https://signatureforever.com/mcp
TLS valid
Negotiated TLS 1.3 with TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 .
| Subject | Issuer | Valid from | Valid until | Key | Signature | Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN=signatureforever.com | CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US | 17 Sept 2026 | 16 Dec 2026 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA256 | 6dd7a7642cdde6f41331dac93a706f94 |
| SANs: signatureforever.com | ||||||
| CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US (CA) | CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US | 13 Dec 2023 | 20 Feb 2029 | ECDSA 256 | ECDSA-SHA384 | 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3 |
| CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=US (CA) | CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE | 15 Nov 2023 | 28 Jan 2028 | ECDSA 384 | SHA256-RSA | 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b |
Background: What to check on a remote MCP endpoint →
DNSSEC insecure
Validation of signatureforever.com. — Not signed
| Zone | DS | Keys | Algorithms | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | trust_anchor | 20326, 38696 | 8, 8 | Verified |
| com. | present | 19718 | 13 | Verified |
| signatureforever.com. | absent | Unsigned (proven) parent-signed NSEC/NSEC3 proves an unsigned delegation |
Authentication No authorisation required
The endpoint answered without asking for a token. Anyone who knows the URL can reach it.
| Result | No authorisation required |
|---|---|
| HTTP status | 200 |
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
| strict-transport-security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains |
| x-content-type-options | nosniff |
| referrer-policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |
Background: How OAuth 2.1 works in the 2026 MCP spec →
Transports 2 probes
| Transport | URL | Outcome | Status | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| streamable-http | https://signatureforever.com/mcp | Verified | 200 | |
| http (plaintext) | http://signatureforever.com/mcp | HTTPS enforced | 301 | https://signatureforever.com/mcp |
The tools this component advertises to a client, with an estimated token cost for each. Expand a tool to see its parameters and schema. The per-tool counts are indicative and are not scored directly; the schema's total context footprint is one signal in Schema Quality & AI Usability. A tool's description is untrusted text the model reads on every call, which is what makes this list a security surface and not just an inventory: how tool poisoning works →
check_email_signature Check an email signature for breakage ~114
Audit any email-signature HTML against what Gmail, Outlook 365, Outlook for Windows desktop, Apple Mail and iOS Mail actually do. Returns a verdict per client plus every problem found, each with the rule it breaks, why it breaks, and how to fix it. Use this when a signature renders wrong, images do not show, layout collapses in Outlook, or before sending a signature to a client. Free, no account needed.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| html | string | yes | The full HTML of the email signature to audit. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
create_email_signature Create an email signature ~263
Build ready-to-paste email-signature HTML from a person's details. The output follows every rule that keeps a signature intact in Outlook for Windows and Gmail: tables only, inline CSS, absolute pixel widths, email-safe fonts, and images by absolute URL (never base64, which Gmail refuses to render). The free result carries one small credit line at the bottom; get_pricing explains how to remove it.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| accent_color | string | – | Hex colour like #B4522F. Defaults to the SignatureForever vermilion. |
| city | string | – | City, or city and state. |
| company | string | – | – |
| string | – | – | |
| full_name | string | yes | Person's full name. Required. |
| string | – | – | |
| job_title | string | – | – |
| language | string | – | Language of the credit line. Defaults to 'en'. |
| string | – | – | |
| phone | string | – | – |
| photo_url | string | – | Absolute https URL of a photo or logo. Anything else is ignored. |
| template | string | – | Layout. Defaults to 'ficha'. Call list_signature_templates for what each one looks like. |
| website | string | – | – |
| string | – | – |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
email_client_compatibility_matrix What each email client supports ~122
The support matrix for the HTML and CSS features that decide whether an email signature survives: tables, flex/grid, <style> blocks, background-image, base64 images, border-radius, letter-spacing, text-transform, web fonts, max-width, margins and image sizing. Each row says yes/no/partial for seven real clients and explains what goes wrong. Use it to answer questions about email HTML support.
| Name | Type | Req | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| feature | string | – | Optional. Filter to rows whose feature name contains this text, e.g. 'base64' or 'font'. |
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
get_pricing Plans and prices ~55
What each SignatureForever plan includes and costs, and the link to buy. Use it when the user asks what removing the credit line costs, how many signatures a plan allows, or what happens to hosted images if they stop paying.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
list_signature_templates List available signature templates ~33
The signature layouts you can pass to create_email_signature, with what each one is good for and its width in pixels.
Input schema present but exposes no named parameters.
No output schema declared.
No examples provided.
What is the SignatureForever MCP server?
SignatureForever is an MCP server listed in the public MCP registry as com.signatureforever/email-signatures. Audit and build email signatures that survive Gmail, Outlook desktop and Apple Mail. This page covers its hosted endpoint (https://signatureforever.com/mcp).
Is the SignatureForever MCP server safe to use?
SignatureForever scores 69 out of 100 on VerifyMCP. That is a record of what we were able to check automatically, not an endorsement. The category breakdown on this page shows every signal behind the number, including the ones we could not confirm.
What tools does the SignatureForever MCP server expose?
SignatureForever exposes 5 tools: check_email_signature, email_client_compatibility_matrix, list_signature_templates, create_email_signature, get_pricing. Their descriptions and schemas cost roughly 587 tokens of context every time the server is loaded.
Does the SignatureForever MCP server require authentication?
No. We connected to SignatureForever without credentials and it answered, so anything it exposes is reachable by anyone who knows the address.
Is the SignatureForever MCP server still maintained?
SignatureForever is still listed as active in the MCP registry. We last reached this channel on 20 September 2026. Those dates come from our own scans of the registry and the channel itself, not from anything the publisher announced.